

UNCLASSIFIED

OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED

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INCLOSURES

TITLE

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| 1 | Organizational structure                    |
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| 4 | After Action Report, Battle of KONTUM       |
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[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDH-GC

21 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report -- Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) for  
Quarterly Period Ending 30 April 1968 (U)

SECTION 1 (C) OPERATIONS: SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) General.

a. During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division continued its participation in Operation MAC ARTHUR. The beginning of the reporting period saw the division engaged in its successful counteroffensive to the VC/NVA TET Truce Offensive.

b. Organizational Structure.

(1) Task organization for Operation MAC ARTHUR for the period is contained at inclosure 1.

(2) The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division returned to divisional control for the first time since its arrival in VIETNAM on 30 March 1968.

c. Commanders as of the end of the reporting period are listed at inclosure 2.

d. Mission.

(1) The general mission of the division at the end of the reporting period was to conduct surveillance and offensive operations and to provide maximum support to the Government of VIETNAM's Refugee Resettlement Program and the Revolutionary Development Program.

(2) The specific missions of the 4th Infantry Division are to:

(a) Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of the CAMBODIAN Border and destroy enemy (NVA/VC) units within the assigned area of operations.

(b) Block enemy infiltration routes from CAMBODIA/LAOS across the highlands into the coastal provinces.

(c) Conduct spoiling attacks and ambush operations.

(d) Destroy enemy base areas and supply installations.

(e) Detect and eliminate VIET CONG infrastructure.

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(f) Clear, secure and assist in the development of the Tactical Area of Responsibility.

(g) Support the Government of VIETNAM's EDAP ENANG Resettlement Program.

(h) Open, secure and maintain land lines of communication.

(i) Be prepared to deploy forces for the relief/reinforcement of Camp Strike Forces, Regional and Popular Forces, critical signal sites and sector/subsector headquarters within II Corps Tactical Zone.

(j) Provide to I Field Force, VIETNAM, a battalion size reserve, on order.

e. Operational Employment.

(1) Possible days for operations - 90

(2) Utilization.

(a) The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division had a two day deployment from LZ ENGLISH.

(b) All other units were on operational missions throughout the 90 day period.

2. (C) Intelligence.

a. General. The beginning of the reporting period saw major enemy attacks on the population centers of the area of operations during TET, with the main thrusts directed at KONTUM City, TAN CANH, PLEIKU City, and BAN ME THUOT. These attacks involved all of the major VC units in the area of operations, and the 66th, 95B, 174th, 24th, and 33d NVA Regiments. After Allied forces repulsed the TET attacks, the enemy began a period of resupply and reinforcement activity. During the remainder of the reporting period, the enemy made extensive preparations for a new offensive. Road construction, resupply and infiltration were at a high intensity through 30 April. The enemy also repositioned his forces and possibly changed subordination in some cases and introduced new units. Following TET, the 32d NVA Regiment moved from KONTUM Province down to the BAN ME THUOT area. The 174th Regiment moved to the lower KONTUM-upper PLEIKU region. The 1st NVA Division shifted from DAK TO and BEN HET to the area west of POLEI KLENG. The 320th Regiment infiltrated from LACS and joined the 1st NVA Division west of POLEI KLENG, and another large unidentified force moved into the area north of DAK PEK. PW statements, documents, agent reports, and enemy activity continued to indicate that major enemy operations would take place in May. The division had a total of 428 contacts with enemy forces of platoon size or larger.

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(1) TET offensive.

(a) The TET offensive began shortly after midnight on 30 January. The enemy's objectives were to destroy US and ARVN troops, overthrow the GVN, induce the populace to rally to the Communists, and to establish a VC controlled government. The enemy's prime targets in the cities were GVN headquarters and military installations, airstrips, and US military and advisory buildings.

The enemy did not accomplish his objectives in any of the cities he attacked. He suffered a total of 2,887 KIA. Significantly, the enemy lost a Battalion CO and the leader of VC Zone 9's Armed Propaganda Team when both were captured. Numerous irreplaceable sappers and infrastructure members were killed or captured. The GVN retained control in all cities, the ARVN defended the cities vigorously, and the populace did not rally to the VC.

(b) In early January, the first indications of an up-coming TET offensive were received. On 5 January, a document was captured that outlined the enemy plans for an offensive in the area. The focal point of the planned enemy operations was PLEIKU City and the enemy planned to cut the roads leading to the city in order to stop US reinforcement. By 21 January, prisoners-of-war and captured documents had outlined quite clearly the impending attack. The units to participate were identified and the plan of attack to include the targets and routes of advance had been disclosed. The time of attacks was reported to be between 28 and 30 January. Numerous agent reports from volunteer informants further confirmed the impending attack. Concentrated enemy automatic weapons fire and heavy readings from Airborne Personnel Detectors (Snoopy) north of PLEIKU during the week before TET confirmed the presence of enemy forces in that area and led to air strikes being directed into the area producing numerous secondary explosions. Red Haze south of PLEIKU assisted in determining the location of a local VC Battalion.

(c) The movement of the 24th NVA Regiment from their TOUMORONG base area southeast towards KONTUM City in mid-January presaged the attack on KONTUM City. A PW captured on 15 January in an ambush on Highway 14 between TAN CANH and KONTUM City identified the 24th NVA Regiment. On 24 January an informant in the KONTUM area reported enemy plans for an attack on KONTUM City similar to the one planned on PLEIKU City. The 24th NVA Regiment and the local VC battalion were identified as the participating units.

(d) The TET offensive centered around four cities in the division's area of operations beginning on 30 January.

1. TAN CANH. The 2d Battalion, 174th Regiment and local forces were responsible for the TET offensive against the KONTUM subsector Headquarters of TAN CANH. Prior to the initial attack on 30 January local VC infiltrated the city in order to start the attack from within. On 30 January the 2d Battalion, 174th NVA Regiment attacked the city joining the local VC. The targets in the city were the GVN and military buildings. The 2d Battalion,

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174th NVA Regiment suffered heavy casualties in the battle, probably running as high as 50%. One hundred and sixty-seven NVA and VC bodies were policed from the city. About 25% of the city was destroyed.

2. KONTUM City. The assault on KONTUM City began at 300200 hours January with two mortar and rocket attacks. At 0230 hours a VC element infiltrated the city targeted against major GVN buildings and the airstrip. The initial attack was repelled and enemy losses were high. By mid-morning, 31 January, Allied forces were in contact with an estimated regimental size element north of the city. During the day 23 attacks against the 24th Special Tactical Zone and the province chief's house were repelled. On 1 February attacks by fire and street fighting continued. By mid-morning US and ARVN forces had again made contact with an estimated regimental size force, believed to be the same element contacted on the 31st. On 2 February enemy units and guerrilla forces began to disperse into small groups. Twenty-two PW's and two HOI CHANH's were captured in the city during the four day period. The total body count was 1049 VC/NVA KIA in KONTUM City for the period 30 January - 4 February. Units identified in the attack were K4, K5, and K6 Battalions, 24th NVA Regiment: 304th Main Force Battalion; 406th Sapper Battalion, and guerrilla forces. Ten per cent of the city was destroyed.

3. PLEIKU City. The offensive began on the early morning of 30 January with mortar attacks on New PLEIKU airfield, the 3d ARVN Cavalry compound, Camp Holloway, and a 122mm rocket attack (12 rockets) on the 71st Evacuation Hospital. Following the mortar attack small arms, machine guns, automatic weapons fire, and satchel charges were utilized in ground assaults on most installations throughout the city. After heavy fighting in the downtown area the enemy withdrew to the southwest. There were no major incidents on 31 January until 2200 hours when the enemy advanced from the northeast. The assault was driven back with the aid of gunships and artillery. On 1 February a mortar attack against Camp Holloway was initiated in the early morning followed by a ground attack. The enemy was able to breach the perimeter setting a POL truck on fire and wounding five US personnel. Southwest of PLEIKU City on 1 February, local forces made a limited attack on THANH AN District Headquarters, resulting in ten VC KIA and 23 VC CIA. Later the same day, five kilometers southeast of THANH AN, Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry contacted an unknown size force, probably a local unit, killing 200 enemy. On 2 February Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry contacted an unidentified local force unit southeast of the city, killing 14 enemy and capturing one. Also, on 2 February in mid-afternoon, the 3d ARVN Cavalry Regiment contacted elements of the H-15 VC Battalion two kilometers southwest of PLEIKU as it was preparing to attack the city. Results were 140 enemy KIA and the Battalion Commander captured. Mortar attacks resumed during the early morning of 3 February. Rounds were reported falling on the east side of the city; Camp Holloway received five rounds setting the POL area on fire, and LE CHI also received an attack. Units identified in ground assaults on PLEIKU City

4/95B

24+25 Jan

MORTAR  
ATK

408th SAPPER BN

25-28 JAN

N

Highway  
19 North

PLEIKU  
CITY

Highway 509

Highway 19E


200 ARMY BN

27-31 JAN


H-15 LOCAL FORCE BN

28 JAN - 2 FEB

ADVANCE of MAJOR  
ENEMY UNITS ON  
PLEIKU CITY AREA during  
TET OFFENSIVE



ADVANCE OF MAJOR ENEMY UNITS  
ON KONTUM CITY AREA DURING  
TET OFFENSIVE 24 JAN 68 TO 3 FEB 68



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included the 407th and 408th Sapper Battalions, H-15 Local Force Battalion, K28 Sapper unit, and local guerrillas. The 31st Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment is believed to be responsible for the rocket attacks. Five per cent of the city was destroyed.

4. BAN ME THUOT. At 0135 hours on 30 January, combined NVA and VC units commenced shelling the 23d ARVN Division Headquarters, 23d Transportation Company, 231st Battalion, 39th Arty, and the city airfield. Attacking from the south, the 1st Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment dispersed in small elements and attacked the DOC LOP Zone and the Administration and Finance Offices. The 301st VC Bn attacked the province chief's house, while the 101st Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment attacked Sector Headquarters and the Food Supply and Equipment Depot. The 39th Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment advanced against the radio broadcasting station, the RF/PF training center, and the soldiers' families' camp of the 4th Battalion, 45th ARVN Regiment.

Attacking from the north, the 401st VC Battalion hit the 8th Armored Cavalry, and the 3d Battalion, 33d NVA Regiment with the F16 and H5 Companies attacked the 231st Battalion and 39th Artillery. The H6 company attacked the National Police Branch and the KHAI DOAN Pagoda while the H8 company attacked the market place and dispersed, staying within the city. During the daylight hours of 30 January the enemy mingled with the people to use them as a screen for another attack. On 1 February the 1st Battalion, 33d Regiment continued to attack the small market place and shelled the 232d Artillery Battalion. On 2 February the 39th Battalion, 33d Regiment dispersed but remained in the area of the Radio Broadcasting Station. On 3 February the 853d Ordnance Company and the Commo Intelligence Company were hit with 122mm rockets. Finally on 5 February the enemy was pushed from the city. The results of the attack were 994 enemy KIA and 26 CIA. Approximately 25% of the city was destroyed.

(2) KONTUM Province. Contacts in KONTUM City and TAN CANH continued as a result of the TET offensive in KONTUM Province until 9 February 68, when the enemy was forced to withdraw to resupply. After the failure of the TET offensive, the enemy shifted his emphasis to the DAK TO/BEN HET area. The 66th NVA Regiment and elements of the 174th NVA Regiment conducted attacks by fire on friendly installations in the area and initiated ground attacks against friendly forces. Both of these units suffered heavy casualties during these contacts in February and were forced to withdraw to CAMBODIA to seek refuge and resupply. On 17 February during the heat of the contacts in the DAK TO/BEN HET area, a FAC discovered a major road complex in the PLEI TRAP Valley in southwestern KONTUM Province. This discovery was the first indication that major elements of the 1st NVA Division were going to move south from the Tri Border Area and conduct operations against POLEI KLENG and possibly KONTUM City. In early March elements of the 24th NVA Regiment were contacted in the high ground north of POLEI KLENG. Large caches of supplies captured in the vicinity of the contacts confirmed that the 24th NVA Regiment had moved to this high ground to resupply. Continued surveillance

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of the PLEI TRAP Road revealed that the enemy was improving and extending the road south and east daily. In mid-March elements of the 15th Engineer Battalion, 1st NVA Division were confirmed as one of the units which had been improving the road. On 26 March elements of the newly infiltrated 320th NVA Regiment were confirmed in an attack on the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB just east of the road complex. The attack was made by the 4th Battalion, 320th Regiment, with the 6th Battalion, 320th Regiment in support. The enemy temporarily breached the perimeter, but could not overrun the position, and was repulsed with heavy losses. There were 135 NVA KIA (BC) around the perimeter, and four PW's were taken. On 20 April two NVA soldiers, who were from an anti-aircraft company attached to the 6th Battalion, 320th Regiment rallied to the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry FSB. These HOI CHANHS said that they had buried many dead and evacuated many wounded from the attack, which would indicate that the enemy lost as many as 200 KIA in the attack. The HOI CHANHS said that at least one company of 4th Battalion, 320th Regiment was annihilated. Their testimony also revealed that the 209th NVA Regiment had infiltrated by truck from North VIETNAM to replace the 32d NVA Regiment which had moved to DARLAC Province. Upon arriving in country the 209th was renamed the 320th Regiment. This identification confirmed that a major reorganization had taken place in the 1st NVA Division. The 66th NVA Regiment also moved south from the Tri Border area in April to join with the 320th Regiment (AKA 209th) to attack POLEI KLENG and KONTUM City. US operations in the area disrupted the plans of the 1st NVA Division and kept the enemy off balance through the end of April.

On 14 March, another NVA road was discovered in the area north of DAK PEK Special Forces Camp. The road is an extension of Highway 165 in LAOS, and enters south VIETNAM at the point where the KONTUM-QUANG TIN Province border connects with the LAOTIAN Border, and extends east parallelling the province border to an intersection of Highway 14, north of DAK PEK Special Forces Camp. In late April this road showed signs of use by numerous personnel, tracked and wheeled vehicles. Reconnaissance and heavy contacts indicated that a large NVA force had moved into this area.

(3) PLEIKU Province. The enemy withdrew to base areas during early February, following the TET attacks. Elements of the 7th Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment moved to join two companies of the 31st Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment, near the hill mass 16-18 kilometers southwest of PLEIKU City. In late February, these elements moved north across Highway 509 to join elements of the 4th Battalion, 95B NVA Regiment in the CHU PRONG-CHU KAN area 25-30 kilometers west of PLEIKU City. On 4 March, a platoon size element of a 122mm rocket unit attacked Camp Enari from the east. On 16 March, a company size element attacked Camp Enari from the southwest. Both attacks were probably conducted by elements of the 31st Battalion, 40th Artillery Regiment, which then moved back to base areas near the CHU PRONG. The main elements of the 408th Sapper Battalion withdrew generally northeast of the city and have operated generally around the LE CHI area since early February. From early February through April, the 408th continued to conduct attacks by fire and company size ground attacks against installations in and around PLEIKU City.

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After the TET offensive, elements of the H-15 Local Force Battalion first rallied in the CATECKA area, then moved to rejoin their rear support elements in base areas along the DAK AYUNH, about 20 kilometers east of Camp Enari, where they received replacements in late February and remained through April.

By early February, the 5th Battalion, 95B NVA Regiment had moved south across Highway 19E establishing a base area on the east side of the DAK PAYOU, 35 kilometers east of Camp Enari. From this location, they conducted minor ambushes along Highway 19E on 7 February about 20 kilometers east of PLEIKU City, and 4-6 March in the MANG YANG Pass area, about 50 kilometers east of PLEIKU City.

On 21 February, elements of the 174th NVA Regiment were identified about eight kilometers northwest of PLEI MRONG and again on 6 March about 27 kilometers north of PLEIKU City. The 1st and 3d Battalions along with the Headquarters and Regimental support elements established temporary base areas in the mountains area east of Highway 14N and 16-24 kilometers north of PLEIKU City. These elements conducted several small ambushes along the highway in early March. On 13 March, 48 NVA were killed when a US convoy was ambushed 20 kilometers north of PLEIKU City. The ambush was probably conducted by elements of the 174th NVA Regiment. On 5 March, a HOI CHANH, and documents captured on 15 March, revealed that a K6 Battalion, believed to be the 6th Battalion, 32d NVA Regiment, was operating with elements of the 174th NVA Regiment and was targeted against the highway.

(4) DARLAC Province. Following the TET offensive the 33d NVA Regiment withdrew to an area approximately 16 kilometers southwest of the city of BAN ME THUOT while the 301st Battalion retreated to an area approximately 30 kilometers southeast of the city. With the arrival of the 1st and 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, the 32d NVA Regiment, after several contacts, withdrew to a position approximately 12 kilometers northwest of BAN ME THUOT, arriving in the area around 25 February. On 1 March the 4th and 5th Battalion's 32d NVA Regiment arrived in DARLAC Province and remained in the area of the MEWAL Plantation until early April when they exfiltrated to base area 740 in CAMBODIA. During the period between early March and mid-April, there were continuing reports from various sources stating that BAN ME THUOT was scheduled for a full scale ground attack by units of the 32d and 33d NVA Regiment's. The arrival of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry in early March thwarted any proposed enemy advance on the city; however, BAN ME THUOT did receive attacks by fire on 4, 11, 13, 23, 26, 28 March and 26 April. The 33d NVA Regiment, after extensive resupply in late March and early April, also moved to base area 740, leaving the area north of BAN ME THUOT in the hands of Local Force VC units. Activity in late April in DARLAC was extremely light and scattered throughout the province but reports persisted of a possible large scale attack on BAN ME THUOT in the early monsoon season.

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b. Estimated enemy composition, disposition, and strength on 30 April 1968.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>CURRENT EST STR</u>	<u>LAST KNOWN LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
B-3 Front HQ's	500	Tri Border area	2 Mar 68	PW
24th NVA Inf Regt	1400	NW of KONTUM City	20 Mar 68	DOC
32d NVA Inf Regt	1450	NW of BAN ME THUOT	17 Apr 68	PW
33d NVA Inf Regt	1600	NW of BAN ME THUOT	20 Mar 68	PW
40th NVA Arty Regt*	1200	Tri Border area*	2 Mar 68	PW
95B NVA Inf Regt	800	E PLEIKU Province	10 Apr 68	PW
1st NVA Division (HQ's & Spt units)	1415	Tri Border area	20 Apr 68	PW
66th NVA Inf Regt	1800	SW KONTUM Province	29 Apr 68	DOC
174th NVA Inf Regt	1800	NW PLEIKU Province	3 Apr 68	DOC
320th NVA Inf Regt	1600	SW KONTUM Province	28 Apr 68	DOC
H-15 LF VC Bn	180	E PLEIKU Province	4 Mar 68	PW
301st LF VC Bn	60	SW of BAN ME THUOT	4 Mar 68	PW
304th LF VC Bn	200	NW of KONTUM City	29 Feb 68	PW
401st LF VC Bn	100	NW of BAN ME THUOT	17 Mar 68	PW
406th Sapper Bn	75	N of KONTUM City	30 Jan 68	PW
407th Sapper Bn	225	PLEIKU/BINH DINH Border	9 Jan 68	DOC
408th Sapper Bn	200	NE of PLEIKU City	25 Mar 68	PW

\*HQ's in Tri Border area, 2 Bn's in KONTUM Province, 1 Bn in PLEIKU Province, and 1 Bn in DARLAC Province.

c. Counterintelligence. The VIET CONG guerrillas operating on the periphery of the Base Camp TAOR continue to utilize low level MONTAGNARD informants to warn them of US troop presence in the area. The VIET CONG have also instructed these low level informants to ascertain what routes civil affairs vehicles use. Counterintelligence Special Agents have identified and picked up eight of these low level VMC informants since February 1968.

d. Significant enemy tactics, techniques, and capabilities.

(1) General. As evidenced by the TET attacks on the major cities and the March - April buildup west of POLEI KLENG, the enemy has demonstrated that he can employ any of several tactics in his operations. He can attack the cities, setting the stage by infiltrating Local Force and Sapper units, followed up with an assault by main force units, but he does not have the capability to seize and hold the cities. He can mass large forces to attack selected friendly installations, as he did on 26 March when he attacked the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB. Experience has proven that normally he loses the equivalent of at least one battalion when he makes an all out ground attack on a FSB. Additionally he does not have the demonstrated capability to seize and hold these Fire Support Bases. He can encircle the cities and attempt to strangle the economy of the provinces by mining and ambushes on the

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highways, and taxation and raids on outlying villages. He has not succeeded at this so far. Basically, the enemy lacks staying power to conduct sustained offensives.

(2) Significant changes in tactics.

(a) The enemy has developed an improved road network within the area of operations and has increased vehicular activity both in and out of country. The increased mobility and capability for resupply will permit the enemy to move more heavy weapons into areas he chooses to launch a large scale attack.

(b) The enemy has improved his artillery inventory, to probably include 105mm howitzers and 37mm AA guns. PW statements indicate that the NVA plan to increase employment of AA weapons. VR and photo readout have identified AA positions in most sections of the area of Operations.

(3) Recapitulation of enemy battle losses.

(a) Personnel.

KIA (BC)	2,316
NVAC	27
VCC/VMCC	35
TOTAL	2,378

(b) Weapons.

S/A	460
C/S	30
TOTAL	490

(c) Ammunition.

S/A rds	42,655
C/S rds	2,031
Grenades	841
Mines	1,093

(d) Miscellaneous captured items.

Explosives (lbs)	1,048
Documents (inches)	336
Rice (tons)	28.2
Salt (lbs)	499

(e) Enemy facilities destroyed.

Structures	38
Fortifications	927

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e. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

(1) Enemy capabilities.

(a) The NVA are capable of launching multi-regimental attacks in the western part of the AO, probably in conjunction with sapper attacks and highway interdiction by local units throughout the area. The enemy also has the capability of launching simultaneous attacks on major cities. He can conduct widespread coordinated attacks by fire, and can harass friendly forces by mining and ambushes on land lines of communications.

(b) The enemy's construction of roads in the PLEI TRAP Valley, the vicinity of Route 512, and north of DAK PEK, and his movement of trucks along these roads give him an increased supply capability and enable him to reinforce or reposition his forces more rapidly. This new capability will be mostly downgraded by the effects of the monsoon.

(2) Enemy vulnerabilities. The enemy is vulnerable to artillery and airstrikes when he bivouacs or masses for a large attack.

(3) Enemy probable courses of action. Attack friendly Fire Support Bases in southwestern KONTUM Province; attack friendly installations in and around KONTUM City, PLEIKU City, and BAN ME THUOT, move sizeable units into the DAK TO/BEN HET area and attack friendly Fire Support Bases in that area; conduct mining and ambush operations along LLOC's, particularly Highway 19E and in the vicinity of KONTUM City and continue to refit the unidentified unit north of DAK PEK.

3. (C) Operations and Training Activities.

a. The following OPLANS were published:

(1) OPLAN 1-68 (CHASE) dtd 14 Feb 68. 4th Division reacts to attacks on the PLEIKU Complex by blocking enemy exfiltration routes and conducting reconnaissance in force operation within assigned AO. TF CHASE will move within one hour by helicopter and/or overland to assigned AO. Additional forces will be committed as situation dictates.

(2) OPLAN 2-68 (DECATUR) dtd 18 Feb 68. 4th Division deploys a force(s) varying in size from a rifle company to a brigade by the most expeditious means to relieve/reinforce a besieged USSF/CSF Camp, RF/PF outpost, Province/District HQ or a critical signal site in KONTUM, PLEIKU, DARLAC, QUANG DUC or TUYEN DUC Province. Units designated will be prepared to move one reinforced rifle company in two hours, battalion (-) in six hours and brigade (-) to include combat support and combat service support elements twelve hours after the battalion deploys.

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(3) OPLAN 3-68 (MC LAIN) dtd 3 Mar 68. Designated battalion task force deploys by C-130 aircraft from specified airfield to PHAN THIET. Upon closure PHAN THIET OPCON passes from 4th Infantry Division to IFFORCEV. Battalion task force will conduct operations in coordination and cooperation with ARVN forces, assist in securing Highway 1 and support Revolutionary Development within assigned AO.

(4) OPLAN 4-68 (ENGLISH) dtd 9 Mar 68. A battalion task force deploys by C-130 aircraft and overland to LZ English and OPCON passes to 3d Brigade 4th Infantry Division upon closure. The battalion task force will conduct operations as directed by CO, 3d Brigade. OPLAN 4-68 terminated 26 April 1968.

(5) OPORD 5-68 (PLEIKU DEFENSE) dtd 12 Mar 68. 4th Infantry Division, on order, provides one company sized unit to Deputy Senior Advisor II Corps to conduct operations in PLEIKU Defense Sector Pea, in coordination and cooperation with ARVN Forces in the PLEIKU Defense Sector.

(6) OPORD 6-68 (COCHISE-GREEN) dtd 25 Mar 68, classified Secret, will not be discussed in this report.

(7) OPLAN 7-68 (ROAD) dtd 5 Apr 68, classified Secret, will not be discussed in this report.

(8) OPLAN 8-68 (SWITCH) dtd 12 Apr 68. The 4th Infantry Division provides one Reciprocal Mobile Training Team (RMTT) to present instruction to the 23d ARVN Division while preparing to accept and utilize a RMTT from 23d ARVN Division. The RMTT will be formed, equipped and prepared to present instruction to 23d ARVN Division prior to D-Day. D-Day to be announced.

(9) OPORD 9-68 (BUSHMASTER) dtd 26 Apr 68. The 4th Infantry Division conducts ambushes along enemy infiltration corridors and commo liaison routes in order to harass and restrict enemy movement within the MAC ARTHUR area of operations. BUSHMASTER operations are designed to establish night ambush programs to complicate and harass the movement of enemy forces in areas where the enemy has been able to move with relative impunity.

b. The 4th Infantry Division continued Operation MAC ARTHUR which began on 12 October 1967. A chronological summary of significant activities for this quarter is at inclosure 3. The actions of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry in the City of KONTUM during TET are covered in the unit's after action report which is at inclosure 4.

c. Training.

(1) Programs of instruction.

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(a) A unit armorer's school was conducted 21-23 March on the M-16 Rifle with a makeup period on 15 April. The school's purpose was to acquaint unit armorers with the maintenance requirements of the M-16 Rifle.

(b) A program of instruction on rappelling was conducted 17-22 March for an aero rifle platoon of the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry and an engineer platoon. The instruction was designed to provide the division with the capability of quickly cutting a landing zone in a heavily forested area. A one day exercise, in which a landing zone for two helicopters was cut in four hours and 15 minutes, was conducted to evaluate the instruction.

(c) A marksmanship program was conducted 17-30 April for the Long Range Patrols to increase quick fire skills.

(d) On 23 April a program was begun to train 30 ARVN volunteers in Long Range Patrol techniques. The objective of the instruction is to provide the ARVN with a genuine Long Range Patrol capability. The first portion of the training will be conducted at the division base camp. At the termination of this phase of training, scheduled for 11 May, the ARVN will be attached to US Long Range Patrols for integration on combat patrols. This program was suggested by IFFV.

(2) 4th Infantry Division Training Detachment.

(a) The detachment trained 3,191 enlisted and 116 officer replacements.

(b) The Combat NCO Leadership School provided instruction to 247 students. Of these, 235 successfully completed the course.

(c) The Recondo Preparatory Course provided instruction to 91 students. Of these, 64 successfully completed the course.

(3) RF/PF Training.

(a) Regional Force/Popular Force training activities experienced a lull because of the commitment of RF/PF units in countering the TET Offensive. This period of relative inactivity continued after TET when the majority of the units continued combat operations. The end of the combat operations saw a period of activity associated with repositioning units and re-establishing training momentum. Throughout the period of the TET Offensive, the Combined Mobile Inspection Team (CMIT) and Combined Mobile Training Teams (CMTT) were engaged in combat operations with ARVN, RF/PF, and CSF/MSF units in the role of advisors. The training presented has been most effective as evidenced by the role the units which had received training played in countering the enemy's TET Offensive. This participation in combat operations was the first broad based opportunity for evaluation of the effectiveness of the CMIT/CMTT program. Additional training conducted in this quarter was the training of a newly formed Mobile Strike Force company, two Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoons

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and three TRUONG SON (MONTAGNARD Revolutionary Development) cadres. Twenty-four RF companies and 38 PF platoons received training. The CMIT/CMTT's have trained 56 companies and 113 platoons since the beginning of the program in October 1967. Additionally, six 4th Infantry Division teams have been upgraded to Mobile Advisory Teams (MATS) and reassigned to MACV.

(b) Problem areas.

1. VIETNAMESE officials are reluctant to release units from operations in order to make them available for training.

2. Responsible ARVN supply officers have failed to make sufficient training ammunition available.

3. Resupply of PF platoons is extremely poor. Reported shortages of barrier material and equipment are rarely followed through by responsible ARVN officials to insure that deficiencies are corrected.

(c) Observations.

1. CMIT/CMTT's need not confine their activities to RF/PF units. When RF/PF units are not available for training, other units such as CSF/MSF, TRUONG SON (MONTAGNARD Revolutionary Development) Cadre, and Revolutionary Development Cadre may be trained.

2. Close cooperation and coordination with USSF/CIDG camps in neighboring areas can often produce needed training ammunition and materials.

3. Since the CMIT/CMTT's have VIETNAMESE interpreters and members, VIETNAMESE holidays must be planned for. Additionally, long holidays such as TET will find the teams without interpreters. A provision for backup interpreters should be arranged through Province Senior Advisors.

(4) New Equipment Training. The Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector was introduced in limited quantity to the division for evaluation. The detector is capable of detecting a man walking at a distance of 30 meters from the monitor or a moving vehicle at a distance of 500 meters. The detectors are light weight and rugged and have met all design criteria. Initially some difficulty was experienced in that the sets were overly sensitive. Users were advised to reduce the sensitivity setting on the detector and no further difficulty was encountered.

(5) Training Regulations.

1. A regulation was published outlining a continuing program wherein one infantry company a week is rotated into base camp for stand down and refitting. The unit has priority on all support services and activities to aid in maximizing the benefits of the program.

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2. A regulation was published outlining the integration of replacement personnel from the Division Replacement Detachment into patrols in the base camp area. The security of the base camp and the training of the individual replacement are enhanced through this program.

3. A regulation was published instituting a refresher marksmanship program for the division's Long Range Patrols.

4. A change to the division's Recondo training program was published which updated the program of instruction and entrance requirements.

5. A change to the program of instruction at the Division Replacement Detachment was published in a change to the division's regulation governing the training detachment.

d. Air Support.

(1) The following close air support missions were flown in support of Operation MAC ARTHUR, 1 February - 30 April 1968.

TYPE MISSION	REQUESTED	FLOWN	SORTIES	A1-E	B57	F4C	F100	A37	AC47
FAC PREPLANNED	908	780	1505	62	53	195	1101	94	0
FAC IMMEDIATE	617	513	1148	66	6	141	836	99	0
CSS	322	213	69	4	19	42	204	0	0
CSS IMMEDIATE	128	110	132	0	14	8	110	0	0
SPOOKY	73	73	73	0	0	0	0	0	73
TOTAL	2048	1689	3127	130	92	386	2251	193	73

(2) Damage Assessment.

TYPE MISSION	EST KBA	BUNKERS	SEC EXP	SEC FIRES	AA/AW	MTR POS	HUTS	ELEP-HANT	TRUCK
FAC PREPLANNED	65	201	17	0	24	4	13	0	0
FAC IMMEDIATE	105	96	19	0	14	6	0	1	3
CSS PREPLANNED	9	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
CSS IMMEDIATE	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	179	297	41	0	38	10	13	1	3

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(3) Damage assessment shown in paragraph 2 is incomplete and does not show the true destructive capability of tactical air. It is estimated that 25% of damage assessment was necessarily made by ground exploitation and 75% by visual reconnaissance from the air.

(4) B52 Strikes: B52's struck known base areas, infiltration routes, strong points and major NVA headquarters. The secondary B52 mission was first used during this reporting period. A secondary target is one of primary intelligence value, but which lacks the evaluation needed to be assigned a primary strike classification. To use this information a secondary target is selected and given a valid time period of 10 to 15 days. During this period, each primary B52 mission is scheduled to strike a secondary target if the mission is aborted on the primary target. Each day a NO BOMBS BEFORE and NO BOMBS AFTER time is given to the division of all secondary targets that are scheduled as back-up targets for primary B52 missions. As will be shown in the sorties flown during the reporting period, the secondary target gives the commander an additional capability to neutralize known enemy positions. The following figures show B52 strikes during the reporting period within the MACARTHUR AO.

PRIMARY MISSIONS		TOTAL SORTIES
4th Div	50	297
II Corps	<u>4</u>	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	54	318
SECONDARY MISSIONS		TOTAL SORTIES
4th Div	96	298
II Corps	<u>13</u>	<u>39</u>
TOTAL	109	337
TOTAL MISSIONS		TOTAL SORTIES
4th Div	146	595
II Corps	<u>17</u>	<u>60</u>
TOTAL	163	655

(5) A program of road interdiction by air and artillery fires was used during the period 5-30 April to halt the enemy's use and construction/repair of the PLEI TRAP and DAK PEK roads. Results of air strikes are shown below:

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(b) Ground based defoliation was negligible because suitable targets (enemy crops, grass, small trees) were in a dormant state during the dry season and not susceptible to growth regulator type herbicides. A total of 615 gallons of defoliant was used in ground based missions compared to 1,450 and 14,725 for the two previous periods. Rainfall during the coming quarter is expected to stimulate plant growth and cause an increase in defoliation activity.

(c) The AGAVENCO spray system received in January was tested as a helicopter mounted defoliation apparatus, and found to be a satisfactory piece of equipment.

(3) RCA Employment.

(a) Bulk Agent. A total of 20,080 pounds of CS-1 powder was dropped using 14 CH-47 sorties. Five of these sorties (8,600 pounds) were employed against the NVA road in the PLEI TRAP area to impede repair of damage by B-52 strikes. The division supported the 24th STZ with two CH-47 sorties on rocket launching sites NE of KONTUM which effectively halted further launchings from the target areas. See inclosure 5 for data concerning RCA employment.

(b) E-158 CS Canister Cluster. A total of 39 E-158 munitions were expended in the division AO, the majority of which were used in preparing landing zones (see Section II).

(c) CBU-19's were employed by Air Force fighters in the division AO for the first time and proved to be a very effective supplement to the use of E-158's.

(d) E-8 Tactical CS Launcher. The E-8 was demonstrated for the USARV and 4th Division Provost Marshal, division cavalry and infantry units, the division ICC, the division signal and engineer officers, and the 937th Engineer Group Commander. All showed great interest in the munition. Two hundred and fourteen munitions were issued to subordinate units.

(e) 4.2" mortar and 40mm M79 rounds were used effectively throughout the division AO during the reporting period.

(4) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD).

(a) One APD was operated daily in the division AO except when non-availability of aircraft prevented flights. Six personnel in the Division Chemical Section are trained and qualified APD operators, each also being a fully qualified maintenance man.

(b) A total of 122 missions were flown totalling 130 hours and 10 minutes of operation.

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f. Psychological Operations.

(1) A total of 35,046,000 leaflets were dropped which compares with six million leaflets dropped during the previous period. Total air and ground loudspeaker time amounted to 520 hours. This compares with 302 hours of combined air and ground time from the previous period. Audio/Visual teams operated a total of 20 hours in support of civic action and psyops activities as compared to 32 hours during the previous reporting period. Leaflet shortages forced cut-backs in leaflet drops on selected targets. The availability of two groundloudspeaker teams allowed an increase in the total loudspeaker time. The damage inflicted on the Audio/Visual truck in a vehicular collision in March forced the Audio/Visual team to reduce its operations. Audio/Visual support from the 20th POLWAR Battalion (ARVN) was available on occasion. Themes emphasized during the period included CHIEU HOI appeals; Defect or Die; The War May Last 20 Years or More; You Have Been Deceived; and 69,000 rallied. Several personal appeals utilizing HOI CHANHS; Captain VU NU Y, former commander of the 9th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment (Rallied on 2 March); Captain (Doctor) LE VINH CAN, former Surgeon of the 1st NVA Division (Rallied during the TET period); and two sergeants of the K6 Battalion, 320th NVA Regiment, NGUYEN SY BO and HOAN MINH CAN, who rallied on 20 April 1968; were used.

(2) Exploitation of HOI CHANH personnel continues to the maximum extent possible. The two most recent examples, Sergeants NGUYEN SY BO and HOAN MINH CAN, who rallied on 20 April 1968 from the K6 Battalion of the 320th Regiment, were most cooperative in support of Psychological operations. They volunteered to immediately perform live aerial loudspeaker broadcasts on the date they rallied. They were brought to the Division Base Camp where they wrote leaflet appeals in their own handwriting which were immediately transformed into quick reaction leaflets and dropped on known locations of the 320th Regiment within 24 hours. The same procedure was also followed with Captain VU NU Y, former commanding officer of the 9th Battalion, 66th NVA Regiment who rallied to US Forces on 2 March 1968. During the period, four significant HOI CHANHS were exploited by the 4th Infantry Division, both separately and jointly. In early February, the Surgeon of the 1st NVA Division, Doctor LE VINH CAN, rallied to elements of the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry. The other three were Captain Y, and sergeants BO and CAN, as mentioned above. An operation was undertaken in which Sergeants CAN and BO were taken to SAIGON and united with Doctor CAN and Captain Y. Several leaflets were produced along with photographs and tape messages by each individual. Group photographs were taken and composite messages were also written. A mixture of five leaflets is currently undergoing production at the 4th Psychological Operations Group in Saigon, and a fifth leaflet is being produced in the printing plant of Company B, 8th Psychological Operations Battalion. This combined testimonial leaflet is considered the climax of the HOI CHANH utilization and exploitation operation of the Division to date.

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(3) A newspaper leaflet is now produced bi-monthly for target audiences of NVA/VC troops. The newspaper was conceived from HOI CHANH and POW reports that there is no outside source of news for the NVA except what they are told by the political cadre. The newspaper produces un-edited news stories originating in North Vietnam, the Republic of VIETNAM and other locations considered to be of possible interest to NVA troops. Wherever possible, the newspaper is "panel tested" on VIETNAMESE personnel to include HOI CHANH and/or POW personnel to determine its credibility level and/or acceptance potential by the target audience. Test results to date are favorable; some recommendations by the "panel" are to be integrated in future editions.

(4) In late March, it was discovered that the NVA were building and defending a series of road networks originating in LAOS and CAMBODIA and directly entering South VIETNAM. A plan was conceived in which the roads would be heavily interdicted by aerial bombardment and artillery fire. This plan was to be conducted in three phases. Psychological operations were undertaken to coincide with the three phase plan. Phase I, a leaflet operation, stressed the theme that to continue to use the road complex built by NVA forces was to invite death at the hands of Allied Forces who were to bombard the area heavily with air and artillery. These special messages were augmented with the National Safe Conduct Pass (NSCP). Following phase I, the theme of the phase II message was essentially one which described the heavy bombardment of the road and cautioned the enemy to save himself and rally to the GVN utilizing the NSCP or any of the leaflets dropped in his area. Phase III consisted of five, one hour, day-and-night loudspeaker broadcasts utilizing the C-47 aircraft of the 9th ACS. The theme emphasized the fact that further surveillance of the road would continue constantly and that interdiction would continue as targets were observed. The tape urged the listener to leave his position and attempt to rally by moving to the east.

(5) The CA/PSYOPS evaluation of the indigenous population remains relatively unchanged since the last quarterly report. In response to three enemy rocket attacks on the division base camp, an increase in aerial loudspeaker broadcasting has been undertaken, employing the theme of "Reward For Information". As of this date, there has been no apparent favorable response to the broadcasts within the Division TAOR.

g. Army Aviation Operations.

(1) Operations. Operational Totals for the quarter.

	<u>Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Bn Total</u>
(a) Hours flown:	5594	1618	7212
(b) Number of sorties:	18370	9573	27943
(c) Number of passengers:	22032	2362	24394
(d) Tons of cargo:	562	0	562

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(e) Average number of Aircraft Utilized:	<u>Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Bn TOTAL</u>
	16	8	24

(2) Intelligence. Continuous, timely and accurate intelligence is of paramount importance to the successful conduct of airmobile operations. Items of extreme importance include landing zone lists, ground fire reports and known locations of enemy units. The aviation battalion can be a source of information when this information can be obtained from aviators and passed to higher headquarters. A debriefing of all aviators, initiated this quarter, greatly assisted the battalion in obtaining information.

(3) Training.

(a) In order to insure air crews obtained the required training in the M-16 zeroing and familiarization, the range south of PLEIKU was scheduled thrice weekly. Aircraft are able to land at the range when returning from missions and each crew member can take turns in zeroing and refamiliarization of his M-16 and .38 cal pistol.

(b) A serious shortcoming has been the lack of a permanent free fire area for aircraft weapons subsystems. The aviation battalion requested and received approval to use a six by three kilometer area for a free fire area, located twelve kilometers from Camp Enari. A free fire area for current helicopter mounted weapons is necessary to test and bore sight weapons, train aviators and crews and check out air crews on newly developed weaponry. The physical area itself must be close enough to the helicopters' base area to avoid excessive blade time. The length and width should be of sufficient size to allow unrestricted firing without endangering any friendly units or civilians.

(4) Logistics.

(a) Class V expended:

	<u>A Co</u>	<u>B Co</u>	<u>Bn Total</u>
7.62	104,000	452,000	556,000
2.75 inch FFAR	0	1,700	1,700
Aircraft flares	1,446	264	1,710
Aircraft destroyed	4	1	5
Aircraft damaged	3	14	17

(b) Problem areas.

1. The aviation unit experienced difficulty in obtaining several items of flight equipment, many of which are aviation safety items, as shown below:

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	<u>QTY AUTH</u>	<u>QTY O/H</u>	<u>QTY SHORT</u>
Survival Kits	120	53	67
Gloves, flying	120	80	40
Armor, body, front plate	92	67	25
Armor, body, front & back plate	176	62	114
Armanent Subsystem XM23	28	21	7

2. The shortage of four LOH aircraft continues.

4. (C) Logistics.

a. General.

(1) Airdrop of supplies was not conducted during February, March or April because of a shortage of USAF aircraft in RVN for training missions.

(2) Action was completed on 169 Reports of Survey. Thirty-one Quarterly Reports of Operational Loss were approved and 746 Combat Loss Reports were processed.

b. Supply and Services.

The following figures represent cumulative support data for support activities of the 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion at all locations in the division area of operations.

(1) Division Supply Office

Requisitions received	14,832
Requisitions passed	3,219
Requisitions filled	7,612

(2) Class I

Average headcount issues	11,664
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(3) Class III (gallons issued)

JPA	1,153,100
MOGAS	1,102,000
DIESEL	1,448,000
AVGAS	220,500

(4) Baths

Individuals processed	56,667
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## (5) Graves Registration

Human remains processed	75
Personal property shipments processed	267

## c. Transportation Service.

(1) During the reporting period convoy operations in the area of operations have greatly improved. Utilization of military police as overall convoy commanders proved extremely successful. Two-hundred and forty-seven special missions by fixed wing aircraft were flown in support of the division lifting 2,012.7 short tons of cargo/equipment and 5,639 passengers. Additionally the C7A division aerial courier lifted 14,595 passengers and 173.75 short tons of cargo.

(2) The hold baggage section of Camp Enari processed 76.23 short tons of baggage for 1,267 personnel.

## d. Material Readiness.

(1) The Command Maintenance Management Inspections continued with three initial inspections and one reinspection. The program is ninety-eight percent complete.

(2) Road side inspections continued on a daily basis.

e. Maintenance support. Maintenance support and supply of Class II & IV for all divisional and attached elements continued to be accomplished through three forward support companies, the main support company and the Aircraft Maintenance Company of the 704th Maintenance Battalion. On 1 April 68, Company B, 704th Maintenance Battalion was detached from the 3d Support Battalion (provisional) supporting the 3d Brigade Task force. Provisional emergency support was provided to the 173d Airborne Brigade as well as Special Forces units.

f. Medical Service. Medical support was provided by the medical battalion, except for a battalion task force operation in the BAN ME THUOT area from 3 March to 22 April. Medical and dental support was provided by an augmentation team, 44th Medical Brigade.

	<u>HQ &amp; Co A</u>	<u>Co B</u>	<u>Co C</u>	<u>Co D</u>
Patients seen	11,347	5,452	788	3,654
Patients admitted	881	784	235	2,182
Patients returned	580	49	50	1,299

## g. Operation MAC ARTHUR Logistics.

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(1) Logistical support was provided forward elements of the division by Forward Support Elements (FSE), from Division Support Command and by Forward Support Activity (FSA) from PLEIKU Sub-Area Command.

(2) During the TET Offensive from 30 January - 8 February logistical support was provided to elements of the 2d Brigade from FSE Oasis. Stockage levels of Class I, III and V were at a three day level at the beginning of the TET Offensive. Continued resupply, medical support, maintenance and services were provided during the 10 day period. Battalion Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry was in base camp as division reserve at the beginning of the TET operation. Prior to employment, levels of supply of all classes in base camp were over five days. During operations in the PLEIKU City area and KONTUM, resupply of the Task Force was by helicopter. The supply levels of the cavalry troop located at KONTUM were  $\frac{1}{2}$  day Class III and V and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  days Class I. Resupply of all classes by helicopter and Class III by C130 (cow) allowed the cavalry troop to continue its operational missions without interruption. Convoy resupply operations were resumed on 8 February to KONTUM. The Engineer Battalion Task Force and Armor Battalion had a three day level of all classes of supplies on hand upon initiation of the TET Offensive. In the PLEIKU Area, resupply was by helicopter and occasionally by LLOC.

(3) On 2 February at 2200 hours a representative of G4 Section departed for BAN ME THUOT, which was under attack by an estimated enemy regiment to coordinate logistical support for a battalion task force of the 173d Airborne Brigade which was to be committed early on the morning of 3 February. Coordination was effected with the MACV Senior Advisor and Staff, 23d ARVN Division and a 1st Logistical Command "Expediter" early 3 February. Resupply of Class I, fast moving II, IV and V was by direct input from the 1st Logistical Command, CAM RAHN Bay. Graves registration team, 1st Logistical Command, and medical augmentation, 44th Medical Group was provided until arrival of the 173d Airborne Brigade supply operations center, medical company and other support units. Resupply of all classes was primarily by air from the 1st Logistical Command.

(4) The FSE in operation at the Oasis continued to provide support for 2d Brigade operations in western PLEIKU. This FSE provided Class I, bulk and packaged Class III, V, barrier materials, graves registration, bath (showers) and laundry services. The laundry platoon was attached from PLEIKU Sub-Area Command.

(5) The battalion trains of Task Force 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry at BAN ME THUOT East Airfield from 3 March to 21 April 68 was augmented by personnel from the 1st Logistical Command as "expeditors". This FSE (augmented) provided Class I, III, V, graves registration and barrier materials by direct input by air and LLOC from the 1st Logistical Command, CAM RAHN Bay. The FSE continued operations until 21 April 68. Class V distribution at BAN ME THUOT was primarily by ALOC through 1st Logistical Command channels, supplemented by convoys when the LLOC was open.

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(6) A FSE was provided from 25 February to 17 March 68 at KONTUM to support Task Force 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and the 173d Airborne Brigade. This FSE provided Class I, limited Class II and IV and limited Class III along with graves registration service during the period. The main supported unit was TF 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry; however units of the 173d Airborne Brigade received support from this FSE during part of all the period. The 4th Supply and Transportation Battalion augmented the Brigade Supply Operations Center until relocated on 27 March 68 to LZ ENGLISH. The main support for Class I, II, III, IV, and V was furnished to the 173d Airborne Brigade by the 1st Logistical Command (PKSAC) until redeployed from the MAC ARTHUR area of operations.

(7) On 26 March an FSE of the 4th S&T Battalion closed KONTUM by convoy from LZ ENGLISH to provide support for the 3d Brigade. This FSE is currently in operation supporting the 3d Brigade with Class I, fast moving Class II & IV items, limited Class III, graves registration service and operation of a forward ASP. Class III bulk products are transported to KONTUM FSE by PKSAC. The Class III supply point is operated jointly by PKSAC -57th Aviation Company for JP4 at the KONTUM Airfield. MORGAS and DIESEL supply points are operated by the 299th Engineer Battalion. Graves registration augmentation personnel and equipment from PKSAC currently augment the FSE's capability. A forward JP4/refueling point was established at POLEI KLENG Airfield and operated by the 4th Aviation Battalion, to decrease helicopter flying time.

(8) Logistical support continued to be furnished to 1st Brigade units in the DAK TO area by the 1st Logistical Command FSA. A forward JP4 refueling point was established by the 4th S&T Bn at DAK PEK on 4 April 68 and is currently operated by the 4th Aviation Battalion. Resupply of JP4 for DAK PEK is by helicopter sling loaded blivets from DAK TO FSA.

h. In addition to the logistical support provided by US Army elements, the US Air Force expended the following quantities of Class III and V in support of operations.

<u>Class III</u>	<u>QTY (Gallons)</u>	
Fighters	30,630,000	
B-52's	178,200,000	
<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	10,231	3,030.23
CBU	623	213
Napalm	2,682	988.3
Rockets	590	113

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Delivered by Fighters and AC47 (Spooky)

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
20mm	232,400	58.2
7.62mm	696,000	17.4

Delivered by B-52's

<u>ORDNANCE</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>WEIGHT (S/T)</u>
Bombs	UNK	10,466.4

5. (U) Military Civic Action Program.

a. TAOR. The Good Neighbor Program (GNP) continued within the Division TAOR, with a reduction in the number of TAOR hamlets to 66. The consolidation of 19 hamlets into 3 composite villages was effected at the request of the hamlet chiefs concerned and affords a distinct security improvement for GVN aligned hamlets. The approximate 20,000 civilians inhabiting the area are visited by 23 Civic Action Teams composed of five to 10 men each. VC/NVA harassment and terrorism continued. A decrease in the number of kidnappings, 18 chiefs and 88 villagers, was noted in comparison to the 24 chiefs and 216 villagers abducted during the last quarter.

b. PLEIKU Province.

(1) The 2d Brigade continued civic action responsibility along Route 19W and in the PLEI MRONG area.

(2) The 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, continued civic action along Highway 19E from PLEIKU City to the MANG YANG pass.

(3) Civil Affairs Team 9, 41st Civil Affairs Company, continued civic action activities at the EDAP ENANG Refugee Center. The migration of people away from EDAP ENANG, commencing in December 1967, continued until March 1968, with an approximate 2,200 MONTAGNARDS remaining in EDAP ENANG at that time. The exodus, reducing the population from an estimated 8,000 inhabitants to 2,200 in a one month period, was the cause for an immediate re-evaluation of the EDAP ENANG project and a concentrated effort to rectify the recognized mistakes. At the end of April 1968, 2,200 MONTAGNARDS had been re-located in EDAP ENANG, raising the number of inhabitants to its present total of approximately 4,600.

c. KONTUM Province. The 1st Brigade continued civic action activities in the vicinity of DAK TO. Its effectiveness in developing the trust and cooperation of the villager in the DAK TO area is attested to by the intelligence

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reports and actual capture of enemy personnel by villages in the DAK TO area during the TET Offensive. Continuing their established civic action schedule and disregarding the increased enemy activity in the area, the 1st Brigade CA team contributed to a large degree in the intelligence collection effort of the 1st Brigade. The admiration and loyalty felt by the villages in the DAK TO area towards the 1st Brigade S5 team is exemplified by a song circulated among the MONTAGNARDS praising the courage and loyalty of the team and their interpreter BAO. The 3d Brigade commenced civic action activities in the vicinity of KONTUM City on 15 April 1968.

d. DARLAC Province. The 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry continued MEDCAP operations in the vicinity of BAN ME THOUT. Civic action efforts were restricted to short duration/high impact projects.

e. Nation Building Program.

(1) Psychological Development.

(a) Government.

1. Division civic action teams assisted district officials in visiting hamlets within the TAOR by furnishing helicopter transportation and security. The Good Neighbor Council House was utilized for a sector meeting during the months of February and April. The 4th Infantry Division Commander, the PLEIKU Province and LE TRUNG District chiefs were in attendance. The meeting enhanced the status of the hamlet chiefs, as GVN representatives gave assurance of their interest in the MONTAGNARD affairs by affording an opportunity to express problems, and develop priorities for civic action teams.

2. The VIETNAMESE supply/logistics system. LE TRUNG District Headquarters received and distributed 1000 bags of cement to villages and hamlets within the TAOR. Division DA teams assisted village leaders in the requisitioning of materials, the follow up on delivery dates, and the transportation of the material to the villages. Offering a practical exercise in area administration for GVN officials and villagers, the distribution program allows for procurement of materials for village improvement while complementing the self sufficiency of the GVN.

(b) Education.

1. The 4th Infantry Division and LE TRUNG District continued to sponsor the health workers training school. Two classes of 12 students each graduated during the quarter with an additional 21 students in attendance at the close of the reporting period. The prevalence of illiteracy in the applicants for the school, in combination with a variety of MONTAGNARD spoken dialects, presents a complicating factor which is overcome by translators and graphical aids. Although not taught to read at the school, graduates possess a basic medical knowledge upon completion, and are a decided asset to their villages.

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2. The Highlands Junior Military Academy continued its program with the support of the Division Artillery civic action team. A source of pride to the GVN officials in the PLEIKU Province, the academy has been visited by many distinguished visitors.

3. Division Support Command and the 2d Brigade team have given assistance to two schools in their respective sectors. Coordination and assistance given range from the contribution of supplies to the reproduction of study material on unit mimeograph machines.

(2) Development of the Standard of Living.

(a) Water Supplies. Twenty-eight wells were completed within the Division TAOR. Two methods proved to be the most productive; the loaning and support of professional MONTAGNARD well digging supervisors from the village of PLEI NHON YUT, and the institution of well digging parties between cooperating villages. The death of a US officer during the month of March, resulting from a well digging attempt, hampered the willingness of MONTAGNARD and Division CA teams alike to hand dig the necessary wells. During the month of April, a resurgence of well digging activity was noted in the various sectors. Spillway construction continued throughout, with a total of ten spillways constructed. Spillways continue to be desired by local villages for their convenience and the prestige they lend to civic improvement.

(b) Agricultural Improvement. The pig program at EDAP ENANG refugee center continued in a state of decline. It is now realized that American raising techniques and the available breed of hogs are not suitable for the primitive MONTAGNARD weight producing techniques. Pigpen construction is continuing in the division TAOR with the desire of adopting American hog raising methods.

(c) Crop Production. A new seed procurement method was instituted during the month of April, wherein members of the Division DISCOM Team wrote to seed wholesale distributors in the US requesting a donation of outdated seed to be given to the MONTAGNARDS within the sector. This seed, although not marketable to US farmers due to the poor germination caused by excessive age, has proved ideal for MONTAGNARDS who have neither the source nor the funds to procure seed in other ways. Indications are favorable that such seed will be sent as a matter of policy at the end of each growing season in the US.

(d) Health Program.

1. Standardized MEDCAP structures using combined US/MONTAGNARD construction efforts have been completed in 18 hamlets. The dispensary program continues with three dispensaries constructed.

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2. A plague control team was transported to KONTUM City during the month of February and carried out mite spraying operations for three days. A total of 16,400 immunizations for plague and smallpox were given within the city and outlying villages to halt incipient epidemics.

3. It was believed a plague epidemic was starting in the TAOR during the month of April. Two deaths had occurred within a two day period and it was suspected 15 additional people had plague. The supply of plague serum was not sufficient to inoculate the villages in the area. Immediate action to stop the potential epidemic was an immediate aerial resupply from QUI NHON and the inoculation of 540 MONTAGNARDS. A sincere appreciation and an amazement at the resources available to Free World Forces was the common attitude in the MONTAGNARD villages.

(3) Development of Security.

(a) The decision by hamlet chiefs of PLEI CHI TEH (2d Bde Sector) to insure security by consolidating their individual hamlets has proved to be successful and is used as a guide for other GVN oriented hamlet chiefs. There have been two additional hamlet consolidations and in both instances a desire for mutual security was the initiating factor. The policy of allowing the MONTAGNARDS to make the decision for consolidation and then assisting with a dynamic supply and assistance program has allowed a completely satisfactory pacification program on the part of the MONTAGNARDS. A total of 65 MONTAGNARD men have commenced PF training.

(4) Statistical Summary of Civic Action.

(a) Construction.

Culverts	3
Footbridges	2
Medcap Shelters	18
Bulletin Boards	12
Playgrounds	8
Latrines	3
Wells	28
Spillways	10
Road Building	1 Kilometer
Pigpens	5
Dispensaries	3

(b) Health.

Medcaps	39,832
Insecticide spray operations	6
Youth Health Program	
(Daily/Milk/Vietamins)	35,351

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(c) Services.

Food Distribution	13,078
Clothing	4,098
Lumber	27,378 Bd Ft
Soap	3,471

(d) Recovered goods returned to the GVN.

Rice	13,000 lbs
Salt	5,225 lbs

(e) Results. Intelligence. Villages served by Division Civic Action teams provided useful assistance on the following recorded occasions.

1. On 1 February, villagers from DAK TOMBOE reported the location of an enemy mortar position.
2. On 2 February, villagers from DAK ROBIE reported the sighting of an NVA squad, carrying a mortar tube. On 3 February, villagers from DAK TOMBOE reported a similar sighting.
3. On 3 February, villagers from DAK MOT LOP and DAK MOT KRAM reported the location of an enemy mortar position.
4. On 4 February, villagers from DAK TOMBOE reported the presence of enemy scouts in the hamlet. The same day, villagers from DAK ROBIE and DAK MOT KRAM reported the observations of a 250 man force, an 80 man force, and a platoon sized force.
5. On 7 February, villagers from DIEN BINH reported the location of a 75mm recoilless rifle site.
6. Villagers from PLEI BIA TIH pointed out a VC to a civic action team on 15 February, the results being the wounding and capture of one VC.
7. On 21 February, villagers from PLEI LE ANH reported the sighting of a VC platoon size force entering a neighboring village.
8. On 23 February, village chiefs abducted 17 and 18 February gave US personnel information as to the size and armament of the VC abducting force, a general route of travel, and volunteered to take US forces to the VC holding area.
9. On 2 March, villagers from PLEI EREL DOR reported that a VC company was hidden in a nearby village. Tactical responses to the report, by Air Force fighter-bombers and Army gunships combined with ground elements of the

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10. On 7 March, a security patrol was informed by the villagers of PLEI DJIRL of the location of two VC. The patrol checking on the report engaged and killed two VC.

11. On 13 March, a MONTAGNARD boy from the village of PLEI WET marked and reported the location of two mines fashioned from 82mm mortar rounds.

12. Villagers abducted 17 and 18 March informed MI personnel of the general routes of travel, and the approximate size and armament of the capturing VC force.

13. On 19 March, the villagers of DAK MOT LOP, DAK TO District, reported the location of many 4.2 inch mortar rounds to the 1st Bde CA team. As a result of this report, 80 4.2 inch mortar rounds were discovered.

14. On 27 March, villagers from PLEI NHAO YUT stopped a combined Division/PLEIKU Military Police Patrol and informed them that two armed VC were near the village. The ensuing firefight resulted in one VC KIA and one VC PW.

15. On 29 March, villagers from PLEI GROI reported the location of two 750 lb bombs. The location of the bombs was confirmed on 3 April.

16. On 2 April, a VC cache was reported to the 2d Bde by the villagers of PLEI BIA TIN. A subsequent investigation by the team resulted in one French AT mine, several uniforms, packs, and documents captured.

(5) Summary. The betterment of the MONTAGNARDS' future through economic, medical and educational assistance are strong incentives for a positive alignment with the Free World Forces. The lack of security in most hamlets prevents a total alignment. The policy of allowing hamlets to determine their own future, with a continuous civil action program to represent the GVN/US benefits, has worked well in the 4th Infantry Division area of operations.

6. (C) Personnel.

a. Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and close of the reporting period were as follows.

(1) Beginning of Reporting Period (1 Feb 68).

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
(a) Authorized organic	1,130	169	17,036	18,335
Authorized attached	9		221	230
TOTAL	1,139	169	17,257	18,565

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(b) Assigned organic	1,202	168	17,424	18,794
attached	<u>10</u>		<u>220</u>	<u>230</u>
TOTAL	1,212	168	17,644	19,024

## (2) End of Period (30 Apr 68)

(a) Authorized organic	1,131	169	17,058	18,358
Authorized attached	<u>9</u>		<u>221</u>	<u>230</u>
TOTAL	1,140	169	17,279	18,588

(b) Assigned organic	1,177	168	17,193	18,538
attached	<u>11</u>		<u>203</u>	<u>214</u>
TOTAL	1,188	168	17,396	18,752

b. Replacements. A total of 212 officer and 4,163 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period division losses were 226 officers and 4,416 enlisted personnel. Some 360 emergency leaves were processed during the reporting period.

## c. Casualties.

UNIT	ILL INJ			ILL		
	DEAD	MISSING	WOUNDED	DEAD	MISSING	INJURED
1st Bde (1-8, 3-8, 3-12)	49	1	509	1	0	16
2d Bde (2-8, 1-12, 1-22)	69	2	574	2	0	6
3d Bde (1-35, 2-35, 1-14)	122	0	460	1	0	17
DIVARTY (5-16, 6-29, 4-42, 2-9)	6	0	120	0	0	11
DISCOM (Med, S&T, Maint)	1	0	30	2	0	0
2-1 Cav	7	0	84	0	0	1
1-10 Cav	2	0	69	0	0	12
4th Engr Bn	2	0	34	0	0	4
1-69 Armor	2	0	43	1	0	3
4th Avn Bn	1	0	28	0	0	0
4th MP Co	2	0	12	0	0	1
4th HHC	0	0	2	1	0	0
4th Admin Co	0	0	3	0	0	1
33d IPSD	0	0	2	0	0	0
E/20th Inf (LRP)	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	265	3	1999	8	0	72

d. Promotions. A total of 4,435 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

## e. Morale and Personnel Services.

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## (1) Decorations awarded.

Distinguished Service Cross	1
Silver Star	70
Legion of Merit	10
Distinguished Flying Cross	21
Soldiers Medal	9
Bronze Star (Valor)	281
Air Medal (Valor)	72
Army Commendation Medal (Valor)	237
Bronze Star (Service)	199
Air Medal (Service)	1,105
Army Commendation Medal (Service)	1,253
Purple Heart	987
TOTAL	4,152

## (2) Combat Badges.

Combat Infantryman Badge	1,725
Combat Medical Badge	121
Aircraft Crewman Badge	42

f. Reenlistments. 175 reenlistments or extension actions were completed. The enlistment/extension breakdown was: first term RA reenlistments 45, AUS enlistments 36, 13 RA extensions and six AUS extensions.

## g. Postal.

(1) Money Order Sales. \$5,377,644.97

(2) Parcel Post and Postal Fees. \$94,515.60

(3) Incoming Mail. Sacks 17,213 - Pouches 2,416/Daily Average 191 Sacks - 27 Pouches.

(4) Outgoing Mail. Sacks 6,549 - Pouches 1,356/Daily Average 72 Sacks - 15 Pouches.

(5) Number of mail days - 90

## h. Special Services.

(1) The division was visited by three USO shows: Fess Parker, RFD Hollywood, and the Peter Leeds show. The Peter Leeds show performed at the Ivy Bowl with an attendance of approximately 1200.

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(2) R&R quotas received were 4,039 out-of-country and 738 in-country.

(3) A total of 78 movies circulated within the division.

i. Chaplain Activities.

<u>DENOMINATION</u>	<u>NO. OF SERVICES</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Roman Catholic	1,152	33,241
Protestant	1,317	54,492
Jewish	15	245
Memorial Services	84	

j. Maintenance of Discipline, Law and Order.

(1) Provost Marshal.

(a) A total of 732 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's office during the period.

(b) Combined police patrols were effected on 1 March. The composition of the patrols is one 4th Infantry Division Military Policemen, a VIETNAMESE National Policeman, an ARVN QUAN CANH (QC) and an ARVN interpreter. Two such patrols have been operating in the vicinity of the division base camp and handle all military and civil police problems involving US Forces personnel. Two similar patrols are operating in the DAK TO area, but an ARVN QUAN VU (military policeman) is substituted for the QUAN CANH.

(c) A VIETNAMESE National Policeman has served since 1 March as liaison between the division and LE TRUNG District for police matters, with his office in the division Provost Marshal's office.

(d) On 19 March a cordon and search operation was conducted with 11 VIETNAMESE National Policemen, seven 4th Infantry Division Military Policemen, and Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech). Seven suspects were detained.

(2) Military Justice.

(a) General Court-Martial 8

(b) Special Court-Martial 71

(c) Summary Court-Martial 131

k. Health.

(1) The general health of the division remained at a satisfactory level.

(2) Malaria remained the single most important health problem for the division with 422 cases reported for the quarter. The incidence of vivax malaria fell to 3.4 cases/1000 men/month in March, the lowest level since August 1967.

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Falciparum malaria continued to occur at over five cases/1000 men/month. The decrease of vivax can largely be credited to command emphasis on proper use of the Chloroquine-Primaquine tablet. Emphasis on daily use of the Dapsone tablet by each man should lower the incidence of falciparum malaria.

(3) Hepatitis became a significant problem with 29 cases reported in March. It is likely that the majority of cases resulted from ingestion of non-potable water. Particular attention should be given to ensuring use of only potable water in food preparation and to proper treatment of water obtained from streams by units operating in the field.

#### 7. (U) Engineer.

a. General. During this quarter, the 4th Engineer Battalion directed engineer effort from the battalion CP located at Camp Enari, RVN. Companies A, B and C remained in direct support of the 1st, 2d and 3d Brigades respectively. Company C arrived in KONTUM with the 3d Brigade during the latter part of March from BONG SON. Company D increased its combat support role by augmentation of the direct support companies with "chain saw" squads and a rappelling platoon. Company E (Bridge) supported the division with tactical bridging and shared a larger effort in base camp construction. Headquarters and Headquarters Company continued its general support role by providing the line companies with heavy equipment, water purification units, flame APC's and tanks. The composite Rome Flow clearing task force completed clearing of eastwest pioneer roads between routes 509 and 19W and began clearing of Route 511 and the 3d Brigade FSB at ZA2282.

#### b. Intelligence.

(1) Reconnaissance. During the quarter, ground and aerial reconnaissance of routes within the AO were performed by the Battalion S-2. Ground aerial reconnaissance was made of routes 19E, 19W, 509, 7B, 511, 19A, 14N, 3B and 6C. Availability of aircraft for aerial reconnaissance and security vehicles for ground reconnaissance continued to be a problem which restricted the total reconnaissance effort.

#### (2) Enemy Engineer Efforts.

(a) Mine Incidents. Mining activities during the quarter increased almost fifty percent over that of preceding quarter with 190 mining incidents reported. As has been previously experienced these incidents continued to be scattered over the Division area of Operations rather than being concentrated in one particular area. There was a sharp increase in the number of mine incidents on Route 14N, especially between KONTUM and DAK TO, and on Route 511, west of KONTUM near POLEI KLENG. It normally took three to four days after a new fire base was established before supply routes to the fire base were mined. Confirming previous experience of enemy mining habits, mines were always planted in pairs and at times three were found within the same general area. Prior to resurfacing of 19W

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with a double bituminous surface treatment course, the only adequate way to prevent mining was the continuous use of WP fires and the running of track vehicles on the roads at nights. In addition to the M1A1 anti-tank mine commonly used by the enemy, there were 29 82mm mortar rounds found armed as mines. In addition, an isolated instance of the use of a Russian type TM-46 anti-tank mine with an MV-5 fuse was detected. Reports were received of nine US type M-19 plastic mines. It was impossible to detect the M-19 plastic mine by other than visual means. Attempts are being made to trace the source of the plastic mines by tracing lot numbers of recovered mines. AN/FRS 4 mine detectors which detect change in density are being used where the M-19 plastic mine incidents have occurred.

(b) Demolitions. The enemy was successful in damaging two timber trestle bridges on Route 509, YA912450 on 14 April 1968 and ZA039430 on 7 April 1968. In both cases, destruction was incomplete.

c. Operations and training activities.

(1) Operations.

(a) HHC provided the engineer special staff section for the division with command and staff supervision and equipment support to the battalion as a whole. The tank dozers and flame APC's remained consolidated in the provisional platoon and were employed primarily as security for the battalion's Rome Flow Team. Throughout the period the water purification units, consisting of 1500 and 600 gallons per hour units, were utilized at 100% of their capacity. Shortage of gasoline engine driven pumps for the 600 gallon per hour unit required units to operate with only two pumps. On 12 March 1968, the heavy equipment platoon received a Caterpillar D-5A dozer from an airmobile set made available for operations within the Central Highlands. The D-5A dozer was initially moved to POLLEI KLENG for the 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne. The chassis was airlifted by CH-54, Skycrane and the tracks and blade were lifted using a CH-47 Chinook. The D-5A was used to dig berm pits and gun emplacements at POLLEI KLENG. The dozer was then airlifted to clear firebases for the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. The dozer has proven to be a valuable piece of equipment in quickly establishing new FSB's, and in reducing the time to clear firebases. The major problems encountered with the D-5A dozer were the weight of the center section, which approaches the upper limit of the CH-54 Skycrane capability; the unprotected engine compartment; and the lack of repair parts.

(b) Company A provided direct support to the 1st Brigade. The mission of the engineer platoons in support of the infantry battalions continues to be demolition work, chain saw cutting, hand cutting of brush, providing wire emplacements, installation of fougasse mines, and bunker construction. On 17 March 1968, Company A undertook a daily minesweep of Route 511 from DAK TO to Bridge 512-3. A total of 42 minesweeps covering approximately 235 kilometers have been conducted in this period. In an attempt to reduce the time necessary to establish an artillery firebase, the airmobile 3414 tractor with backhoe was airlifted to a hilltop at the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry firebase. The complete 3414 tractor was airlifted using a CH-54

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Skycrane. Consequently, the tractor was in operation within minutes after touching the ground. The 3414 tractor dug a fighting/sleeping bunker within 15 minutes, and operation which normally requires three men four to six hours of hand shovel work. A comparable saving of time was reflected in digging the TOC, FDC, ammunition storage pits, sumps, and leveling pads for the guns. At DAK TO the engineer effort was devoted to upgrading the brigade headquarters and cantonment area, with emphasis on improving drainage.

(c) Company B provided direct support to the 2d Brigade and its brigade base camp development. The brigade was widely dispersed and operated as far north as DAK TO and as far south as BAN ME THUOT. Numerous firebases were cleared by engineer platoons providing direct support to infantry battalions. A period of adjustment was required for the engineer platoons which changed areas of operations due to the fact that mountainous areas near DAK TO are different from those of the flatlands around BAN ME THOUT. Eighteen and 36 inch McCulloch chain saws were used during this period for heavy cutting required in clearing of FSB's. This saw is equipped with carbon-tipped blades and is of heavier construction than the Remington chain saw. Added engine power, carbon tipped blades, better balance, and easier starting makes the McCulloch saw preferable to the Remington. To date, the McCulloch saw is standing up under heavy usage far better than the previous chain saws. The chain saw is the single most important piece of engineer equipment used by forward platoons in clearing FSB's.

(d) Company C provided direct support to the 3d Brigade. During February the brigade's area of operations was between CHU LAI and DA NANG at LZ BALDY. Engineer support generally consisted of two platoons in support of the infantry battalions clearing FSB's, destroying enemy fortifications, and constructing field fortifications. The remaining platoon operated at the brigade FSB and provided daily minesweeps on Routes 1 and 508, patrols near the FSB (resulting in one NVA KIA and nine NVA CIA), assistance to Marine engineers conducting quarry operations, and utilization of the flame APC and service unit as a deterrent against mining. When the 3d Brigade moved to LZ ENGLISH at BONG SON late in February, one engineer squad remained at LZ BALDY, while one platoon from Company D, 4th Engineer Battalion joined the remainder of Company C at LZ ENGLISH. Daily minesweeps were conducted on 50 kilometers of Route 1 from LZ ENGLISH to LZ UPLIFT and from LZ PONY to BONG SON. The bridge at BONG SON required defensive upgrading consisting of bunkers, protective wire, towers, and clearing of the bridge site. Company E's AVLB and launcher was used extensively and successfully in support of the 1st Squadron 10th Cavalry on Route 3A. The advanced party for Company C arrived at KONTUM during the last week of March with the remainder of the company arriving the following week. Clearing operations of FSB's on hilltops west of POLEI KLENG were immediately initiated. The terrain change from the clear and relatively level areas of the coastal plains to the triple canopy jungle of the highlands required a period of adjustment for both the infantry battalions and their supporting engineer platoons. Company C has most of the battalion's heavy equipment

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resources utilized in clearing Route 511 and in construction of the 3d Brigade base camp, located four kilometers south of KONTUM. The 3d Brigade base camp is to consist of the following: An extensive road network, a 15 cell ASP, six bands of perimeter wire, 50 perimeter bunkers, a TOC and FDC, 50 WABTOC tent frames, helicopter revetments and a water point.

(e) Company D continued its general support role in the 4th Division Base Camp, but received several combat support missions. Significant items were: Seven minesweeps on Routes 19W and 7C; support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry with one engineer squad for the recon package; providing one platoon in direct support of the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized Infantry at LZ UPLIFT; support of the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry to assist clearing of a FSB; providing operators for the 3414 airmobile tractor with backhoe that was airlifted to 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry FSB's; two platoons aiding in construction of the 3d Brigade FSB; and overall supervision of the Rome Plow land clearing team. The construction effort within the division base camp was primarily directed toward preparation for the monsoon season. Culvert upgrading was completed for the 124th Signal, 2d Brigade, 704th Maintenance, and 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry areas. Other projects included reveting trailers at DTOC; construction of 10 quonset dayrooms; pouring numerous pads for billets, latrines, showers, orderly rooms, and dayrooms; and construction of Red Cross latrine and shower facilities. A platoon was organized and trained to rappell out of helicopters in order to clear helicopter landing zones. A training mission was conducted north of PLEIKU and a two ship LZ was successfully cleared in two hours. On 30 April the platoon was committed to clear an LZ for the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry to make possible a combat assault on 1 May.

(f) Company E (Bridge) provided general support to the division by installing and retrieving bridges. A 15 float, M4T6 bridge was installed on 22 February across the KRONG POKO River on Route 511W (ZA101914) opening Route 511 for class 60 traffic to POLEI KLENG. On 2 March a 38'-4" M4T6 dry span was installed at BAN ME THOUT (AQ991313) in support of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry. This bridge was extracted on 24 March. The AVLB Platoon provided tactical bridging to the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry and two bridges and a launcher remained with Company B, 299th Engineer Battalion at KONTUM for immediate response to possible enemy bridge destruction on Route 14N. A total of 14 AVLB missions were performed in support of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry. The timber trestle bridge that was destroyed on Route 509 (ZA0394431) was repaired on 12 April. Company E shared a larger portion of the division base camp construction due to heavier commitment of Company D. Base Camp projects included: pouring more than 40 building pads, spreading 2,860 barrels of penepime and constructing catwalks at IA BANG Lake for the base camp water supply lines.

## (2) Training.

(a) Training in the area of operations. Training was conducted at the squad level. Each man was cross trained in demolitions and the use of chain

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saws and mine detectors. Squad leaders conducted discussions with their squads on mandatory subjects. Basic engineer skills were reviewed at frequent intervals to include rigging, bridge classification, field fortification and engineer reconnaissance.

(b) Clearing of Artillery Fire Support Bases.

1. General. Landing zone clearance, fire support base clearance, and construction are normally handled by the direct support engineer platoon working with the infantry battalion. Companies A, B, and C have an engineer platoon with each infantry battalion of the brigades. When an infantry battalion conducts a combat assault, an engineer platoon is normally in the second or third lift into the LZ. Under the present MTOE, the engineer platoon consists of 32 enlisted men and one officer; however, the strength that can be fielded at any given time is nearer twenty enlisted men and one officer. One engineer squad with demolitions can accompany the security force into a given location and cut the initial one ship LZ. When additional security forces are airlifted into LZ areas, the balance of the engineer platoon is also airlifted in taking with the pre-mixed gasoline and oil, additional oil for chain oilers, and chainsaws, pioneer hand tools, and additional demolition equipment and explosives. In approximately one day a given FSB can be sufficiently enlarged to receive mortars to provide indirect fire for defense of the FSB. After two days of clearing the area is large enough to accept the battalion tactical operations center (TOC), 105mm howitzer battery, and the battery fire direction center (FDC).

(2) After the location for a FSB has been chosen and reconnaissance performed, the infantry battalion commander decides how the security force will enter the area. Security forces will either combat assault (CA) directly into the desired location, or CA into a nearby LZ and then walk into the FSB location. The FSB area will often receive a preparation normally consisting of both Air Force ordnance and artillery fire. After two days in the FSB the tree mask can be sufficiently cleared to provide the artillery unit with the principal directions of fire. By the third day, the artillery tree mask has been eliminated. At this time the engineers will assist in further developing the perimeter and fields of fire on which the infantry has worked since its initial entry into the area.

3. FSB Layout. There are certain items in the layout of a FSB which should be given consideration in the FSB development. These items are normally decided by the battalion CO or his S3, with recommendations from the engineer platoon leader. These considerations are: siting of the artillery battery, location of the resupply heli-pad, battalion TOC, and artillery FDC. The siting of the artillery battery is normally given first priority with other facilities situated around the battery. The artillery battery commander will indicate the size and location of the area to be occupied by the tubes (normally five each). It must be relatively flat and as free from stumps as possible. It is desirable to locate the resupply pad downwind from the main

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portion of the FSB during the dry season. The heavy traffic of CH-47 Chinooks causes a dust problem which creates a health and safety hazard. The resupply pad should be located so that ammunition does not have to be carried an excessive distance to the artillery battery or mortar platoon, and the artillery FDC should be located close to the artillery tubes for control. The command pad is normally located near the battalion TOC. Bomb craters are often used as an emplacement for both the battalion TOC and the FDC. The overall size of a FSB depends on the area and the number and type of units which are to occupy the base. A mortar base on a flat plateau might be as small as 100m x 100m, while a FSB intended to support a 105mm and 155mm battery on a ridge might be as large as 250m x 400m.

#### 4. Demolitions.

a. Use of demolitions in FSB development. Demolitions used in clearing are C-4 plastic explosive, TNT, detonating cord, bangalore torpedoes, and 15 pound shaped charges. The C-4 and det-cord are used for felling standing timber and these two items account for the greatest bulk of demolitions used in the FSB. When C-4 is not available, TNT is acceptable but less desirable. The approximate weight of C-4 required to fell trees is 70% of the weight of TNT required to do the same job. C-4 is easier to place than TNT and can be molded around trees for more efficient use. When felling trees, charges are placed on the tree approximately four to five feet above the ground to take advantage of the decrease of diameter. The stumps are dissected with chainsaws when their existence would interfere with an artillery gun pit or some other facility. Up to 100 trees have been charged at one time, and are simultaneously detonated using a ring main of detonating cord. Non-electric caps are preferred because of the potential hazard of radio signals prematurely detonating an electric cap. The precise control of detonation time which is available using electric caps is therefore sacrificed. The quantity of C-4 and det-cord required in clearing a FSB varies with the type and density of vegetation, and the size of the base necessary. Battalion FSB's with a 105 DS artillery battery, require an average of 9,500 pounds of C-4 and approximately 11,000 feet of detonating cord. A rule of thumb which relates number of pounds of C-4 to feet of det-cord has been developed. For dense vegetation triple canopy, average three diameter between 12 to 36 inches, approximately one foot of det-cord is required for each pound of explosive. For light vegetation, approximately two feet of det-cord is required for each pound of explosive. Bangalore torpedoes are used extensively in dense bamboo growth. Although not specifically designed for this purpose, the shrapnel from the torpedoes is extremely effective in leveling bamboo growths, even with stalk diameters up to six inches. Chainsaws are totally ineffective against bamboo. The pulp will clog the saw chain, and the chain assembly must be disassembled and cleaned after only one cutting. The bangalore torpedo pattern used is parallel lines spaced at approximately ten foot intervals. The length and number of lines required depends upon the area being detonated at one time. Bamboo packed with C-4 was used as a field expedient on one firebase to clear bamboo thickets when bangalore torpedoes were not available.

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b. Logistic support for demolitions has been handled by the supported infantry battalion's S-4. About three days prior to combat assaulting, the engineer platoon leader will give his initial demolition requirements to the battalion S4. The platoon leader will determine what demolitions he will carry in with his unit, and the S4 will make arrangements to have the balance of the demolitions airlifted into the initial LZ. The brigade DS engineer company commander monitors availability of demolitions, and coordinates with the Brigade S4 when there is an insufficient supply.

c. Shaped charges and cratering charges have been used to facilitate digging of foxholes, bunkers, ammunition storage pits, mess hall sumps, and artillery powder burn pits. There has been no difficulty in obtaining 15 pound shaped charges and 40 pound cratering charges. The results obtained using the 15 pound shaped charges have varied with the type of soil encountered. In clay, or laterite, a hole approximately 3 or 4 feet deep, and approximately the same diameter is obtained. In shale or other soil with rock, (often decomposed granite) the resulting hole is about 2-3 feet deep, same diameter, however the digging is easier for a greater distance because the surrounding rock has been shattered. When larger excavations are required, the hole resulting from a shaped charge is cleaned out, deepened with a post hole digger or hand auger, and a cratering charge is placed at a depth of approximately five feet. The resulting crater will be about eight feet deep, and about 10-12 feet in diameter.

d. Experiments to reduce the amount of explosives used in timber clearing operations have shown that notching a tree with a chainsaw and placing explosives in the notch will reduce the required amount of explosives. During hasty LZ construction and during the initial phase of FSB clearing, the reduction of explosives does not warrant the additional time required. The notching technique is satisfactory for further developing a FSB during occupancy.

e. Linear shaped charges for cutting timber would reduce the overall amount of demolitions required for the clearing operations. Linear shaped charges are classified ENSURE (Expediting Non Standard Urgent Requirements for Equipment) and were requested through operations channels. At the time of this writing the linear shaped charges were not available in the 4th Infantry Division.

5. Use of Chainsaws: Chainsaws are used for two operations in clearing FSB. They are used for cutting down standing timber of diameter less than 16", but the major portion of their job is to cut fallen timber previously dropped using demolitions. The fallen timber is cut into 6-8 foot lengths for use in constructing overhead cover. Large diameter logs (greater than 12") are cut into smaller pieces which can be man-handled out to the area beyond the FSB perimeter.

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The 18" Remington chainsaw has proven to be a constant maintenance ~~problem~~. It is unsatisfactory for clearing operations conducted in the Central Highlands. The ~~size and type~~ type of trees (mostly mahogany) encountered cannot be effectively cleared with this saw ~~because~~ it lacks durable engine and chain blade assemblies. Shrapnel from preparation ~~has also been~~ a source of maintenance problems. Hidden pieces of steel cause broken dull chains. There has been a shortage of chains, sparkplugs, and chainsaw files. Blades must be sharpened after every four or five cuttings, and a file can be expected to last only 3 to 4 blade sharpenings. It has also been found that the starter mechanism of the Remington chainsaw is too light and breaks often, the carburetor requires continual adjustment, and the claw (dog) which grips the tree to assist the saw in cutting wood has repeatedly broken due to the failure of the aluminum screws used to secure the claw to the saw casing. Only 50-75% of the saws being used in FSB are in operational status at any one time. One man is generally assigned the full time job as chainsaw mechanic in the FSB.

6. Use of the D-6B or D5A Dozer.

a. Clearing operations in the FSB's are greatly enhanced by the availability of a bulldozer. As there are normally no roads into a FSB, the dozer is airlifted into the base using the CH-54 Skycrane. The dozer can be used to level bamboo, move large fallen timber, and dig ammunition slots and sumps. A dozer will normally be used within the FSB for a week.

b. The blades and tracks are removed from the tractor because the CH-54 cannot lift the complete dozer. In the past the blade and tracks have required two CH-47 Chinook sorties. Recent experiments have combined the blades and tracks into one sortie, with the tracks wrapped around the blade frame. The dozer chassis is one CH-54 sortie. The CH-47 first lifts the blade and tracks into location and positions the tracks. The Skycrane then lifts in the dozer chassis and positions it on top of the tracks. The tracks are then assembled on the chassis and the dozer walks into position to have the blade attached. With a well trained crew and correct placement of components the reassembly time at the FSB is 15-30 minutes.

c. An airlift conversion kit is considered to be unsatisfactory for use with the D-6B (Mechanically operated rather than hydraulically operated blade) in that it requires two CH-54 Skycrane sorties, and at least three hours for reassembly on the rough terrain normally encountered in the FSB's.

7. Overhead Cover. Common sense and prudence dictate that overhead cover must be provided as soon as possible after arrival in the FSB. Where timber is available the engineer platoon must ensure that logs of proper thickness and length are provided for overhead cover. Also, the engineer platoon leader must ensure that he provides enough time for his own personnel to construct their overhead cover. The support provided to the clearing operation must be reduced about midafternoon of the first day for this purpose. Where timber is not available, M8A1 matting and PSP, as well as

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pre-fabricated bunker material may be required for the construction of immediate overhead cover.

g. Summary.

a. The clearing of FSB's is normally accomplished by the DS engineer platoon supporting an infantry battalion. The equipment used in clearing is demolitions (primarily C-4 and det-cord), chainsaws, axes, and machettes.

b. Shaped charges and cratering charges are used to facilitate excavation of foxholes and bunkers.

c. D-6 bulldozers are desirable in the clearing operation.

d. Where timber is not available, M8A1 matting, PSP, and pre-fabricated bunker material may be supplied.

(c) Organization and Training of the Engineer Rappelling Platoon.

1. General. During the period 18-24 March a program of intensive training was conducted to prepare an engineer platoon to rappell into a heavily wooded area to cut a two ship LZ. The training was evaluated in a one day field training exercise.

2. Training schedule:

1st Day

Subject

0700-0750	PT: Daily Dozen
0800-0850	Fundamentals of explosives and demolitions
0900-1050	Non-electric priming, Demolitions
1300-1700	Practical exercise on electric non-electric demolitions.

2d Day

0700-0750	PT: Daily Dozen
0800-0950	Charge calculation, timber cutting, pressure charges, stump removal
1000-1200	Use of chain saw
1300-1700	Practical exercise in Demo calculation and tree cutting

3d Day

0700-0750	PT: Daily Dozen
0800-1200	Equipment check
1300-1700	Artillery and gunship Fire support adjustment

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4th Day

0700-0750 PT: Daily Dozen  
0800-0900 Tower orientation  
0930-1130 Rappelling (cliff side of tower)  
1240-1530 Rappelling (cliff side of tower and free tower)  
1530-1700 Knots, lashing and rigging

5th Day

0700-0750 PT: Daily Dozen  
0800-0850 Methods of Infiltration (rope ladder) Rappelling  
0900-0950 Helicopter orientation  
1000-1100 Rigging Helicopter  
1230-1330 Rope ladder (free tower) w/o equip  
1400-1700 Ladder Tng (free tower w/equip)

6th Day

0700-0750 PT: Daily dozen and Run  
0800-0950 Lashing and rigging helicopter (practical work)  
1000-1120 Helicopter loading and unloading techniques  
1230-1450 Lashing and rigging of LZ clearing material  
1500-1700 Rappelling (free tower)

7th Day

0700-0730 Move to south range  
0730-0800 Helicopter rigging  
0800-1130 Rappelling from helicopter at hover (100 ft)  
1300-1700 Rappelling from helicopter at hover

3. 30 March 1968. LZ clearing operation at ZA173682. The LZ was constructed in an east-west direction as this was the most favorable direction from terrain observation and to insure maximum use of prevailing winds which are from a northeast direction during the dry season. The mission was performed by the 2d Platoon Company D, 1st platoon from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry as the security element. The engineer platoon was composed of 28 men including the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and RTO. At approximately 1015 hours the first five man engineer team was inserted into the area. The insertion took 30 minutes. The problems on insertion were that ropes became entangled in trees due to slight movement of ships and three engineers were injured during insertion. At 1110 hours full scale operations began in clearing the LZ. The platoon leader defined the area to be cleared and a detonating ring main was strung through the area. At the same time other members of the platoon were placing charges on the base of trees. The charges were prepared the night before by wiring one pound blocks together with three foot wires on either end for wiring to the trees.

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Blasting caps were already crimped on 4 foot sections of det-cord and these were placed in charges while the running end was tied to the ring main. On the initial blast the general area of the LZ was defined and engineers then began placing charges on remaining trees too large to be cut by chainsaws and large trees grounded for removal from the area. One chainsaw broke down ten minutes after work began and one saw was used to clear the entire LZ. Machettes were used extensively for removing limbs from trees and brush on the LZ area. The overall operation to clear the 120x35 meter LZ took 2½ hours.

4. 29 April to Present. ERP's were airlifted to POLEI KIENG and inserted to CHU DO (YA8593) for clearing of LZ's for 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.

5. Administrative Matters. Air transportation and support provided by 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry and 189 AHC was superior. Communications were maintained all times with the security element as well as with the command ship. There was no resupply during this period as elements were selfsustaining during this training mission. There were three minor injuries.

6. Commander's Analysis. The scope and purpose of the LZ clearing by means of insertion is sound. Such activities can be highly effective and problems that developed on this initial mission can be eliminated. The operation proved that the basic concept is workable and should be used.

## 7. Recommendations.

a. That in future operations all equipment such as explosives or chain saws be lowered or dropped after the engineers are already on the ground.

b. That a minimum of five operational chainsaws be taken on such missions as on this mission there was only one operational chain saw and this caused work to be extended by at least one hour.

c. That more air support be given and less ground security provided as it becomes difficult to extract a large number of individuals in case of emergency.

d. That missions be regularly scheduled to maintain the degree of proficiency necessary for this special type unit.

e. That only two ropes be used for rappelling from any one ship to lessen tangling of ropes and undue strain on aircraft.

f. That two or three drop zones be utilized instead of one.

(d) Organic land clearing team. The "Rome Plow" team completed clearing brush and trees for the 30 kilometer lateral east-west pioneer road

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between routes 509 and 19W. The team utilized the D-7E dozers from HHC and Companies D and E. A combination of one bull and three roma blades proved to be most effective in clearing operations since the bull provided better assistance in movement of windrows, digging right locations for the clearing team, and construction of the pioneer road. Clearing in this area ranged from light to heavy, averaging 1.5 acres per hour for light and 0.5 acres per hour in heavy clearing. In April the team was reconstituted and cleared Route 511 from POLEI KLENG to KONTUM.

d. Logistics.

(1) Excessive lead time has been experienced in replacing generators and cement mixers.

(2) Repair parts support for the armored vehicle launched bridge and the tank dozer continued to be non-existent.

(3) Adequate stockage of C-4 is on hand at the Division ASP.

(4) Heavy timber for bridge PLL is still not available.

(5) McCulloch Chain Saw.

(a) The 4th Engineer Battalion received thirty new McCulloch chainsaws with 18 and 36 inch blades, models 795 and 895 respectively. These saws are being considered as replacements for the present Remington saw which has proven unsatisfactory for cutting required in the Central Highlands.

(b) Prior to issuing the new saws to the line platoons, a three hour class on its operation, maintenance, and control was presented to each receiving element. A three man instructor team was heli-lifted to six different forward fire bases for the instruction.

(c) The using engineers are extremely pleased with the new saw. The added engine power, carbon-tipped blades, better balance and easier starts make the saw easier to handle and much more efficient than the Remington. To date, the saw is standing up under heavy usage far better than the previous saw.

(d) The main problems anticipated with the McCullochs are maintenance and repair. A system has been established whereby all inoperative saws are evacuated to battalion maintenance as soon as possible where a repair facility has been established. A replacement saw is immediately returned to the using unit. Requisitions have been submitted to establish a PLL, and all repair parts except spark plugs and filters will be maintained at the battalion repair facility. Filters and spark plugs will be maintained at the using unit.

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To date no repair parts have been received which has caused a heavy deadline rate.

(g) Airmobile Engineer Equipment Set. The 90th Heavy Material Support Company at PLEIKU started receiving its airmobile equipment during March. The 4th Engineer Battalion had received a D-5A dozer and two 3414 tractors on a one time mission basis with approval from USARV. Continuous requests for extensions of the D-5A and 3414 equipment became necessary in order to meet the requirements of clearing new fire bases west of KONTUM. Both the D-5A dozer and the 3414 tractor have proven to be valuable in quick establishment of new FSB's and in reducing the time necessary to clear firebases which are only accessible by air. Both pieces were airlifted by CH-54 Skycrane. The dozer and tractor are being used in the establishment of new FSB's for a period of six to eight working days. Experience has shown that a minimum of two D-5A dozers and two 3414 tractors with backhoe are required.

8. (U) Inspector General:

a. General. On 6 February 1968, a program of Command Inspections of division units was initiated to provide the Commanding General with an independent appraisal of the overall condition of the unit inspected. The inspections encompass all aspects of personnel and administration, security, training, logistics and civil affairs.

b. Organization: The inspection team is headed by ADC-B and includes the Annual General Inspection Team, Command Materiel Maintenance Inspection Team plus officer (normally field grade) representation from all general staff sections and selected special staff sections. Units to be inspected are notified 48 hours in advance. The inspection is confined to the base camp area and is completed in one day.

c. Inspections:

(1) During the period Feb - Apr 68, the following units were inspected:

- (a) 4th Administration Company
- (b) HHC, 1st Brigade
- (c) 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry
- (d) 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry
- (e) HHC, 4th Infantry Division

(2) Results. The results of these inspections indicate that additional emphasis is most needed in the areas of unit supply, vehicle maintenance, records, and medical/sanitation. The utilization of the AGI and CMMI teams

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provided a trained and experienced nucleus for the Command Inspection Program. Initial orientation was required for the additional inspectors provided by the general and special staff sections.

d. Complaints.

Justified	20
Unjustified	26
Requests for assistance	149

9. (C) Signal.

a. Plans.

(1) Company C, 124th Signal Battalion was reorganized on 27 March 1968 under MTOE 11-39E. There were no personnel changes and only minor adjustments in equipment allowances.

(2) The 3d Platoon, Company B, 124th Signal Battalion returned from operations on the coast with the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division on 30 March 1968.

(3) Construction of the building for the Dial Telephone Exchange Facility began on 11 April. Company C, 518th Engineer Battalion is constructing the facility, which is projected for completion on or about 1 August.

(4) Construction of the new bunker complex on Dragon Mountain continued during the quarter.

(5) Approval for expansion of the outside telephone plant to support the telephone exchange has been received from USARV.

(6) On 23 March the Armed Forces Radio Service assumed responsibility for daytime broadcasting from 0800 to 1700 as the 124th Signal Battalion assumed responsibility for the remaining 15 hours.

(b) Operations.

(1) VHF Operations.

(a) The below listed VHF systems were in operation as of the end of the reporting period:

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>RELAYS</u>	<u>RQD</u>
4TH INF DIV MAIN (AR794348)	2/1 CAV SQD (BRO32532)		
	1/10 CAV SQD (ZA099679)		1

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1st BDE FWD (ZB004217)	2
1st BDE FWD (ZB004217)	2
2d BDE FWD (ZA112275)	
2d BDE FWD (ZA112275)	
3d BDE FWD (AR785905)	2
3d BDE FWD (AR785905)	

(b) The versatility and dependability of the four channel VHF equipment, AN/MRC-112, proved to be a necessary aid when supporting battalion sized units which move frequently. Recently an AN/MRC-112 with a two man team of operators was attached to a cavalry squadron forward element. The unit changed location frequently. The use of an Omni-directional ground plane antenna allowed contact to be reestablished quickly. Once contact was established, a Yagi antenna was used for its increased gain.

(c) The Signal Battalion established and operated a 126 kilometer VHF system in support of an infantry battalion. The normal planning range of the VHF radio, TRC-24 is 30 miles (line of sight). This system was engineered utilizing the technique of "obstacle gain," wherein the range of the VHF radio can in some cases be greatly extended. Through mathematical computations, this system was calculated to be possible within a certain range of frequencies. The system was installed using the calculated frequency range and proved to be both reliable and effective. The infantry battalion moved on four subsequent occasions and each time the system was reestablished with minimum difficulty.

(2) AM Radio Operations.

(a) The 124th Signal Battalion continued to operate the Net Control Station for Division Command Net #3, as well as a station in the IFFV RATT and SSB nets.

(b) Communications using the AN/VSC-2, SSB, RATT, were used extensively in operations. The following nets were maintained:

1. 173d Abn Bde (KONTUM)
2. 1-12 Inf (BAN ME THUOT)

(3) FM Radio Operations.

(a) The battalion continued to operate Division Command Net #1, DIOC remotes, and Dragon Mountain retransmission station. An additional retransmission station was provided to the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry during their operation in the southern portion of the Area of Operations.

(b) FM radio sets for NCS continued in operation for the VHF and HF Tollhouse, Division Intelligence, and G-2 Air nets.

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(c) FM retransmission stations were also provided on Dragon Mountain for a Dustoff net and the Division Transportation Office.

(4) Communication Center Operation:

(a) At present the following teletype circuits are in operation at the Division Main Communications Center.

1. 2 circuits to IFFV (Typhoon).
2. 1 circuit to PLEIKU.
3. 1 circuit to 1st Bde (Formal)
4. 1 circuit to 2d Bde (Fortify)
5. 1 circuit to 3d Bde (Flexible)

(b) One teletype circuit from DTOC to IFFV TOC is provided for coordination of combat operations.

(c) Teletype circuits are provided over tactical VHF systems for the 374th RRC to forward elements located at each of the three brigades.

10. (U) Information Activities.

a. During the quarter 42 news media representatives visited the division covering a variety of subjects from strictly hometown material to the recent heavy action west of KONTUM. The Commanding General briefed eight of the correspondents personally, among which were representatives of the New York Times, Chicago Tribune, Washington Post, London Times, UPI, NBC and CBS. No problems were experienced in housing and transporting correspondents. The press billets are being continually improved with furniture and furnishings, through limited space prevents any increase in capacity.

b. Membership in the Division Chapter of the 4th Division Association reached 5,067. Groundwork was laid for a 4th Division Association Scholarship Fund.

c. The return of the 3d Brigade to the Division proved highly beneficial to the Information Office. The brigade's 14th Public Information Detachment had an abundance of useful photographic equipment acquired when the Brigade was part of the 25th Division. Much of this equipment was redistributed where needed elsewhere in the division.

In addition the PLEIKU area Central Post Welfare Fund allocated the information office a grant of over \$3,000.00 to purchase needed photographic and sound equipment. While administrative problems have delayed actual purchase of this equipment, these problems are being solved.

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d. In March the information office received the latest edition of the 4th Division Magazine in 20,000 copies. This magazine serves as an orientation to replacements and has been distributed throughout the division for use in dayrooms.

In addition the information office just recently received a grant of \$2,000 from the PLEIKU area Central Post Welfare Fund to finance a 4th Division Combat History in magazine format. The new magazine is in process of development and should be taken to Japan for printing in July.

e. During the period the number and quality of Home Town News Releases submitted improved greatly, largely due to heavy command emphasis and improvements in the system within the information office. Over 2,000 HTNR's are now being submitted monthly.

f. The radio-television section continued to present "FOCUS", its weekly television program. In addition in April the section began presenting a daily "News Highlights" radio program each morning featuring 4th Division news. In March, 30 taped interviews were submitted by the section for hometown release. A series of television home town release was also submitted. As equipment status improves, this function of the section will receive increased emphasis.

g. According to USARV Information office figures, the division continues to stand high among infantry divisions in number of inches of copy printed in the Army Reporter for the quarter. In January the division ranked 5th. In February our position was upped to second behind the 101st Airborne Division and in March to first in narrative copy. Figures for April are not available yet.

The Information Office under direction of the Commanding General has begun sending specially tailored and packaged photo-feature stories weekly to the Service papers serving VIETNAM.

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SECTION 2 (C) LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATIONS, EVALUATIONS, AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. (U) Personnel.

1. SHORTAGE OF AVIATORS

Observation: Non-rated officers have replaced aviators occupying staff positions which require no flying.

Evaluation: The present USARV manning level of 83 per cent for aviation units is such that all cockpit slots and all staff positions cannot be filled. A solution to the problem is assignment of non-rated officer to positions such as S1, S2, S4, S5 and communications officer. Since the duties of such personnel in battalion sized units are similar, and since such officers often would have little time for flying, a good solution is to utilize non-rated officers.

Recommendation: That non-rated officers be assigned to certain staff positions in order to alleviate the shortage of pilots.

2. REAR AREA REST CENTERS

Observation: Personnel in the companies are seldom able, because of the press of operational commitments, to relax completely and get a full day's rest. Any method of providing the opportunity for such rest, on an equitable basis, pays dividends in higher morale and efficiency.

Evaluation: One of the maneuver battalions established a small rest center in its trains area, and sent a man from each company back each evening with the resupply helicopter. A small field expedient steam bath and shower were available, as were clean clothes, a floored sleeping tent, bunks, and a movie. Each man was afforded the opportunity to clean up, change clothes, see a movie, get refreshments, and relax for twenty-four hours before returning to his unit. The program had a noticeable effect on the morale of the unit.

Recommendation: That a small inexpensive rest center be established away from the battalion forward area to provide personnel with a means of periodic relaxation.

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2. (C) Operations.

1. AFTER CONTACT BLOCKING FIRES

Observation: NVA elements tend to regroup after an attack much closer to the perimeter than would normally be expected.

Evaluation: Withdrawing NVA elements tend to regroup within 300-400 meters of the perimeter, thus avoiding areas in which air strikes and blocking fires would normally be placed. Knowing this, units can fire in their DEFCONS very close to the perimeter, plan blocking fires close-in, and expect to bring air strikes close-in when the enemy is withdrawing from contact.

Recommendation: That after a contact blocking fires be placed within 300 to 400 meter of US positions.

2. USE OF A FLASH OP

Observation: Enemy rocket and mortar positions can be located by use of a "flash OP".

Evaluation: A "flash OP". ie., an OP manned around the clock with the primary mission of watching for the flash of enemy weapons, is a valuable adjunct to the counter-mortar/counter-rocket program. The OP is manned by responsible individuals, picked from a rotating duty roster, and provides instantaneous warning of enemy rocket or mortar firing, including location of the sighting. Appropriate suppressive fires can then be brought to bear.

Recommendation: A flash OP can be set up near the FSB in almost all situations where mortars or rockets are a threat. This will transform the normally hit-or-miss observation of enemy weapons firing into a reliable, responsive system.

3. LZ PREPARATION

Observation: There is a tendency to fall into a pattern when preparing an LZ for a combat assault, and to use the same pattern for every LZ.

Evaluation: Units often tend to use the same length and type of artillery preparation on every LZ; to always use a particular munition. This practice may allow the enemy to eventually learn to work around the pattern, and as a result the preparation may miss enemy positions entirely. In cases where little or no preparation is required, following the same pattern may waste time and ammunition. Always firing for the same length of time permits the enemy to leave his protective bunkers and effectively deploy before US troops can be landed.

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Recommendation: That each LZ be studied as a separate problem for each combat assault. A pattern of fires should be planned specifically for that LZ after considering the known enemy position, likely positions, and the shape of LZ. Lifting of preparatory fires, followed by a feint towards the LZ and an immediate TOT, would discourage the enemy from deploying too rapidly around the LZ.

#### 4. PLACEMENT OF FSB BUNKERS

Observation: FSB bunkers must be positioned so as to allow for direct fire by the direct support artillery battery.

Evaluation: FSB bunkers, especially those on the perimeter, may limit the ability of the battery to fire close range direct fire, unless care is taken in the positioning of the bunkers. They should be located far enough down the slope to allow the artillery pieces to fire direct fire at maximum depression. This becomes especially critical should the need arise to fire "bee-hive" ammunition.

Recommendation: The FSB should be surveyed during initial preparation and the bunker line should be planned to allow for maximum defensive capability while still allowing maximum direct fire capability for the artillery battery.

#### 5. FSB COMMUNICATION TRENCHES

Observation: A protected means of moving from bunker to bunker is an indispensable part of FSB construction.

Evaluation: Units need inter-connecting trenches between bunkers, particularly those on the perimeter, but as soon as possible between all bunkers. These trenches provide a means of rapidly moving reinforcements and ammunition to threatened areas during an attack, and provide protection for leaders and all other personnel who need to move about. In one instance, perimeter personnel were able to escape injury by using trenches during a 75mm RR attack, even though the enemy weapon destroyed several bunkers before suppressive fires were effective.

Recommendation: Communication trenches should be constructed in FSB's on a priority basis after preparation of bunkers and ammunition pits.

#### 6. EARLY WARNING FOR FIREBASES

Observation: Sporadic mortar fire frequently results in numerous

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casualties until an adequate warning system is developed.

Evaluation: At one firebase 82mm mortar fire was received at irregular intervals and followed no particular pattern. Casualties mounted because most functions on the FSB required that personnel be exposed. It was necessary to establish a means of warning all personnel so they could seek cover before the first rounds impacted. It was determined that personnel on the forward edge of the perimeter could hear the sound of the mortar being fired; consequently, one man was kept on duty in that area at all times with the mission of listening and sounding the alert. At the first sound of a mortar firing, he turned on a siren mounted on top of the TOC. This gave audible warning to all exposed personnel and they had sufficient time to take cover. Not one casualty was taken from enemy mortar fire after this system was instituted.

Recommendation: That any unit in similar circumstances establish a simple, fast and audible warning system of this nature.

#### 7. FSB PROTECTION DURING DEVELOPMENT

Observation: Large trees that are felled when clearing a FSB and left in place even temporarily, provide the enemy with an avenue of approach into the position. Such approaches are also provided by old enemy bunker positions located near the FSB.

Evaluation: Large trees that are felled outward from the center of the FSB may be difficult to destroy or remove, at least during the initial stages of FSB development. They provide an excellent covered approach for enemy elements, as do old enemy bunkers which are frequently located downhill from the FSB. Action must be taken to deny these approaches to an enemy force.

Recommendation: That the FSB unit emplace bangalore torpedoes and the special explosive fragmacord, rigged with trip wire, under the downhill side of the fallen trees. Similar treatment of old enemy bunkers is appropriate.

#### 8. 106MM RECOILLESS AS DEFENSIVE WEAPON

Observation: Organic heavy direct-fire weapons can be used advantageously in mountainous terrain.

Evaluation: There are many instances in which direct fire is needed and artillery is not able to provide it because of proximity to friendly troops or conflicting missions. The 106mm recoilless rifle was found to be excellent for this purpose, despite a tendency in the

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past to ignore this weapon during operations in the Central Highlands. The weapon is accurate, effective, and more responsive than weapons systems using an FDC. It was frequently used in a role similar to that of artillery firing direct fire, with outstanding effects.

Recommendation: That the 106mm recoilless rifle be used consistently as one of the supporting weapons in the FSB. Where units are operating near the FSB its fire can assist their operations; in all situations, the 106 can be integrated into the defense of the perimeter.

#### 9. PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF AMMUNITION FIRES

Observation: There is constant danger of ammunition fires within FSB's, especially in areas subject to enemy fires.

Evaluation: It is necessary to place adequate stocks of ammunition in the battalion FSB, with the attendant danger of fire, especially during the early phases of FSB construction. It was found that once such a fire started, it was almost impossible to extinguish; the best solution was to contain it and prevent its spreading from one ammunition pit to another.

Recommendation: That a chemical fire extinguisher be placed near each ammunition pit, and that personnel be positioned near the fire but in a protected area between bunkers or in a trench where they can observe the fire and take action to control it if it starts to spread.

#### 10. USE OF FLASHTRAPS AS DETECTORS

Observation: NVA and VC elements frequently move through the same areas repeatedly, especially where terrain restricts alternate movement. US units can take advantage of this fact if these areas are located, indirect fires are plotted in the area, and some means is established whereby enemy movement through the target area is picked up.

Evaluation: It has been determined that the "flash trap" is an effective means of reacting to enemy movement. When patrols locate an area through which there has been repeated enemy movement, mortar and artillery concentrations are plotted and fired into the area. A later patrol re-enters the area and sets out a series of trip flares. Smoke grenades with trip wires may also be set. An OP, manned around the clock, then observes the area. When the trip flares or smoke grenades are set off, the pre-planned concentrations are fired.

Recommendation: That flash traps be set any time a unit is in a position to observe an area through which the enemy habitually moves.

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11. DESIGNATION OF AN AIR COMMANDER

Observation: Helicopter gunships from different units in support of the same contact often experience delays and confusion in attempting to engage the enemy because of the lack of an air mission commander to direct the combined gunship support mission.

Evaluation: Delays and confusion have been experienced when gunships from different units react to a contact, as there is often no provision for an overall air commander. The need for such a commander is much like the need for a ground commander, i.e. one aircraft would program each gun team on target, give all gunships the situation report, mark the target and identify friendly positions. Factors such as utilization of aircraft which are short on fuel can be accounted for by such an arrangement. An SOP is needed which regulates who will be the air mission commander in the event that the ground situation requires air support from separate units. The first ship to arrive, or if available, a forward air controller would be suggested solutions.

Recommendation: That units make provision for designation of an air mission commander in cases where none has been designated.

12. SEPARATE FREQUENCIES FOR BRIGADE AO

Observation: Artillery advisory nets should employ separate FM frequencies for each brigade area of operation when interference between stations is experienced.

Evaluation: Different advisory stations operating on the same artillery warning net caused interference between stations often resulting in delay and a failure to receive artillery warnings. This problem was solved by assigning a different frequency to each brigade area of operation.

Recommendation: That separate frequencies be established for each brigade sized area of operations to eliminate interference between stations.

13. FLIGHT ROUTES BY ARTILLERY ADVISORY NETS

Observation: Artillery advisories provided for aviators should be given in the form of safe flight routes, in relation to prominent geographical terrain features, e.g., clear to fly east of Highway 14N from KONTUM to DAK TO.

Evaluation: Artillery firing data given to aviators formerly included the point of origin, direction and maximum ordinate of fire. The pilot was then required to plot the artillery data and plan

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a flight route adjusting to the known sectors of fire. The policy now is that aviators inform the artillery warning net of their points of departure and destination, and the air advisory net gives a safe route of flight which avoids potential danger areas.

Recommendation: That artillery advisory nets provide aviators with clear flight routes, using prominent geographical terrain features as reference criteria.

#### 14. STANDARD FREQUENCIES FOR HELICOPTER OPERATIONS

Observation: There is a need for standard helicopter gunship frequencies for divisional or brigade areas of operations.

Evaluation: Helicopter gunships have a need for designated frequencies to communicate with ground troops and other helicopters. There should be a common FM frequency that can be used to coordinate with ground elements and a common UHF/VHF frequency that aircraft from different units can use to effect immediate contact and coordination. The use of a standard set of frequencies for each area would give ground and air elements a quick reaction to contact capability.

Recommendation: That FM and UHF/VHF frequencies be designated by brigade area for use in helicopter operations when reacting to an immediate contact.

#### 15. BINH MINH NEWS FOR NVA

Observation: HOI CHANH's report that within the ranks of the North VIETNAMESE Army there is a scarcity of news, except that which is disseminated by political cadre.

Evaluation: Based on the observation above, a bi-weekly newspaper called "BINH MINH" (Trans: First Light) was initiated. The objective of the newspaper is to present a series of credible news stories to the NVA target audience. The newspaper includes a brief editorial of thoughtful provoking quality and short news reports of war activity throughout the Republic of VIETNAM, quotes from North VIETNAMESE Governmental sources, and selected news stories which relate to the war. Illustrations are also included. The newspaper was tested on two HOI CHANH personnel who rallied on 20 April 1968. Their comments were generally favorable, particularly in regard to articles in which North VIETNAMESE news sources were quoted. They recommended that the illustrations include pictures of female personnel, more stories on the overall view of the war, and the use of a blank sheet of paper to be mixed with the newspaper so as to camouflage the news sheet itself. Thus, if a soldier were to read the paper, he could quickly revert to writing or drawing on the blank sheet if in danger of observation by a cadre officer.

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Recommendation: That the newspaper be continued and that the recommendations of the HOI CHANH panel testing the newspaper "BINH MINH" be included in future issues.

(The following lesson learned is an extract from an analysis prepared by the Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry)

#### 16. NVA USE OF SADDLE POSITIONS

Observation: During the period covered by this report, attacking elements of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, operating west of POLEI KLENG, came up against three separate "saddle positions". The positions, each of which would accommodate an estimated NVA company, were laid out in a similar fashion; furthermore, the tactics and techniques used by the NVA at each position were almost identical.

Evaluation: The "saddle position" and the NVA tactics associated therewith could be a unit characteristic; however, discussion with the Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry indicates that his element also encountered a "saddle position" some two months earlier when they were fighting a different NVA regiment north of BEN HET. Both the position and the tactics were similar to those encountered by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry. There is, therefore, a good indication that a particular NVA tactic has been identified and, further, that this tactic is generalized, i.e., it is one used by more than one NVA regiment.

A graphic representation of the saddle position is attached. Post-combat study and discussion of both the position and the NVA tactics suggest strongly that the saddle position is evolutionary, developed from an NVA analysis which apparently assumes that:

1. US units habitually move down a ridge or saddle which connects two pieces of high ground, rather than approaching by contour or swinging down across draws and up fingers.

2. In moving from one piece of high ground to another when NVA are known to be defending in the area, US units will hold on one hill and prepare the next with an intensive air and artillery preparation, directing the preparation primarily against the objective hill mass. Secondary emphasis or perhaps reconnaissance by fire will be directed to the ridge or saddle connecting the high ground.

The location of the saddle position and the manner in which the NVA fight from the position both suggest that the saddle position was designed to take advantage of the US "characteristics" noted above.

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The position is not sited on the objective hill mass, but is located so as to control the most likely approach, as well as limited (200-300 meter) flanking attempts. The majority of the fighting positions are not located on the top of the ridge or saddle (the probable US line of march), but rather on the sides. The position thereby possibly escapes one or more gun target lines. The position is sited so that it can be fought as either a perimeter defense or an ambush; in either case, good withdrawal routes and delay positions are available. Further, the siting of the individual positions permits the NVA to deliver heavy fire toward the center of their own positions without masking each other's fires. Finally, the protective bunkers located some distance away in well-protected draws on each flank provide protection during air and artillery preparation as well as a covered attack position for reinforcing units.

Elements of the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry fought these positions on at least five occasions. Three times the NVA used the saddle position as a defensive perimeter, and twice they employed it as an ambush position. The contact made by Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry on 30 March, was the major contact with the saddle position, and is the best example of the tactics employed by the NVA when fighting from the position.

In this particular contact, Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry moved to contact down the ridgeline leading to Hill 1198. The hill itself had received an air and artillery preparation, and the company moved behind artillery fire. After 400-500 meters of movement along the ridge, the company made contact with automatic weapons and machine guns dug in at the base of the hill. As the company attempted to recover its wounded and pull back for more artillery preparation, the NVA attacked from both flanks and from the rear. An enemy mortar was moved into position in the rear of the company and began to fire into forward elements. The mortar attack as well as the attempt to seal the company rear were both thwarted by elements of Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry which had been given the mission of securing the high ground from which Company A jumped off. Company A fought to both flanks and the front, and was able to withdraw back to the jump off position, moving through the "channel" held open by elements of Company D.

A discussion with company officers and NCO's strongly suggests that Company A had moved well into the saddle position and made contact on the far side of the perimeter. NVA troops at about the same time moved up from their protective bunkers in the draws to the flanks and into fighting positions on Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry flanks and rear. Two members of a squad who were cut off in the initial contact confirmed the presence of protective bunkers 300-400 meters down hill from the saddle position, with well-used trails leading up into the position. The fighting was heavy up on the saddle as the two men came upon the protective bunkers but the bunkers were not occupied.

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
In the five saddle position contacts made by 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry two techniques worked exceptionally well. On one occasion, after the position had been located and fairly well defined, one company was moved forward to make contact with the near edge of the perimeter. The other attacking company swung well to the flank, down into the draw and back up onto the saddle on the far side of the perimeter. At this point the NVA apparently became confused and began running back within the position. The first company then moved forward, cleaning out each individual NVA position and to secure the entire saddle position.

Stealth was employed on another occasion. A reconnaissance patrol located and sketched an unoccupied saddle position along a route of march to be used in a two company attack the following day. An air and artillery preparation was fired into the position and into the hill beyond it on the next day; however, when the lead company reached the position, the NVA had occupied it and took the point under fire, the unit extracted its point squad, then pulled back to work the position more with air and artillery. The artillery was started but the requested air strikes were diverted to other missions. The artillery was continued, at a reduced rate, while the units awaited the air support. Late in the afternoon (approximately 1500) a technique was devised which was derived directly from experience with a saddle position on the two previous days.

As the artillery on the saddle position continued, a reconnaissance patrol was readied and the two companies which were to move to the high ground beyond the position were alerted for immediate movement. The artillery was shifted 700-800 meters beyond the position and the patrol moved out immediately to check the position. The patrol reported the position unoccupied. The companies were then directed to begin movement toward the position, and the patrol was moved uphill from the position to a point where they could observe NVA attempts to occupy the positions. Under cover of the recon patrol's surveillance, the two companies, moving by bounds, and covering each other's movement secured the hill beyond, which was the day's objective.

As the two companies closed to the top of the objective hill, the NVA mounted an uncoordinated and piecemeal attack, taking heavy casualties both from US small arms fire and from direct fire artillery. In this case, it appeared that the NVA, upon leaving the protective bunkers below the saddle position, found that the US companies had already cleared the position. They then attempted to change their tactics but lacked the flexibility to do this successfully.

A third technique proved effective against the saddle position. Following the contact mentioned previously, relieving units of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry walked through the saddle position area and onto



NVA SADDLE POSITION

Three separate NVA company sized positions similar to the above were encountered by the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry, during contacts west of Kontum during the period March 20 through April 3 1968.

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their objective with no resistance whatsoever. This ease of movement was the result of intensive artillery and air preparation (8-10 strikes were made available), directed and adjusted by personnel who knew the location and extent of the saddle position.

Still another technique for use against the saddle position was planned, but never executed because of insufficient time. The plan called for bringing artillery fires directly on the position, then continuing these fires while patrols on each flank located the feeder trails leading to the position and prepared claymore ambush positions on the trails. The artillery then would be shifted, and a company would feint along the saddle in hopes of drawing the NVA out of their protective bunkers, onto the feeder trails, and into the ambushes.

The "saddle position" appears to be a near standard NVA tactic. There are a variety of ways to fight the position successfully, depending upon the situation and the support available.

Recommendation: That the techniques described herein be employed against NVA saddle positions, and that more data be collected and more extensive analysis be made of this enemy tactic.

### 3. (C) Training.

#### 1. AUDIO/VISUAL MOTIVATION FOR POPULAR FORCES

Observation: The Popular Forces are not afforded any psychological motivation in their training programs or during their operations.

Evaluation: It is felt that the initial training and operations of the PF troops would be more effectively received if there were sufficient motivation infused into their overall operations. These forces are considered at the lower end of the overall defense structure of the Republic of Vietnam Forces. They are poorly paid, equipped with obsolete or obsolescent weapons, and generally are shown little or no interest when compared to other units. It is felt that the presentation of films, playing of taped speeches and music and the use of television media within the capability of the audio-visual team would greatly enhance their motivation to learn and to serve their country. A program of the use of audio-visual team equipment and visual aids is currently being established.

Recommendation: That an audio-visual team be integrated in the Popular Force Program to include visits to various PF training sites and presentation of interesting audio/visual material to augment their training program and to make them part of the overall GVN effort.

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## 2. ADJUSTING GUNSHIP FIRES

Observation: Frequently, ground commanders are not familiar with the techniques of adjusting gunship fire.

Evaluation: To quickly place effective fires on an enemy, the ground commander must mark the friendly position and give the direction and range to the enemy from an available reference point. Once the target has been engaged, the ground commander should continually adjust fires in approximately the same artillery sequence.

Recommendation: That service schools include more instruction on the adjustment of armed helicopter fires.

## 3. COMBINED SYSTEM OF INTERDICTING FIRE

Observation: Dense mountainous terrain provides the enemy with a variety of areas from which to observe or fire into the FSB. The best defense against such fires or observation is a systematic method of interdicting these areas.

Evaluation: The ground surveillance radar, BC scope, Starlight scope, .50 cal MG, and the sniper rifle can be combined into a target acquisition and interdiction system which is extremely valuable. The components of the system complement each other and, with minimum training, FSB personnel can be taught to operate them in a coordinated manner to locate and interdict appropriate targets.

Recommendation: That personnel should be trained to use their weapons and equipment as part of a combined system.

## 4. WP GRENADE USED AS IMMEDIATE ACTION IN CONTACT

Observation: The point man of a patrol or any other tactical element needs some means of breaking contact and of covering his withdrawal to the main body.

Evaluation: The point man, by the nature of his mission, is exposed to surprise fire and usually has little cover or assistance, other than through his own actions in the initial moments of contact. One method of providing him at least a minimum temporary advantage is to have him employ a WP grenade upon making contact. This will serve both to momentarily distract an enemy and to provide some cover for the point man's movement.

Recommendation: That personnel be trained to employ the WP grenade when on the point as an immediate action upon making contact. This can be taught as a drill.

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4. (C) Intelligence.

1. PROGRAMMED RECONNAISSANCE INFORMATION

Observation: In order to get maximum coverage of the extremely large division area of operations (8,000-10,000 square miles), reconnaissance assets must be employed most judiciously.

Evaluation: The fragmenting of reconnaissance assets, in an attempt to get some coverage over the entire area of operations at all times, dissipates the overall potential of these assets, thereby greatly reducing the chances of finding the enemy.

Recommendation: That reconnaissance assets be programed into selected target areas in a progression commensurate with the developing intelligence picture. Suspect areas are determined from agent reports, PW interrogations, captured documents, and general trends in enemy activity. Initial reconnaissance, consisting of Red Haze, Snoopy, aerial photography, SLAR, concentrated VR, and other means of intelligence collection, are then employed in the suspect areas. Once these suspect areas have been further narrowed down, long range patrols and air and ground caverly forces are inserted into the reduced area. At the same time, Snoopy, aerial photography, SLAR, concentrated VR and other means continue to be employed. After this phase has been completed and the enemy has been fixed in what is now a relatively small area, maximum destruction is caused by air and artillery while ground forces further fix the enemy. It has been found that this is the most efficient and productive way to utilize reconnaissance resources to find and destroy enemy forces in this large area of operations.

2. HOI CHANHS AS INTERROGATORS

Observation: The Interrogation Prisoner of War section has been using NVA HOI CHANH, VU HONG, to assist in interrogation of PW's.

Evaluation: Although the RVN interpreter speaks fluent VIETNAMESE, the HOI CHANH, as a former NVA soldier, is better acquainted with NVA organization and operations, and is thus able to recognize more readily if the subject is telling the truth. It was noted that in interrogations in which VU HONG took part, attempts at deception were less frequent.

Recommendation: That NVA HOI CHANHS be considered for employment as assistant interrogators.

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### 3. PLACEMENT OF NVA FORTIFICATIONS

Observation: According to HOI CHANH VU NHU Y, former Commanding Officer, 9th Bn, 66th NVA Regiment, the enemy digs shelters and trenches whenever they stop, even if it is only an overnight halt. He suggested that bombing would be more effective if the bombs were dropped halfway up a hill or between two hills. Large bombs should be dropped first to break up the fortifications, then small bombs to inflict casualties. When looking for the enemy, reconnaissance planes should pay particular attention to areas that have been bombed, since the enemy often are located within 400-500 meters of them. The enemy also locates near creeks or halfway up a hill, never near rivers or large streams.

Evaluation: This information is generally supported by other reports.

Recommendation: That VR be concentrated on areas between and on the sides of hills, near small streams or creeks, and around areas where airstrikes and artillery have been employed.

### 4. CLOSE-IN FIRES AFTER ASSAULTS

Observation: According to HOI CHANH's, the NVA, when assaulting a friendly position such as a FSB, move in close to the objective (250-300 meters away) so that they will not be hit by artillery and airstrikes. He recommended that friendly units, when being attacked in a defensive position, fire artillery on all sides of the position at a range of 250-300 meters.

Evaluation: This information is corroborated by other reports. According to two HOI CHANHS who had participated in the 26 March attack on 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB in KNOTUM Province, they remained in the vicinity of the FSB for over two weeks after the attempt to overrun it to avoid airstrikes.

Recommendation: That during and after enemy assaults on friendly defensive positions, reconnaissance and close-in fires be intensified in the immediate vicinity of the position.

### 5. MORE DETAILED CITY MAPS

Observation: Maps of VIETNAMESE cities are needed for tactical operations.

Evaluation: The recent TET offensive required considerable fighting in cities. It was found that there were no city maps available. Tactical maps are of too small a scale to give the required detail for city fighting. Armor units which at times were required to react

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in different parts of a city found movement difficult because maps were not available.

Recommendation: That maps be made available for cities of reasonable size.

5. (C) Logistics.

1. ARTILLERY CANNISTERS FOR WATER RE-SUPPLY

Observation: The commander frequently needs a method of resupplying a company by air, especially when water resupply is involved, without landing. Any field expedient method for kicking out water in such a situation gives an advantage.

Evaluation: Artillery shell canisters are excellent items for making kick-out deliveries of water from the air. This is often desirable when the unit being resupplied is unable to prepare an LZ. The average rifle company can be adequately resupplied with eight canisters. An added advantage is that the canisters can be discarded and buried if need be, thus avoiding the problem of backhauling water cans.

Recommendation: That stocks of salvaged artillery canisters be maintained in the trains area for use when needed. Canisters should be boiled prior to use.

2. SUPPLYING NON-STANDARD REPRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

Observation: Many supply items used with reproduction machines are non-standard items and must be specially requisitioned many months in advance from suppliers and manufacturers who are normally located outside VIETNAM.

Evaluation: Many of the supplies for reproduction machines, such as special inks, chemicals, and sensitized papers, are available only by special order. Lead time for filling such requisitions is three to four months. Upon receipt of such items, it is noted that the long lead time has at times allowed them to exceed their shelf life. It is common to receive many of the supplies in a damaged condition, or for sensitized papers to have been ruined by exposure to the elements. Supply catalogues must be maintained since these items are non-standard and must be ordered by catalogue and price. High priority requisitions are used to insure that items will arrive before their shelf life has expired.

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Recommendation: Units who have non-standard reproduction equipment must have a large supply of reproduction supplies for their machines and should have in their possession complete sets of supply catalogues.

### 3. PROPER UTILIZATION OF MANPOWER

Observation: Once bulldozers are employed in a fire support base, men tend to rely on the machinery to the exclusion of manpower in improving the FSB.

Evaluation: In one instance a bulldozer overturned in a fire base. After a 24 hour wait for a CH-54 Skycrane, it was decided that manpower might be able to right the dozer. Sixty men got the dozer back in operation within one hour. On other occasions, enough men have watched a dozer operate to equal its output if they were armed with D-handle shovels.

Recommendation: That commanders not lose sight of the tremendous work potential of manpower. Units cannot afford the luxury of waiting on equipment before digging in on new fire support bases.

### 4. ADVANTAGES OF THE D-6B BULLDOZER

Observation: The D-6B bulldozer is superior to the D-5A for FSB clearing in the central highlands of VIETNAM.

Evaluation: A comparison between the D-6B and D-5A dozer when used to clear FSB's in the central highlands revealed the following:

1. The D-5A has an unprotected belly which causes damage to exposed parts when working in rough terrain.
2. The pony engine of the D-5A is a common cause of deadline. The lack of a pony engine has caused no hardship in the use of the D-6B.
3. The front heavy weight distribution of the D-5A caused it to overturn in the uneven terrain of a FSB.
4. The hydraulic cylinder on the blade of the D-5A has been a cause for additional maintenance where the simpler cable operated blade of the D-6B has performed satisfactorily.

Recommendation: That the D-6B be used in FSB clearance.

### 5. USE OF M548 AMMO CARRIER IN ARMOR UNITS

Observation: The M548 ammunition carrier was used successfully to

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resupply tank ammunition in terrain which would have been inaccessible to normal land resupply.

Evaluation: The tank battalion recently took part in an operation where the terrain was particularly difficult because of numerous rice paddies. Some M548 tracked ammunition carriers were made available to the unit to resupply heavy ammunition. The carriers were able to travel with the tanks where the organic 5 ton trucks were not. Request for MTOE authorization has been forwarded.

Recommendation: That consideration be given to the substitution of M548 tracked ammunition carriers for a small portion of an armor unit's normal 5 ton trucks.

#### 6. TRANSPORTATION LEVY ON SUBORDINATE UNITS

Observation: The Division Transportation Office had no means of augmenting its transportation resources to meet large vehicle requirements.

Evaluation: The Division Transportation Office often had requirements for truck assets which exceeded the number of trucks available in the supply and transportation battalion. To alleviate this problem, the DTO was authorized to levy unit commanders for up to ten per cent of their organic trucks. The commanders are required to keep this ten per cent available until 2100 hours of the day prior to the day for which the vehicles might be levied.

Recommendation: That consideration be given to meeting unusual transportation requirements through levy authority on subordinate units.

#### 7. FIELD EXPEDIENT FOR M48A3 TANK TURBOCHARGER

Observation: A field expedient repair is available for the turbo-charger for the M48A3 tank.

Evaluation: Excessive wear of the bearing in the fan of the turbo-charger caused excessive smoking. As a field expedient when repair parts are not available, the following was used to keep the tank operational. The back exhaust plates were removed and twisted 180 degrees, and the housing of the turbo-charger was twisted 30 degrees to the left to line up the turbo-charger outlet elbows. The turbo-charger assembly was secured by tightening the back plate bolts. An EIR has been submitted.

Recommendation: That the above procedure be used when the proper

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repair parts are lacking.

#### 8. NEED FOR CONVOY COMMANDERS

Observation: Convoy control was a serious problem due principally to the lack of an overall convoy commander.

Evaluation: Extensive enemy interdiction on Highway 14N made it necessary to reduce the number of convoys using this main supply route to conform with the available security. Elements of several separate organizations were required to move in combined convoys. No single unit had a majority of vehicles in the convoy, or adequate security for the entire convoy, but units did have adequate security for their own elements. No unit had overall convoy responsibility. A requirement existed for experienced convoy commanders who would have the authority to control both division and non-divisional convoy elements, and who were familiar with convoy procedures and supporting tactical elements.

Recommendation: That Military Police be considered for convoy command responsibilities for multi-unit convoys from non-tactical units.

#### 9. REPRODUCTION MACHINE MAINTENANCE

Observation: Resources available to the division have not been adequate to provide the required degree of maintenance and repair for TO&E reproduction equipment. Maintenance and repair have been accomplished by operators who are neither authorized nor trained to perform such maintenance, often resulting in greater damage to expensive equipment.

Evaluation: The dusty and humid climate of Vietnam makes reproduction machine maintenance a continuing and critical problem area. Attempts at repair by untrained and unauthorized operators only aggravate an already serious problem through damage and loss of parts. It has been found through a tedious and unnecessary process that generally there are civilian contract firms who are authorized to repair and maintain these machines in VIETNAM.

Recommendation: That maintenance and repair functions for reproduction machines be examined with a view towards determining who is to repair such machines and that the resultant policy be publicized to allow organizations to contact firms authorized to accomplish needed maintenance, and further, that units deploying to VIETNAM contact HQ, 1st Logistical Command to coordinate maintenance programs for reproduction machines upon arrival in VIETNAM.

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10. REVERSING HYDRAULIC LINES ON AVLB

Observation: A reversing of the hydraulic lines on the M60A1 AVLB results in a smoother launching of the bridge.

Evaluation: The hydraulic lines on the M60A1 AVLB launcher were reversed to determine what effect this would have on the launching and placement of the bridge. The reversed lines produced a push-pull effect which made the installation of the bridge smoother and faster. This smoother launching results in less damage to the bridge locking pin. An EIR has been submitted.

Recommendation: That hydraulic lines on the M60A1 be reversed.

6. (U) Organization. None.
7. (U) Chemical. None.
8. (U) Information. None.
9. (U) Tactical Cover and Deception.

1. ADVANTAGES OF A PLANNED FEINT

Observation: The use of a feint is a valuable asset for Snatch or cordon and search operations.

Evaluation: Tracked vehicles moving rapidly cross-country can be heard at sufficient distance to alert the enemy of their approach. A helicopter circling near a village also alerts anyone in the area that some action is likely. By planning and executing a feint toward an adjacent village and shifting to the target village at the last moment, the enemy is deceived. The use of the helicopter enhances the credibility of the feint and enables the using unit to keep the target under surveillance.

Recommendation: That feints be considered in planning for Snatch or cordon and search operations.

2. CONCEALMENT OF INFORMERS

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Observation: The use of a willing and concealed informer enhances the possibilities of capturing VIET CONG in cordon and search operations.

Evaluation: Recent cordon and search operations where a willing informer was available resulted in the capture of four VC and five civil defendants. The informer was concealed inside of an APC and viewed suspects through the vehicle's vision blocks, pointing out known VC.

Recommendation: That efforts be made to obtain a willing informer prior to cordon and search operations to eliminate some of the guess work as to which villagers might be VC. The concealment of the informer insures his safety and avoids possible compromise.

### 3. ARTILLERY USED AS TACTICAL DECEPTION

Observation: Artillery can be employed in a tactical deception and cover role.

Evaluation: Combat assaults into landing zones which may be defended by the enemy require that artillery preparatory fires be used. A disadvantage, however, is that the preparation alerts the enemy sufficiently to allow him to commit additional forces before the assault area can be adequately secured. The firing of artillery preparations in two or more potential landing zones can contribute either to the dissipation of enemy forces or to an erroneous commitment of his reaction forces. This technique materially reduces his capability to react to combat assaults.

Recommendation: That artillery be employed in its role of tactical deception.

### 4. MULTIPLE LANDINGS FOR LRP DECEPTION

Observation: Tactical deception is possible in LRP insertions.

Evaluation: The use of helicopters to insert LRP's gives flexibility in the number of locations which may easily be reached without fatiguing the LRP in a long march to reach the area of operation. The landing of the helicopter, however, gives away the location of the inserted LRP and adds to the danger of compromising the LRP's location.

Recommendation: That multiple landings be made in different areas to deny the enemy knowledge of the actual location of LRP insertions.

11. (U) Civic Action.

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Observation: The American serviceman is likely to overdo his expression of generosity in dealing with those he deems less fortunate. This is evident in the inflationary prices paid for trade goods and the excessive amount of gifts given to children.

Evaluation: The country of VIETNAM will not develop a sound and self-sufficient economy under the continuing influence of American inflationary practices. Prices for any commodity on the VIETNAM market are, by tradition, settled by bargaining. American generosity and willingness to pay a higher price will leave a vacuum in the VIETNAMESE economy that cannot be filled when US personnel leave. Excessive generosity to children tends to belittle the child's parents or the recipient.

Recommendation: That US servicemen be continually instructed to exercise appropriate restraint in their generosity with indigenous personnel. A knowledge of comparative prices should be provided as well as an appreciation of the detrimental effect of inflation. The use of generosity as an expression of good will should be weighed against the harm done by extravagant gifts.

## 2. HAMLET CONSOLIDATION

Observation: The consolidation of hamlets into larger villages is desirable and will be successful if the villagers are allowed to make their own decisions and if self help principles are employed.

Evaluation: Consolidation of hamlets into villages is not only important from the tactical viewpoint but also permits civic action projects to be completed more efficiently. Persuasion of hamlet chiefs to appreciate the need for consolidation has proved a successful approach. Mutual security is the basic selling point. If the desire for consolidation has been successfully cultivated in the minds of the villagers, self-help construction principles will be easily employed. During the reporting period two successful consolidations were accomplished, one is in progress and indications have been received that additional consolidations are being considered. The first consolidation was the most difficult to establish. "Show and tell" techniques were successful in convincing other villages once the first village was successfully consolidated.

Recommendation: That continued emphasis be placed on hamlet consolidation; that the villagers be persuaded to consolidate, and that self-help construction principles be applied.

## 3. INSTRUCTIONS FOR HOI CHANH

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Observation: There is a need to standardize, improve and publicize the method for potential HOI CHANH (Returnees) to approach US/GVN positions safely.

Evaluation: On 20 April 1968, Sergeants NGUYEN SY BO and HOAN MINH CAN K6 Battalion, 320th NVA Regiment rallied to an infantry FSB in KONTUM Province. They approached the US position with a piece of cloth tied to the barrel of their weapons and were directed to the US position. Based on their interview, there are many potential HOI CHANHS who do not know how to rally. Future loudspeaker and leaflets will incorporate instructions directing the use of a piece of cloth, as done by the two sergeants. Instructions to NVA target audiences should emphasize the use of a rag or piece of cloth as a "flag"; a traditional symbol of peaceful intent and that as they approach a US or GVN position, they should wave it vigorously above their head. They will be told to approach cautiously and to follow the directions of the US/GVN personnel. Sudden or unexpected movement should be avoided. US personnel should keep alert during this procedure. These instructions, when disseminated to all Allied personnel, will avoid accidental shooting or premature discharge of weapons against a potential HOI CHANH.

Recommendation: That future leaflet and loudspeaker messages contain instructions for rallying to include incorporation of the use of a cloth tied to a stick or bamboo pole and that as a US/GVN position is approached, the HOI CHANH wave it vigorously; it is further recommended that all US personnel be oriented on this procedure by commanders concerned.

6 Inclosures  
as



CHARLES P STONE  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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DISTRIBUTION:

1 - ACSFOR - DA	1 - ACofS, G1
1 - OCMH - DA	1 - ACofS, G2
4 - USACDC	1 - ACofS, G3
1 - USCONARC	1 - ACofS, G4
2 - CINCUSARPAC	1 - ACofS, G5
3 - DGG, USARV	5 - TACP (ALO), 4th Inf Div
2 - COST ANAL STUDY GP, USARV	1 - Comdt, 4th Inf Div Repl Tng Det
6 - CG, I FFORCEV	1 - Chemical Officer
1 - Comdt, Armed Forces Staff College	1 - Provost Marshal
1 - Comdt, C & GS	1 - IG
1 - Comdt, Armor Sch	10 - CO, 29th Mil Hist Det
1 - Comdt, Arty Sch	1 - AG File
1 - Comdt, Avn Sch	
1 - Comdt, Engr Sch	
1 - Comdt, Inf Sch	
1 - Comdt, Sig Sch & Cen	
1 - Comdt, USA Chem Cen & Sch	
1 - USMA Library	
1 - CO, CDC, CER Agency	
1 - CO, 52d Arty Gp	
1 - CO, 52d Cmbt Avn Bn	
2 - CO, 1st Bde, 4th Inf Div	
2 - CO, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div	
2 - CO, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div	
1 - CO, 173d Abn Bde	
2 - CO, Div Arty	
2 - CO, DISCOM	
2 - CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav	
2 - CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav	
2 - CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf	
1 - CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf	
1 - CO, 1st Bn, 22d Inf	
1 - CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty	
1 - CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty	
1 - CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty	
1 - CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty	
2 - CO, Engr Bn	
2 - CO, 124th Sig Bn	
1 - CO, 4th S&T Bn	
1 - CO, 4th Med Bn	
1 - CO, 704th Maint Bn	
2 - CO, Avn Bn	

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TF 1-22 Dissolved effective 15 Feb.

6. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 40-37-67 15 Feb.

173d Abn Bde (-)

Delete: 2-1 Cav (-)

2-1 Cav: Return to Div Control

7. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 42-37-67, 22 Feb:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

Delete: 1-22 Inf (-) (eff 22 Feb)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Delete: A/1-22 Inf

Delete: B/1-69 Armor

TF 1-22 (Established eff 22 Feb)

1-22 Inf

B/1-69 Armor

C/5-16 Arty (DS)

8. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 43-37-67:

173d Abn Bde (-)

Delete: 2-503 Inf

Add: 3-503 Inf (eff 3 Mar)

9. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 45-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

Delete: 1-12 Inf (eff 2 Mar)

TF 1-22 (established 2 Mar)

1-12 Inf

B/1-69 Armor (-)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Delete: B/1-69 Armor (-) (eff 2 Mar)

3-6 Arty

C/3-6 Arty (DS)

B/5-16 Arty (GSR)

C/7-15 Arty (GSR)

10. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 47-37-67.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

Delete: 3-8 Inf (eff 8 Mar)

173d Abn Bde (-)

Add: 3-8 Inf (eff 8 Mar)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

Add: 1-22 Inf (-)

Delete: 1-10 Cav (-)

Div Troops

Add: 1-10 Cav (-) (eff 11 Mar)

TF 1-22 dissolved effective 7 Mar.

Recapitulation of above changes with supporting artillery:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-8 Inf A/2-1 Cav (-)

3-12 Inf

6-29 Arty

A/5-16 Arty

D/5-16 Arty

C/1-92 Arty

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-10 Cav (-)

2-8 Inf

1-69 Armor (-)

1-22 Inf

4-42 Arty

A/3-6 Arty

B/6-14 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty  
Co A (-), 4th Engr

B/3-6 Arty  
A/6-14 Arty  
A/1-92 Arty  
A/4-42 Arty  
C/4-42 Arty  
Co B (-), 4th Engr

173d Abn Bde (-)  
1-503 Inf  
3-503 Inf  
3-8 Inf  
3-319 Arty  
C/6-29 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty  
C/5-22 Arty  
C/5-16 Arty

TF 1-12  
1-12 Inf  
B/1-69 Armor (-)  
C/7-15  
C/3-6 Arty  
B/5-16 Arty

DISCOM

2-1 Cav (-)

Div Arty

7-17 Cav (GS)

11. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 48-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: 3-8 Inf (eff 13 Mar)

173d Abn Bde (-)  
Add: A/1-69 Armor (eff 11 Mar)  
Add: Recon Plt/1-69 Armor 11 Mar  
Delete: 3-8 Inf (eff 13 Mar)

12. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 50-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Delete: 3-8 Inf (eff 17 Mar)

173d Abn Bde (-)  
Add: 3-8 Inf (eff 17 Mar)

13. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 52-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Delete: A/2-1 Cav (-) (eff 25 Mar)

173d Abn Bde (-)  
Add: A/2-1 Cav (-) (eff 25 Mar)

14. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 53-37-67:

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div returns 4th Inf Div Control effective 301800 Mar.  
173d Abn, Bde (-) departs 4th Inf Div Control effective 301800 Mar.

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
1-8 Inf  
3-12 Inf  
6-29 Arty  
A/6-29 Arty  
B/6-29 Arty  
A/5-16 Arty  
D/5-16 Arty  
B/6-14 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
1-35 Inf  
2-35 Inf  
2-8 Inf  
3-8 Inf  
B/2-1 Cav (-)  
C/2-9 Arty  
A/4-42 Arty  
B/5-16 Arty  
C/1-92 Arty  
C/6-29 Arty  
C/5-22 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty

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2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
1-22 Inf  
1-69 Armor (-)  
1-10 Cav (-)  
4-42 Arty  
B/4-42 Arty  
C/4-42 Arty  
B/3-6 Arty  
A/1-92 Arty

TF 1-12  
1-12 Inf  
C/3-6 Arty  
C/7-15 Arty  
B/5-16 Arty  
Div Troops  
2-1 Cav (-)  
7-17 Cav (GS)  
A/5-22 Arty

DISCOM

Div Arty

15. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 54-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: 3-8 Inf (Eff 3 Apr)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: 2-8 Inf (eff 3 Apr)  
Delete: 1-22 Inf (eff 3 Apr)

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Delete: 2-8 Inf (eff 3 Apr)  
Delete: 3-8 Inf (eff 3 Apr)  
Add: 1-22 Inf (eff 3 Apr)

16. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 56-37-67:

1-69 Armor OPCON 173d Abn Bde effective 061505 Apr 68.  
C/1-10 Cav returns to 4th Inf Div Control effective 081300 Apr 68.  
1-14 Inf returns to 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div control effective 081530 Apr 68.

17. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 58-37-67:

TF 1-12 dissolved effective 22 Apr 68.

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: 1-12 Inf (eff 22 Apr)

18. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 59-37-67:

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Delete: 1-12 Inf (eff 231830 Apr)

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: 1-12 Inf (eff 231830 Apr)

19. (C) Task organization as changed by FRAGO 60-37-67:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: C/2-1 Cav (eff 29 Apr)

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Add: A/2-8 Inf (Mech)(eff 29 Apr)  
Add: B/1-10 Cav (-) (eff 29 Apr)  
Delete: C/2-1 Cav (eff 29 Apr)

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div  
Delete: A/2-8 Inf (MECH) (eff 29 Apr)  
Delete: B/1-10 Cav (-) (eff 29 Apr)

20. (C) Task organization as of 30 April with supporting artillery units:

1st Bde, 4th Inf Div

3-8 Inf  
3-12 Inf  
1-8 Inf  
C/2-1 Cav  
6-29 Arty  
A/5-16 Arty  
B/6-14 Arty  
A/6-29 Arty  
Co A (-), 4th Eng Bn  
TACP

2d Bde, 4th Inf Div

2-8 Inf (Mech) (-)  
1-10 Cav (-)  
4-42 Arty  
A/6-14 Arty  
B/3-6 Arty  
C/3-6 Arty  
B/5-16 Arty  
Co B (-), 4th Eng Bn  
TACP

DISCOM

Div Arty

3d Bde, 4th Inf Div

1-14 Inf  
1-35 Inf  
2-35 Inf  
1-12 Inf  
1-22 Inf  
B/1-10 Cav (-)  
A/2-8 Inf (Mech)  
2-9 Arty  
B/1-92 Arty  
C/1-92 Arty  
C/6-14 Arty  
C/5-16 Arty  
C/5-16 Arty  
C/5-22 Arty  
C/4-42 Arty  
Co C (-), 4th Engr Bn  
TACP

Div Troops

2-1 Cav (-)  
7-17 Air Cav (-) GS  
A/5-22 Arty  
4th Eng Bn (-)

KEY PERSONNEL

Key personnel by position as of the end of the reporting period.

Division Headquarters

Stone, Charles P.	MG	CG, 4th Inf Div
Hickman, Don R.	EG	ADC-A
Brownfield, Albert R. Jr	EG	ADC-B
Sniffin, Charles R.	COL	Chief of Staff
Birch, Harold B.	LTC	AC of S, G1
Smith, John A. Jr	LTC	AC of S, G2
Petro, Peter P.	LTC	AC of S, G3
Heiden, Charles K.	LTC	AC of S, G4
Evans, Henry C. Jr	LTC	AC of S, G5
Warren, James R.	LTC	Dpty Post CO
Thomason, David A.	LTC	AG
Zone, Robert M.	LTC	Div Surg
Seaman, Robert W.	LTC	IG
Solley, Bill	LTC	PMO
La Barbera, Albert	LTC	Fin Off
Sheehan, Joseph F.	LTC	Chap
Young, Harold G.	LTC	Cml Off
Thornton, James F. Jr	LTC	SJA
Kington, Donald M.	MAJ	IO

1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Fix, Joseph E. III	COL	CO
Caldwell, James K.	LTC	XO
Stiner, Carl W.	MAJ	S3

2d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Hodges, Warren D.	COL	CO
Story, Robert P.	LTC	XO
Foss, John W.	MAJ	S3

3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Forrester, Eugene P.	COL	CO
Bentz, Harold F.	LTC	Deputy CO
Kunze, Melton H.	LTC	XO
Doyle, William P.	MAJ	S3

Inclosure 2

Division Artillery

McAlister, Robert C.	COL	CO
Dewherst, Sam T.	LTC	XO
Godwin, Bobby J.	MAJ	S3

Division Support Command

Abernathy, William C.	COL	CO
Grant, William D.	LTC	XO
Haltiner, Robert G.	MAJ	S3

Battalions

Tombaugh, William W.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn 8th Inf
Edgerton, John P.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 8th Inf
Malone, Danridge M.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 8th Inf
Schneider, George J.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 12th Inf
Hendrix, Jamie R.	LTC	CO, 3d Bn, 12th Inf
Ball, George L.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 14th Inf
McBride, Thomas E. Jr	LTC	CO, 1st Bn 22d Inf
Taylor, William W.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 35th Inf
Livsey, William J.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 35th Inf
Brownfield, John F.	LTC	CO, 1st Sqdn, 10th Cav
Graham, Charles P.	LTC	CO, 2d Sqdn, 1st Cav
Riggs, Theodore S.	LTC	CO, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Akers, Albert B.	LTC	CO, 6th Bn, 29th Arty
Olson, Carl R.	MAJ	CO, 4th Bn, 42d Arty
Bobzien, Gerald B.	LTC	CO, 2d Bn, 9th Arty
Hayward, Baston M.	LTC	CO, 5th Bn, 16th Arty
Mierswa, Myles H.	LTC	CO, 4th Avn Bn
Lee, Emmett C. Jr	LTC	CO, 4th Engr Bn
Spitz, William M.	LTC	CO, 124th Sig Bn
Stracener, Carl E.	LTC	CO, 4th Med Bn
De Ville, David A.	LTC	CO, 4th S&T Bn
Hyatt, Frederic C.	LTC	CO, 704th Maint Bn

Separate Companies and Detachments

Gross, Paul J.	MAJ	CO, HHC, 4th Inf Div
Sammons, William E.	CPT	CO, 4th Admin Co
Simons, John E.	LLT	CO, 4th MP Co
Magee, Michael C.	MAJ	CO, 4th MI Det
Sawin, Peter L.	CPT	CO, 29th Mil Hist Det

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CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

OPERATION MAC ARTHUR

1 February. An enemy force of 40-50 men attacked the Special Forces Camp in KONTUM City. Gunships and artillery broke the attack and the enemy fled at 0700 hours. At YB885290 the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB exchanged mortar and SA fire with an enemy force NW of its perimeter. A later sweep revealed four NVA KIA by grenades 30 feet outside of the perimeter. Also found were one LMG, three AK-47's, one carbine, seven 75mm RR rounds, eleven 82mm mortar rounds, 40 B-40 rocket rounds, 23 CHICOM hand grenades, three satchel charges, two bamboo charges, and 13 AK-47 magazines. At ZA236881 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received AW fire; four NVA and two VC were killed by return fire. In KONTUM City 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry remained in contact throughout the day resulting in 12 US WIA, 87 enemy KIA. PLEIKU continued to receive sporadic mortar attacks and US and GVN forces continued operations to clear the city of enemy elements infiltrated during the TET offensive. At YB944245 one US was wounded when elements of Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor received 75mm RR and B-40 rocket fire. THANH AN District Headquarters came under heavy attack shortly before noon. Contact was broken off by the enemy at 1406 hours, but artillery and gunships were employed against the enemy units as they retreated. Before nightfall 139 enemy bodies were counted. At ZB004217 a convoy preparing to depart DAK TO received an unknown number of M-79 rounds, one US WIA. A north-bound convoy from KONTUM to DAK TO received sporadic SA and mortar fire from 1400-1600 hours, two US WIA. At YB838212 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one US body, previously MIA. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received two rounds of 60mm mortar fire, resulting in one US WIA.

2 February. At AR777895 Company B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed a mortar firing on KONTUM City. The mortar was destroyed, and one US WIA. At YB875316 Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar and two rounds of 75mm RR fire, resulting in four US WIA. At ZA149245 Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found 64 additional VC KIA resulting from the 1 February battle near THANH AN. From 1150 to 1400 hours Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry was in contact with an unknown size force at AR895435, results 13 VC KIA, five PW, one US WIA. At ZA130293 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found a VMC with his leg blown off; individual was evacuated. At AR870434 50 enemy were killed by an airstrike. At YB830209 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry exchanged fire with five NVA; three US WIA, one NVA KIA. At ZB003249 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, two NVA KIA, two US WIA. At YB875315 Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA platoon and killed one NVA. At 1900 hours the companies' night location received four 75mm RR Rounds, one US WIA. At AR823403 a 4th Aviation Battalion aircraft engaged and killed four enemy. Heavy fighting continued throughout the day in KONTUM City, resulting in three US KIA, 20 US WIA, 75 NVA KIA, and eight NVA PW.

South of PLEIKU City the 4th Battalion, 3d ARVN Armored Cavalry and elements of the 1st Battalion, 69th Armor fixed an estimated NVA battalion and called in gunships and artillery, resulting in 130 NVA KIA. At YB911121 a 4th Aviation aircraft received SA fire, one US WIA. TF Powerhouse with one battalion minus conducted an airlift to BAN ME THUOT for further redistribution. At YB944245 one US was wounded when elements of Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor received 75mm RR and B-40 rocket fire.

3 February. At YB952239 Bridge #3 was attacked by an enemy force using hand grenades, three US WIA. In the vicinity of ZA2087 an ARVN unit with TF 22 made contact with a battalion size force and reported finding 150 NVA bodies in the sweep after the battle. At AP798887 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry heard movement near their night location and killed one NVA. At ZA004217 the 1st Brigade FSB received two rounds of 82mm mortar fire, one US WIA. At YB838223 the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received five rounds of 82mm mortar and one round of 75mm RR fire, wounding two US and damaging the command and control ship. At ZA013214 the Special Forces camp received three rounds of 82mm mortar fire, one US WIA, one CSF KIA, two CSF WIA. At ZB004221 an OH-23 aircraft from the 6th Battalion, 29th Artillery received MG fire, killing the pilot, wounding the artillery aerial observer and destroying the aircraft. Three NVA were killed and the machine gun destroyed by artillery directed against the enemy position. In the vicinity of AP7897 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company using SA, AW, and mortar fire. The company was supported with gunships and artillery, and Company D linked up to provide assistance. The enemy broke contact after four hours of fighting. One US KIA, eight US WIA. At YB004217, DAK TO received 29 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Four US were killed and six wounded when one of the rounds hit a 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry bunker.

4 February. In three separate attacks prior to dawn DAK TO received 68 rounds of 82mm mortar and 122mm rocket fire, two US WIA. At YB889291 an OP at the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB made contact with two NVA, resulting in one US KIA, four US WIA. At BEN HET two CSF were wounded when the FSB received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At ZB095382 a Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry gunship received several hits from ground fire and returned fire, killing two NVA. At AR777896 Company B, 299th Engineer found 27 bodies in KONTUM City. At AP795975 Companies C and D, 1st Battalion, (Abn), 503d Infantry killed three NVA and captured one. They also found 10 NVA bodies killed in the contact of 3 February. At YB880328 three US were wounded when an aircraft supporting a 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry airlift received ground fire. At YB889929 Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received sniper fire, one US WIA. At ZB095389 Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an enemy force and received SA and 60mm mortar fire. Company A and two platoons of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry reinforced. The enemy position was hit by gunships, artillery and airstrikes, and at 1450 hours Company B assaulted, penetrated the enemy perimeter and engaged in close combat. While in the perimeter they observed at least 30 enemy dead. The company withdrew, and at 1830 hours disengaged to set up blocking positions prior to darkness. Results

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of the contact were one US KIA, 27 US WIA, 16 NVA dead by body count, one NVAC, two machine guns, 11 AK-47's, two SKS, one B-40 rocket launcher, and two 60mm mortars CIA.

5 February. At BR042328 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed four VC and killed three. At ZB018259 a 52d Aviation Battalion aircraft crashed as a result of a broken tail rotor, nine US WIA. At the same location a 4th Aviation aircraft crashed for unknown reasons and exploded, four US WIA. BEN HET received 10 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, two US WIA, one CSF WIA. Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry swept battlefield of 4 February contact and found 19 NVA bodies and captured one wounded NVA. At BR015387 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry conducted reconnaissance by fire and killed one VC. Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry killed one VC at AP809923.

6 February. At ZB004216 two unknown type rounds landed in the tent area at DAK TO, wounding three US. At AR802933 the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with a dug-in company size force, resulting in four US KIA, 17 US WIA, one US MIA, 11 NVA KIA. At 1121 hours BEN HET received 39 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm RR fire, five US WIA, four CSF WIA. At 1630 hours BEN HET received an unknown number of 82mm mortar and 75mm RR fire, seven CSF WIA. At ZA155357 Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with a company size force employing SA and B-40 rocket fire, two US KIA, five US WIA. At ZB004214 DAK TO received three 122mm rocket rounds, four US WIA. At YB926203 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA bodies killed by air or artillery. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received 10-12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, three US WIA. At AR810528 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire impacted at the 937th Engineer location northeast of PLEIKU City, resulting in 19 US WIA.

7 February. At YB886290 the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received four rounds of 82mm mortar fire, two US WIA. At AR985503 a convoy was ambushed by an estimated 50 NVA, three US WIA, seven NVA KIA. Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found one US body reported as MIA on 6 February. At AR985465 Company D, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with five NVA, killing two and capturing one. At ZA155357 Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body. At AR813944 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated platoon, resulting in 40 NVA KIA, six NVAC, three US KIA, one US WIA. At AR813936 a dustoff aircraft was shot down. At BR006461 Company D, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry exchanged fire with four NVA, three NVA KIA. At 1836 hours the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received 12 rounds 60mm and 82mm mortar fire, wounding three US.

8 February. A rescue party from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found the dustoff aircraft shot down on 7 February, one US KIA, three US WIA. Camp Enari received 30 rounds of 122mm rocket fire from the west, one US KIA, nine US WIA. At AR813942 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed movement to its flank and fired, killing one NVA. The company also found seven NVA bodies. At ZB006256 Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy squad in bunkers. The company attacked twice with air, artillery and gunship support. The company broke off the attack to prepare its night location with the Air Force pilots still reporting heavy AW fire. Results, one US KIA, 11 US WIA one US MIA. At ZA197345 LRP H4B took two individuals under fire,

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one NVA KIA. At YB911121 the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received four rounds of 75mm RR fire and an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds, one US KIA, two US WIA. BEN HET received seven or eight rounds of B-40 rocket fire and 10 rounds of 75mm RR fire, one CSF WIA. At ZB077179 a Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry aircraft observed an unknown size NVA force apparently establishing a road block. Gunships took them under fire and killed 12.

9 February. At AR922478 the bridge site received 15 rounds of mortar fire, and 10 NVA were killed when the security element returned fire. At YB955175 a patrol from Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in one NVA KIA, one US WIA. At YB913312 the 1st NVA Division surgeon surrendered as a HOI CHANH to Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry. At ZB010261 a company size enemy force attacked the Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry patrol base. Artillery, airstrikes and gunships were employed in support. The fighting continued for two hours, resulting in 20 NVA KIA, six AK-47's, one CHICOM carbine, one B-40 rocket launcher, one heavy machine gun and three light machine guns captured; two US KIA, 25 US WIA.

10 February. Camp Holloway received 35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, one US KIA, 38 US WIA. At AR817946 northeast of KONTUM City Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry repelled probes against its perimeter during the early morning hours. A morning sweep revealed nine NVA KIA and one NVAC (WIA). At YB953174 Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an entrenched squad size force. After two hours of fighting, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Results, two NVA KIA, one US KIA, three US WIA. At AP754885 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company, resulting in 15 NVA KIA, one US KIA, five US WIA. At AR829956 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, four US WIA, one US MIA. The 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received 30 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, six US WIA.

11 February. At AR825949 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received 11 rounds of 82mm mortar and SA fire, one US KIA, 13 US WIA, one US MIA. At ZA208960 a 3/4 ton truck from Company B, 299th Engineer hit a mine, six US WIA. At ZB097175 one individual from the 4th Engineer minesweep team was wounded by a sniper. At ZU248887 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry killed one NVA. At AR827952 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 25 rounds of 82mm mortar fire wounding three US. At AP741870 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with four to eight NVA, one NVA KIA, one US KIA, one US WIA.

12 February. At YB880294 the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB OP received sniper fire, one US WIA. At YB878294 Company C, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an estimated platoon, four US WIA, 12 NVA KIA, one NVAC. At ZA089389 Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found three NVA bodies in graves. At YB975269 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, one US KIA, 14 US WIA. At ZU247853 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with a reinforced NVA company, results two US KIA, 20 US WIA, six US MIA. At AP740870 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry engaged and killed two snipers. At ZU253876 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry ambushed and killed three NVA.

13 February. At YA995420 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry fired on two individuals taking evasive action, one VC KIA. At ZB003261 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found five NVA bodies, estimated dead for three days. At BR086552 a 1/4 ton truck from Troop E, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry hit a command-detonated mine, killing one US and wounding two. At BR073375 Company A, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry observed two VC and killed one. At YA982434 Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry observed three NVA and killed one. At YA982434 Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry observed three NVA and killed one. The aerial rifle platoon was inserted and one NVA, two AK-47's, one MAS 36, and one 9mm pistol were captured.

14 February. At ZU259936 the 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry FSB was attacked by an estimated reinforced NVA company employing SA, AW, B-40 rocket and mortar fire. Results of the contact were 15 NVA KIA, one US KIA, seven US WIA. At YA875652 IFFV LRP Team 23 made contact with seven armed individuals, resulting in two NVA KIA.

15 February.

16 February. At ZA032382 Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry wounded and captured one VC and AK-47. At ZA150315 an APC from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine, two US WIA. At YB911121 the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received three rounds 75mm RR, SA, and MG fire, two US KIA, three US WIA. At ZU236839 Company C, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, two VC KIA, three VCC. At ZB009260 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found nine NVA bodies, apparently killed by airstrike on night of 15-16 February. At AR922479 the Company C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry bridge security element received 10 mortar rounds, B-40 rocket and SA fire. One mortar round landed inside an APC. Results were two US KIA, two US WIA, one PF WIA.

17 February. At ZA208342 a duster from the 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery hit a mine, resulting in one US WIA. At BR032543 a 1/4 ton truck from 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine, one US KIA, one US WIA. At AP758878 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry killed one NVA. At ZA235886 an RF outpost was partially overrun by an unknown size VC force, 12 RF KIA, four RF WIA.

18 February. At AR881817 an RF outpost was overrun by a multi-company VC force, 15 RF KIA. Shortly after midnight an unknown size attacked the KONTUM City jail, six VC KIA, one ARVN WIA. At YA877657 IFFV LRP Team 32 killed one NVA. At YA962309 Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received one fragmentation hand grenade and heavy SA fire, resulting in one US WIA.

19 February. At AR829924 an OH-6A from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry crashed for unknown reasons. Two platoons from Troop D were inserted and found three US KIA. At ZB032262 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found eight NVA bodies in graves. At YA851652 LRP 44 made contact with an estimated 20-40 NVA, resulting in four US WIA, 12 NVA KIA.

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20 February. POLEI BRENG at ZA140915 and POLEI DRONG at ZA105914 were overrun by an estimated 200-300 VC at each location. The VC withdrew after destroying class V supplies in the villages. At ZA068309 a 2½ ton truck from Company A, 20th Engineer hit a mine, two US WIA. At YB847138 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size force in bunkers. The enemy broke contact and fled. Results were one US KIA, one US WIA, three NVA KIA.

21 February. At ZA115673 PLEI MRONG received a ground attack supported by mortar, rocket and AW fire, two CSF WIA. At ZA075397 Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry killed one NVA. At ZA192652 a ¼ ton truck from the 4th MP hit a mine wounding three US. At AR873531 an RF element from LE TRUNG made contact and killed one VC. At YB925208 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force, two US WIA. At ZA015282 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated squad size force, six US WIA, one VC KIA, one B-40 rocket launcher CIA. The aerial rifle platoon of Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size force, two NVA KIA. At ZA192652 Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry killed one VC and captured one.

22 February. At ZA185337 a PF platoon at CATECKA Plantation was attacked by an estimated company size force resulting in 13 PF KIA, six PF WIA, five PF MIA. At ZA167337 a civilian Lambretta hit a mine as it was passing an APC that had also hit a mine, three civilian KIA, one civilian WIA, two US WIA. At YB925208 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found five NVA bodies. At YA843712 LRP 27 observed four VC chopping a tree near a bunker. The patrol took them under fire, killing two and wounding and capturing another. At ZA162750 an aircraft from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry killed two NVA observed taking evasive action. At YA885682 LRP 34 killed one VC.

23 February. At ZA171767 Company A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry observed bunkers and one NVA. The aircraft fired on the NVA and received return fire. The aerial rifle platoon was moved to the area and immediately made contact. Troop D and the aerial rifle platoon from Troop B made a heliborne assault to ZA173770. After several hours of fighting the enemy withdrew with US ground elements in pursuit. Results were 24 NVA KIA and six wounded and captured. At AR813944 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed one NVA. At YB914205 Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with four NVA and killed two. At AR802943 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed an NVA officer. At ZA184754 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received SA fire from a bunker complex, resulting in one US KIA. At YA974291 Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received sniper fire, one US WIA.

24 February. At ZA179759 an LOH from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received heavy AW fire. The aircraft exploded and crashed into the enemy bunker position. One US KIA, two US WIA. The second aircraft began firing suppressive fires and Troop D began moving to the crash site. When the rescue force reached the site they destroyed two bunkers and killed two NVA and linked up with the survivors of the crew. Four US were wounded assaulting the bunker position. The crew and WIA were successfully extracted. At AR816946 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated six snipers, one US KIA, one US WIA. At YB991144 a patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry exchanged fire with

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four NVA, resulting in two US WIA. At ZAO92877 Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry observed an NVA squad washing clothes. The troop took them under fire and killed two. At ZA123510 the Scout Platoon from the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry received SA fire and two rounds of either B-40 or rifle grenade fire. Two US WIA, one VCC WIA. At YB875275 BEN HET received 14 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, two CSF KIA, two CSF WIA.

25 February. At AR836484 the 937th Engineer made contact with three VC, one VC KIA. At AR815947 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found seven NVA bodies, apparently killed in 24 February contact. At ZAO47856 an aircraft from Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry observed and engaged 10 NVA with packs and rifles. The aerial rifle platoon was inserted and found 10 NVA KIA. At AR844940 the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry with a Mike Force Company made contact with an unknown size force, one MSF WIA. At YA865718 an aircraft attempting to extract a LRP Team received ground fire, two US WIA. At ZA219600 a convoy received one round of M-79 fire, one US WIA. At ZA125785 an aircraft from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received one round of sniper fire, one US WIA.

26 February. At AR788888 KONTUM City received approximately 20 rounds of 122mm rocket fire, killing six civilians, one ARVN, and one RF, and wounding 16 civilians and five National Police. A FAC directed an airstrike onto the rocket position, and it was destroyed. Two companies of the 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry were combat assaulting into an LZ at YB832277 when one of the aircraft was shot down by enemy fire. The crew and infantry returned fire while the remainder of the two companies completed the assault at YB831279, then moved overland and linked up. The enemy broke contact at 1300 hours. Results were one US KIA, nine US WIA, 21 NVA KIA. At ZAO07175 LRP 2D killed one VMC. BEN HET received 13 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, one CSF WIA. At YA962392 an APC from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received AW fire and three B-40 rocket rounds, one US WIA. While sweeping the area another APC was hit with a B-40 rocket round, one US WIA. Ground elements from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry were inserted and found a wounded NVA. The PW was evacuated but died at the hospital. An hour later the platoon captured another NVA.

27 February. At BR019537 Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry killed one VMC and captured a light machine gun. At AR808471 Camp Holloway received 30-35 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 17 US WIA. At 0827 hours at YB832277 the patrol base of Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry was attacked by an estimated battalion of NVA employing SA, AW, rifle grenade and 60mm mortar fire. The contact continued all day, and the position was still receiving SA fire after dark. Results were two US KIA, 15 US WIA, and 49 NVA KIA in the immediate vicinity of the perimeter. At 1937 hours an aircraft in support fired 20mm ammunition into the US position, killing two US and wounding seven. At 2346 hours the night location received six B-40 rounds. Fire was returned. Results were five US WIA, one NVA KIA. At ZA208749 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an entrenched platoon, two US KIA, eight US WIA, four NVA KIA. At AR826954 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received heavy mortar, SA, and AW fire from a large enemy force, apparently defending an NVA

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ammunition storage area. Artillery and airstrikes were employed, and 23 secondary explosions were observed. Results of the contact were 24 US WIA. At AS877027 an aircraft from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged and killed one VC, and killed another VC at AR893926. Secondary explosions were observed in both engagements.

28 February. At ZAI73527 a patrol from the 52d Artillery Group made contact with 10 NVA and killed one. At AR833957 Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 33 rounds of 82mm mortar and one round of 122mm rocket fire, one US WIA. At YB843705 LRP Team 11 ambushed a group of 25-30 NVA, resulting in 20 NVA KIA. At YB938307 LRP 1D killed one NVA. At YB817247 Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry conducted a combat assault and received fire from several NVA. Fire was returned, resulting in three NVA KIA. Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry swept the battle area of the previous day's contact and found 20 additional bodies. At AR825954 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received 10 rounds of mortar fire, four US WIA. At AR839958 a 4th Aviation aircraft crashed because of wind turbulence, four US WIA.

29 February. At ZAI25895 the village of TRUNG NGHIA received 25 rounds of mortar fire and SA fire, three RF KIA, four RF WIA, five civilian WIA. At ZBL44045 the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry and RF elements made contact with an estimated company sized force. Results were 26 NVA KIA, five NVAC. At ZAO63858 a gunship from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made a crash landing when the tail rotor fell from the aircraft, one US KIA, three US WIA. At YB911251 the Reconnaissance Platoon 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry made contact with six NVA and killed one. At 1729 hours the patrol base received 40 rounds of mortar fire and SA and AW fire, one US KIA, one US WIA. At YB832277 the patrol base of Companies A and B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received 16 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from YB831283. After the countermortar program had been fired and airstrikes called in Company A swept the area and found 10 NVA bodies and numerous blood trails and drag marks. At YB786228 Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with several NVA, resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA, one NVA KIA, one NVAC.

1 March. At YB782228 Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found an underground position for a vehicle, with overhead cover. Nearby was a bunker complex with one NVA KIA. At YB782225 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry killed two NVA. Between 1015 hours and 1358 hours the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry at YB911121 FSB received a total of nine rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in three US WIA. At YB822299 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found 28 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, and one NVA in a grave two to three days old. At YB822289, Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found a large bunker complex with 70 bunkers and seven NVA killed by air strikes. At YB834278 a patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force resulting in two NVA KIA. At AR828956, the Reconnaissance Platoon from the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made light contact with an unknown size force resulting in one US WIA.

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2 March. LRP Key Chain was surrounded by an estimated NVA Battalion at YB913102. Helicopters fired rockets in support, setting off secondary explosions which continued for over an hour. At 2037 hours at YB839223 the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry observed the lights of what appeared to be an enemy convoy. At YB826299 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry exchanged fire with an enemy force killing three NVA. Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received 20 rounds of mixed 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and a ground attack, resulting in nine NVA KIA, one light machine gun, one SKS with grenade launcher, and two CHICOM grenades CIA. At YB827277 Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found a grave with three NVA bodies three to four days old. At ZAO67722, an APC from Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit a mine. Another mine was found 20 feet from the first. At ZAO62724 an APC received two rounds of B-40 rocket fire resulting in two US WIA. At ZA153713 the Reconnaissance Platoon from the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found two bodies, one VMC and one NVA, killed by small arms fire. At AR832950 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received mortar fire and automatic weapons fire. Fire was returned, with one NVA KIA. A later contact with the same enemy force resulted in one US WIA and six friendly indigenous WIA. At ZA137718 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed three NVA.

3 March. At YB805246 a patrol from the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found three rucksacks and 26 rounds of 75mm RR ammunition. At ZAO75705 Company B, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force. The enemy fired B-40 rockets and small arms. Results were 15 NVA KIA, two B-40 rocket launchers and 11 S/A CIA. At AR854976 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received mortar and small arms fire resulting in three US WIA. At AR854976 Company C, 1st Battalion, (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, receiving heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in three US KIA, and five US WIA. At ZA126773 Company B, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an unknown size force resulting in four NVA KIA and three US KIA and eight US WIA. DAK TO received 34 rounds of mixed 75mm RR and 82mm mortar fire resulting in one US KIA, three US WIA, one HULD helicopter and one wrecker damaged.

4 March. Between midnight and 1030 hours the FSB at DAK TO received a total of 29 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At noon one round of 122mm rocket fire was received with another six rounds at 1714 hours, all with no damage. At 0530 hours there was an explosion on the southeast corner of the DAK TO perimeter. Investigation revealed one body in the wire who had apparently blown himself up. He had four blocks of C-4 and two grenades. At AQ875018 the trains of the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received two mortar rounds resulting in one US KIA and eight WIA. At AQ889380 the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed 15 foxholes, a radio antenna and movement. Artillery was fired on the area resulting in a large secondary explosion, possibly a fuel storage area. At AR788886 KONTUM airfiled received 22 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. Five of the rounds were duds. At BR111186 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry found 50-60 hootches in a draw, and detained one individual. Later at the same location contact was made with an unknown size VIET CONG force resulting in four VC KIA. At BR115170 D Troop detained four individuals. At BR238502 three command detonated mines were set off as a convoy passed with no damage. At BR-222494 Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment received S/A from a bunker.



received sporadic small arms fire resulting in one US WIA in Troop E. At ZA212930 a sweep of the contact area of 6 March by Troop E and the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry revealed 15 NVA KIA, three 57mm RR rounds, four B-40 rounds, and assorted web gear. At BR235490 Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry found four bunkers and four NVA in graves. A bulldozer uncovered one NVA body from the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry's action on 4 March at BR234499. Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA and captured one NVA at AQ848367. At AQ803293 Troop D engaged 10-15 personnel carrying stretchers resulting in one NVA KIA.

8 March. LRP Ball-Cap found a battalion size base camp with bunkers and medical supplies. There were two roads from the southeast leading into the area at YB750252. At 0120 hours the FSB at DAK TO received a small attack by a sapper unit. Results were one NVA KIA, four US WIA. At AR848992, Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with five NVA with unknown results, and later had three NVA approach the perimeter resulting in one NVA KIA. At BR355544 Company C, 2d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found a booby trapped road block and made heavy contact with an enemy force resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. At ZA106913 Company C, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry and Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received 15-20 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 26 US WIA. At BR246492 a convoy was ambushed by an estimated enemy squad, destroying one truck and damaging three, with four US WIA. At YB998026 the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed 15 individuals on a trail with packs. Individuals were taken under fire and the area was swept by the Aerial Rifle Platoon. Results were four NVA KIA, 18 mortar rounds and one SKS CIA. At YB998026 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size force resulting in seven NVA KIA and three US WIA, with two AK-47's and 18 rounds of 120mm mortar ammunition CIA. At YB998042 four 100 pound bags of salt were sighted and the Aerial Rifle Platoon from Troop D was inserted. The Aerial Rifle Platoons from Troops A and B made heavy contact and nearby the Troop D Aerial Rifle Platoon moved to reinforce. Results of the contact were 16 NVA KIA and one US KIA and two US WIA.

9 March. At YB728060 a forward air controller observed six vehicles on the road in groups of three, 300 meters apart heading west. Air strikes were called in resulting in two enemy trucks destroyed. One truck was damaged. At BR155505 Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry and the Division Exploitation Platoon made contact with a 10-15 man enemy force. Results were two NVA KIA and two US WIA, and one SKS and one AK-47 CIA. At ZA0989 an OH6A observation helicopter from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was shot down by automatic fire resulting in two US WIA. At YB994026 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry took one NVA under fire killing him. A sweep of the previous day's contact area produced three SKS's, one AK-47, and 4,000 pounds of rice. At ZA196678 a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle hit a mine destroying the vehicle and wounding three US. Two additional mines were found in the area. Results of the mine were one US KIA and two US WIA.

10 March. At YB997252 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one 75mm recoilless rifle position with four 75mm recoilless rifle rounds. At YB912283 a patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry set a hasty ambush for four individuals with negative results. While checking the area two additional individuals were spotted in a canoe and taken under fire resulting in two NVA KIA. At ZA059724 Company B,

2d Battalion, 8th Infantry found eight bodies in graves three or four days old. At AQ863253 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry set up an ambush. Eight NVA entered the ambush resulting in one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. At AR845995 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry observed a mortar firing. Small arms and artillery were fired into the position resulting in one NVA KIA.

11 March. At YB915328 Long Range Patrol HLA found a mortar position with seven rounds of 82mm mortar fire. At ZA175908 a convoy from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry hit two command detonated mines and received small arms fire plus two rounds of mortar fire. Results were two US WIA.

12 March. At ZA208950 a tank from Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine causing moderate damage. At ZA119553 a body was found by Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry. At ZA881365 Long Range Patrol 36 found a weapons cache with two RPG rockets, three rifles with grenade launchers, one AK-47, and one B-40 rocket. At ZA196683 a convoy hit a mine, damaging a lowboy.

13 March. At 1720 hours at ZB007216 DAK TO FSB received 15-20 rounds of 122mm rocket fire from YB953174 resulting in five US WIA, and one  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck destroyed. Air strikes were called in resulting in one secondary explosion. At AR983415 and AR982392 Troops A and B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry conducted a cordon and search of two villages resulting in nine detainees and one VMC captured. At ZA102502 an Engineer convoy was hit by a B-40 rocket damaging one bulldozer and causing four US WIA. At ZA018168 LRP H2A made contact with an unknown size force resulting in one US WIA. At ZA046972 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received small arms and mortar fire. The contact started at 0550 hours and lasted until 0800. Results were one US KIA, five US WIA, two NVA KIA, two small arms and one radio captured. At ZA064482 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry spotted 10-15 individuals and took them under fire. The Aerial Rifle Platoon was inserted, resulting in three NVA KIA and one AK-47 and seven B-40 rocket rounds CIA. At ZA070485 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry uncovered a spider hole. A grenade was dropped in resulting in a secondary explosion 200 feet high. The following were captured: one AK-47, 18 82mm mortar rounds, four 60mm mortar rounds, six and  $\frac{1}{2}$  pounds of C4 and five pounds of documents.

14 March. At YB846060 LRP HLA set up a hasty ambush for four NVA resulting in three NVA KIA. The patrol withdrew 75 meters and made contact with one NVA, killing him. At YB952239 Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in one US WIA. Company D, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found a 122mm rocket position that had been hit by artillery. There were three 122mm rounds damaged by artillery. A sweep of the area of contact of Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry produced one RPD light machine gun, one AK-47, two grenade launchers, 84 CHICOM grenades, 150 pounds of medical supplies, 3,455 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, 350 new uniforms, and 400 pounds of food stuffs. At ZA147943 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy company. Contact was initiated by three snipers in trees, followed by automatic weapons and small arms fire. Earlier Company D had received 20 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in two US WIA. Company D was joined by Company B. Air strikes and artillery were called in. Air strikes produced

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two secondary explosions. Results were one US KIA, four US WIA and five NVA KIA. At ZA228685 an OH6A light observation helicopter received automatic weapons fire and took four hits. The Aerial Rifle Platoon from Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was inserted after air strikes. Contact was made with an estimated 25 individuals. The aerial rifle platoons from Troops A and B were inserted and contact was established with an estimated reinforced enemy company. A reaction force from the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry moved to reinforce and tanks from the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry were called in. The enemy withdrew under pressure. Two NVA were killed. At AR785373 a patrol from the 4th Military Police company picked up two detainees. Five other individuals ran into a village. The patrol received small arms fire and called in helicopters. Three additional individuals were picked up and evacuated. At 2345 hours at YB988278 an ambush from Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry heard what sounded like a track vehicle racing its engine.

15 March. At ZA192985 Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry received B-40 and automatic weapons fire resulting in one US KIA, four US WIA, one truck, and one APC damaged. At YA975291 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received one B-40 resulting in three US WIA, negative damage to the track. At AR795525 the 937th Engineers received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire resulting in 20 US WIA, three trucks, one mess hall, and one barracks damaged. The 1st Battalion, 503d Airborne received 60 and 82mm mortar and automatic weapons fire from north, south and east. Air strikes and artillery were employed resulting in six NVA KIA, one US KIA and one US WIA. At ZB026003 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, killing one NVA. At ZA148937 Company D, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received six rounds 60mm mortar fire resulting in six US WIA. Five MIA from previous day's contact were found along with four NVA KIA. At ZA228685 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry sweep produced two AK-47's, five B-40 rounds, two documents, numerous foxholes, and six NVA KIA. At BR247486 Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry found six mines which were blown in place. At BR153519 a 5,000 gallon tanker was hit by a B-40 rocket. Two command detonated mines were set off in the same area. At BR200523 Troop B received four 60mm mortar rounds with negative results. At BR156512 a B-40 rocket was fired at a Troop B APC with negative results.

16 March. The FSB at DAK TO received five rounds of 122mm rocket fire with negative results. At ZA232669 Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found one SKS, one AK-47, four B-40 rounds, and four NVA KIA. At ZA201714 the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry made contact with an unknown size force when a convoy in the same area received 20 rounds of automatic weapons fire. There were four US WIA. At 1028 hours Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy squad in bunkers at ZA045895. Air strikes were employed resulting in one NVA KIA. At ZA039990 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received small arms fire resulting in three US WIA. At ZA039990 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rocket fire. Air strikes and artillery were called in. Results of the contact were one US KIA, three US WIA, six NVA KIA, three AK-47's, one RPD light machine gun, and one B-40 rocket launcher CIA. At ZA150938 Companies B and D, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received 17 rounds of mortar fire resulting in three US KIA and seven US WIA. An ambush in the same vicinity received six rounds of mortar fire and ambushed an unknown size unit resulting in two US WIA and one NVA KIA.

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At AQ780236 an aerial observer received automatic weapons fire from two positions. Artillery was called in resulting in one NVA KIA. At YB960062 an aircraft from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed one NVA lying by the trail. NVA was fired on resulting in one NVA KIA. A large group of NVA then appeared on the trail and were fired on resulting in one NVA KIA. At YB945062 Troop D observed a wounded NVA and landed to pick him up. The NVA resisted resulting in one NVA KIA and one SKS CIA. At 0032 hours Camp Enari, 4th Division Base Camp, received 12 122mm rocket rounds. All rounds outside the perimeter. At AR792229 at 0215 hours a NIGHT HAWK aircraft observed a vehicle moving south on Highway 14S and a second vehicle was picked up by radar at 0223 hours. Vehicles were taken under fire and secondary explosions were observed. Gunships received heavy automatic weapons fire from the same area. An aerial rifle platoon was inserted and found a heavily damaged logging truck with blood stains in the cab.

17 March. Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found a bunker complex with 150 bunkers. An aircraft had received ground fire from this location the previous day. Contact was made with an unknown size enemy force resulting in five NVA KIA, four AK-47's, six B-40 rocket rounds, 30 rounds of 82mm mortar, 31 rounds 60mm mortar ammunition, six boxes of mortar fuzes, 400 rounds AK-47 ammunition and 500 rounds of .30 cal ammunition CIA. At ZB028002 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found miscellaneous equipment, ammunition and explosives from the previous day's contact. Later at the same location, Company A received M-79 fire. The unit pulled back, and began receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire. Artillery was fired in support. Results were 13 US WIA. At ZAO38992 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received hand grenades and small arms fire sporadically through the night. Four NVA KIA were found the next morning. A sweep of Company B's 16 March contact area at ZAO39992 produced one RPD machine gun, one M-79 grenade launcher, two SKS's, three AK-47's and three NVA KIA. While searching the contact area, Company B received sniper fire and artillery was called in. A sweep of this area produced one NVA CIA/WIA and six NVA KIA. At ZAO41988 Company C, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry swept an area that had been hit by air strikes, and found the following: one NVA who was flushed out of a tunnel and killed, one 60mm mortar, four AK-47's, one B-40 rocket launcher, one RPD machine gun with seven ammunition drums, three rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, seven rounds 82mm mortar ammunition, 27 pounds of explosives, ten pounds of home made bangalore torpedos, four pounds medical supplies, assorted food, clothing and web gear, one bundle of documents, and 1,863 rounds AK-47 ammunition. At the same location three NVA KIA were found. At ZAL47942 Company B, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry observed an unknown number of individuals north of the perimeter which were engaged with small arms and artillery fire. A sweep in the morning revealed two NVA KIA, two AK-47's, one MAS-36, and two rifle grenades. At 172100 at YB738045 LRP T-12 observed eight enemy trucks on the NVA road. The lead vehicle was disabled and the other seven trucks were lined up behind it. Artillery was fired destroying one truck. Five trucks moved up the road to the northwest and artillery was called in again destroying two trucks, with an estimated six to 10 enemy KIA. KONTUM airstrip received 15 rounds of 122mm rocket fire resulting in one US WIA.

18 March. At ZA228682 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry fired on one NVA killing him. At ZA034010 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an estimated reinforced NVA company, receiving small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. Air strikes were flown against the mortar positions, but the mortar fire continued. Upon reaching Hill 1062, Company D continued to receive heavy fire. Company D then pulled off the hill. Results of the action were one US KIA two US WIA and four NVA KIA. At YA840910 an aircraft from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry received heavy automatic weapons fire. The troop's aerial rifle platoon was inserted and made contact with an estimated enemy company. The NVA attempted to surround the ground element, which withdrew to its landing zone and was extracted. Results of the contact were one US WIA and 12 NVA KIA, with several aircraft taking hits, but no injuries. At ZA219916 a 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry APC on convoy security was attacked by an estimated two enemy squads with B-40 rockets and automatic weapons. The driver of the APC was wounded and ran the vehicle into the ditch at the side of the road, overturning it. Results were one US KIA and four US WIA. A reaction force engaged the enemy force killing six NVA and capturing one NVA, two AK-47's and two B-40 rocket launchers.

19 March. Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) apprehended two detainees at ZA198675 and six detainees at ZA205688. At ZV237156 Companies A and D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry received 30-50 rounds of 82mm mortar fire from the north. All rounds landed outside of the perimeter with negative casualties or damage. At ZA037997 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received sniper fire. Artillery was fired and the sniper fire stopped. Shortly thereafter, contact was made with an unknown size force along a trail at ZA038997. M-79 and mortar fire were received. Artillery was fired in support and the enemy withdrew to the north. Negative casualties were received. At ZB036010 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received sporadic small arms, automatic weapons and mortar fire. An enemy ground attack was launched five minutes later with automatic weapons and grenades. Sporadic fire was received through the early morning. At 1240 hours at ZA155955 Company B made contact with an unknown size force. Airstrikes and artillery were called in and contact broke at 1300 hours but resumed at 1515 hours. Eight snipers were shot out of trees. But the bodies were not recovered. Results of the action were one NVA KIA and one US WIA. At AR947486 the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry found a cut in highway 19E six feet deep by ten feet wide. At ZB173015 an APC hit a mine, resulting in two US WIA.

20 March. At YA962365 IRP 2B made contact with an unknown size force, resulting in one US WIA. Aircraft reinserting the patrol received heavy ground fire from YA963336. An M 42A1 Duster (SP twin 40mm) hit a mine at ZA22734 resulting in the track being blown off. At ZA107733 Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found 800-1000 pounds of rice, which was evacuated. At ZA097300 Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor found a mine during a road sweep. A check of the area produced four 60mm mortar rounds, two 82mm mortar rounds and three M-79 grenade launchers. At ZB036000 Company B, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found one NVA KIA, one AK-47, one RPD machine gun and several magazines of ammunition. At ZA151948 at 0815 hours Company C, 3d Battalion, 503d Airborne made contact with an unknown size force

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receiving M-79 or 60mm mortar fire, and automatic weapons fire. When the unit attempted to withdraw to allow air strikes, it began to receive small arms and grenades from three sides. Company A moved out to reinforce. Contact continued sporadically until 1130 hours. Contact resumed at 1500 hours and continued until 1600 hours. At ZV227186, Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed two NVA companies moving northeast at sling arms. Company A engaged the force while Companies C and D formed a perimeter. Company A withdrew to the perimeter pursued by the enemy force. Air strikes and artillery were called in as the friendly perimeter began receiving four to five volleys of mortar fire every three minutes. The contact broke after four hours of fighting. A sweep of the contact area produced 18 NVA KIA, two NVA CIA, with seven US KIA and 23 US WIA. Four RPD machine guns, three AK-47's, seven SKS's, four B-40 rocket launchers, one 60mm mortar tube, ten pounds of explosive, one pair of field glasses and three M-79 grenade launchers were captured. At AR830316 the Exploitation Platoon, 4th Infantry Division made contact with an unknown size force. The platoon received a hand grenade while moving to their night location. Later another grenade was received resulting in one US WIA.

21 March. Long Range Patrol 2B made contact with an unknown size enemy force at YA960366. The enemy fired claymore mines and small arms and threw grenades. The fire was returned resulting in one VMC KIA and one small arm CIA. At ZA2374 a 937th Engineer Group convoy received automatic weapons fire and a dump truck hit a mine heavily damaging the dump truck. Two enemy were KIA. At ZB029004 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found 50 120mm mortar rounds, and 24 122mm rocket rounds. The lead element of Company A, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry was hit by an NVA ambush and received automatic weapons, small arms and mortar fire. Results were one NVA KIA, two US KIA and 23 US WIA. At ZA080693 an APC from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine with heavy damage to the track. At YA939913 Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire resulting in one US KIA and one US WIA. At BR248486 a bulldozer hit a mine sustaining light damage. At BR248485 a 5,000 gallon tanker hit a mine, catching fire and was destroyed. Two additional mines were found in the area. At ZA208958 an APC from Troop A, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine, causing two WIA. At 210300 KONTUM Airfield received five rounds of 122mm rocket fire. An additional three rounds were received at 1336 hours. There was no damage or casualties. A patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry observed one individual and took him under fire at ZV229193. A sweep of the area produced 14 NVA KIA from the 20 March contact and one NVA KIA from this contact.

22 March. At YA848935 Omega Team 14 made contact with an unknown size enemy force, resulting in one US KIA and five NVA KIA. At YB921297 Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found 17 bodies in shallow graves. At ZV230192 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found two bodies in graves. At ZB029005 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found ten rucksacks. At ZB037008 Company B found one NVA body. At ZB041996 Company B found a base camp and captured one AK-47, one RPD machine gun and assorted ammunition. At ZB057044 Company D made contact with snipers and received mortar fire resulting in one US KIA, two US WIA and one NVA KIA.

At ZA152955 Company C, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry made contact with an unknown size enemy force employing small arms, automatic weapons and B-40 rockets. Results were three US KIA, five US WIA, and three NVA KIA. At ZA162982 an APC from Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) hit a mine, destroying the APC and wounding three US. At ZA152972 Company C received small arms fire resulting in three US WIA. At YA940916 a patrol from the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an enemy force resulting in three US WIA. At ZA032929 a howitzer from the 6th Battalion, 14th Artillery hit a mine causing moderate damage and wounding one US. At ZA204314 a Base Camp patrol received one round of mortar fire, resulting in one US WIA.

23 March. At ZA090685 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine which pierced the hull. Another APC from Troop A hit a mine at ZA077733. There were no casualties. At ZA180752 Company B, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found one NVA in a grave, killed by artillery. Two more NVA in graves were found at ZA176751 by Company C. At ZV228208 Companies C and D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three fresh graves with one NVA in each grave. At ZV225205 Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found a bunker/hospital complex with documents and a large amount of supplies. At ZB057004 Company D, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found a company sized bunker complex with one pound of documents, 11 new gas masks, seven hand grenades, one pound of medical supplies and six recoilless rifle rounds. At ZA152929 Companies A and C, 3d Battalion, (Abn), 503d Infantry received sniper fire from trees and bunkers. Artillery was fired. Results were two US WIA and four NVA KIA. At ZA035928 Troop E, 17th Cavalry had a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton hit a mine wounding one US and destroying the vehicle. At YA939918 Companies C and D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with an estimated enemy squad in bunkers, using small arms and flamethrowers. The companies pulled back and called in airstrikes and artillery. The companies again advanced on the position, fire was again received and the units pulled back for airstrikes and artillery. Casualties were one US KIA and six US WIA. At ZA035928 a duster (SP twin 40mm) from the 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery hit a mine blowing off the track and wounding five US. At BRO04504 a tank from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine with moderate damage to the suspension. At ZA153968 Company C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) received small arms and B-40 rocket fire. One APC was hit with a B-40 rocket. Results were nine US WIA and one NVA KIA.

24 March. At ZA009704 Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry fired on ten NVA hitting several with one NVA KIA. Artillery was fired. One pistol belt, one hand grenade and a pack with documents were captured. At AQ7723 a light observation helicopter from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry was hit by ground fire. Later, an HULB helicopter was also hit resulting in one US WIA. The area was swept with negative results. At ZA079997 Company A, 1st Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry found a 30-40 man way station with assorted food, clothing, small arms ammunition and documents. At ZA101991 Company B met one NVA on a trail resulting in one NVA KIA. At ZA150960 Company C, 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry received B-40 or grenade fire and found 27 bunkers. At ZA151960 Companies A and C made light contact with an unknown size force. Contact became heavy as NVA were discovered in bunkers. The positions were taken with one US KIA, ten US WIA, and six



two US WIA, and four NVA KIA. At ZA144959 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found one NVA KIA from previous days contact of 3d Battalion (Abn), 503d Infantry. At ZA159958 Companies A and C, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found one AK-47, one SKS, one RPG-2 with five rounds of ammunition, five rounds 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition, 20 rounds of 82mm ammunition and two rounds of 60mm ammunition.

27 March. At YA936914 Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry took one NVA under fire. The individual fled leaving his AK-47. At YA937914 Company B observed one NVA stringing commo wire. Results were one NVA KIA and one AK-47 and one telephone CIA. At ZA149964 Company A, 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry (Mech) found a week old grave containing one NVA. At ZA153978 a Company A APC hit a mine heavily damaging the APC and wounding two US. The 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry passed from OPCON of 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division and became OPCON to 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep).

28 March. At AR875328 a base camp patrol from Red Sector swept the area of a contact and found one VC KIA and one SKS CIA. At ZA015718 the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and PLEI MRONG CSF found a battalion sized base area. While moving southeast from the base area, they observed more bunkers and detected movement. They pulled back and called in artillery. As they moved back into the area they made contact with an estimated enemy battalion. The units again pulled back, calling in air-strikes and artillery. The units again moved into the area receiving sporadic small arms fire. Results were four CSF WIA. (See 29 March for enemy) At YA939920 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received small arms and automatic weapons fire from an estimated 12 individuals in bunkers. The unit pulled back and called in artillery. Results were one US KIA and one NVA KIA. At YA938921 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, and Company A, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry who were colocated, received 14 rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in one US WIA. Later they received two rounds of 75mm RR fire. Artillery was fired and three secondary explosions were observed.

29 March. At ZA049431 Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry reported that a bridge had been blown. An Armor Vehicle Launched Bridge was used to span the gap. The Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made a sweep of the area of the previous day's contact and found seven NVA KIA, two pistols, one AK-47, 25 rounds of B-40 ammunition, three cases of B-40 propellant, eight mines and assorted documents. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received mortar fire throughout the day resulting in 13 US WIA. At YA937924 Company A found one NVA KIA, one AK-47, and 16 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At ZA039993 Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found ten NVA KIA by artillery approximately one week old. At ZA069923 a VTR from 5th Battalion 22d Artillery hit a mine damaging the track. At ZA053929 a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton from Battery C, 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery hit a mine killing two US and destroying the vehicle. At ZA054928 a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton from Troop E, 17th Cavalry hit a mine wounding two US and destroying the vehicle. At ZB109167 a five ton truck from the 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine blowing a rear tire.

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30 March. At ZAO74705 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry hit a mine blowing off one road wheel. At ZAO85710 a Troop B tank hit a mine suffering minor damage. At BR248486 a 3/4 ton truck hit a mine suffering moderate damage and resulting in two US WIA. At ZAO17716 Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found 15 bunkers and later found a total of 110 bunkers and one NVA KIA. At 300140 hours the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received four rounds of 60mm mortar fire resulting in five US WIA. During the period 290600 to 300600 hours, a total of 80-100 rounds of mortar fire was received. At YA928923 a patrol from Company B, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry observed nine NVA. Artillery and airstrikes were called in with unknown results. At YA932909 a Company C, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry patrol engaged an unknown size force. Artillery and airstrikes were called in. There were two US WIA. At YA937927 Company A engaged an unknown size force in a contact which lasted through the afternoon. Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry reinforced. There were no casualties. At ZAO39993 Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force. Heavy mortar fire was received resulting in one US KIA and four US WIA, one NVA KIA and one AK-47 CIA. Troop B 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed ten bunkers and one individual. Airstrikes and artillery were called in resulting in three NVA KIA. At 302000 hours 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) released all OPCON units to 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, which returned to control of 4th Infantry Division from I FFORCE V OPCON.

31 March. At YA952375 a tank from Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor had a B-40 rocket fired at it but the round detonated against a tree wounding two US. The 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry FSB received sporadic mortar and recoilless rifle fire throughout the day resulting in six WIA. At ZAO36995 Company A, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and one attached CSF company made contact with an estimated enemy platoon dug in, receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire. Gunships, artillery and airstrikes were called in. Results were three US KIA, 11 US WIA, two CSF KIA and six CSF WIA. At ZA204965 an APC from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine suffering heavy damage and three US WIA. A tank and a wrecker hit mines in the same area shortly thereafter. At BRO35522 a five ton truck from the 937 Engineer Group hit a mine resulting in heavy damage to the truck and one US WIA. At ZAO44930 a VTR hit a mine resulting in moderate damage to the VTR and six US WIA. At YB892182 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry observed and engaged five NVA in the open resulting in five NVA KIA. At ZAO52929 an ambush patrol from Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and an ARVN element killed two NVA. Two ARVN were wounded.

1 April. At YB982293 a reconnaissance patrol from 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry engaged an estimated 15-20 NVA. Artillery was fired in support and Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry conducted a sweep of the battle area. Results were two NVA KIA. At AP825983 an element from the 3d Battalion, 45th ARVN Regiment made contact with an unknown size force resulting in two NVA KIA, one ARVN KIA. At ZAO37996 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry and a CSF company engaged an unknown size force in bunkers, resulting in two NVA KIA, five CSF WIA, six US WIA. At YA917935 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged four NVA, killing one. Companies A and D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry secured Hill 1198 at YA937930 and recovered the bodies of eight US killed previously and found 10 NVA bodies killed by air and artillery. At

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ZAO69709 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry struck a mine, resulting in one US WIA.

2 April. At ZAO28993 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body. At YA840942 an LOH aircraft from Company B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was shot down by heavy AW ground fire. A platoon from Troop D was inserted and extracted one US WIA and one US KIA. At AQ775183 a stay-behind ambush from Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry engaged several NVA with artillery and killed one. At YB930209 Headhunter 42 observed three NVA in the open and called in artillery, resulting in two NVA KIA.

3 April. At ZB173017 an APC from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry hit a mine, resulting in two US WIA. At ZBQ38012 Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company, four US KIA, four US WIA, five NVA KIA. In the vicinity of FSB #7 a patrol from Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry called in artillery on four NVA in bunkers, resulting in four NVA KIA. At ZAO38991 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company, four US KIA, seven US WIA, nine NVA KIA.

4 April. At AR836484 eight VC were killed attempting to breach the perimeter of the engineer quarry. At AR822489 a patrol from the 52d Aviation Group ambushed an enemy mortar crew firing on Camp Holloway, resulting in five VC KIA, one VC PW, and three AK-47's, one B-40 rocket launcher, three B-40 rounds, 35 satchel charges, one bangalore, seven grenades, one 82mm mortar base plate and 20 82mm mortar rounds CIA. At YA878928 Headhunter 42 called in artillery on five individuals with weapons and packs, resulting in one NVA KIA. At YA826964 Headhunter 41 called in artillery on 15-20 armed individuals, two NVA KIA. At YA935938 a 155mm artillery round impacted near the Reconnaissance Platoon of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, wounding six US. At YA936937 Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry found seven NVA bodies. At ZAO38992 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry killed seven NVA. At YA939913 FSB#14 received three or four mortar rounds, four US WIA. At YA938912 Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry received one round 82mm mortar fire, three US WIA.

5 April. At YA928932 Companies A and C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA battalion in bunkers. The fighting continued through the day and into the night, resulting in one US KIA (the CO of Company C) 22 US WIA, six US MIA, and 48 NVA KIA. At ZB049014 Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force resulting in four US WIA, two NVA KIA. At YB968151 Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry received rifle grenade fire, three US WIA. At ZAO35992 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with an unknown size force, two US WIA, three NVA KIA. At ZA785888 KONTUM airfield received 22 rounds of 122mm rocket fire.

6 April. At ZA146963 Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry found two NVA bodies in graves. At YA987447 LRP 2B engaged an unknown size force and killed two NVA. Fourteen sorties of airstrikes were flown in support of the 3d Brigade in the vicinity of YB735048 - YB735060, with all pilots

reporting receiving ground fire up to altitudes of 10,000 feet. At ZA307999 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body and one SKS. At YA937931 an APC from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry struck a mine, resulting in two US WIA. At FSB #14 an 82mm mortar round wounded seven US. At ZA031928 a fire in the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry's mortar pits caused several rounds to explode, wounding three US, and destroying two 81mm and three 4.2" mortars. At ZB037011 Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found three NVA bodies and a B-40 rocket launcher. The 1st Battalion (-), 69th Armor was released from the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. At ZB037000 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found eight NVA bodies. At ZA211831 LRP #12 killed two NVA.

7 April. At ZA208945 a  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton truck from 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry struck a mine, resulting in two US KIA, one US WIA. At YA905915 an airstrike destroyed an enemy mortar position. At ZA205965 an APC from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry struck a mine resulting in five US WIA. Between 1025 and 1535 hours FSB #14 received an estimated fifty 82mm mortar rounds, resulting in five US WIA. Additional elements of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor were released from the operational control of the 4th Infantry Division. During the overland move at BR069544 a tank from Company C struck a mine, resulting in one US WIA. Between 1740 and 1910 hours FSB #14 received 10 rounds of recoilless rifle fire, resulting in one US KIA, 13 US WIA and two 105mm howitzers destroyed.

8 April. At ZA217599 a PF outpost was overrun by an estimated VC platoon, resulting in seven PF KIA, two PF WIA and one PF MIA. At ZA069309 a vehicle from the 20th Engineers struck a mine, one US WIA. At ZB038000 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body. Throughout the day FSB #14, at YA939913, received a total of 70 rounds of 82mm mortar and 29 rounds of recoilless rifle fire, resulting in eight US WIA. Airstrikes called in on the enemy positions caused two secondary explosions. At ZA103502 an aircraft from Troop D, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received ground fire, one US WIA. A platoon from Troop A was inserted into the area and made contact with an unknown size force. The fighting, which continued for more than four hours, resulted in six NVA KIA, three AK-47's, two carbines, one B-40 rocket launcher and 10 packs CIA. The 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry completed its move into the 4th Infantry Division area of operations. At AQ835287 the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry FSB received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, one US WIA.

9 April. At ZA047998 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found a large bunker complex and captured four small arms weapons, 244 rounds of 60mm and eight rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition, and 3000 AK-47 rounds. At YA937926 Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies killed by artillery. At ZV227230 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged three NVA, killing all three. At BR155522 a west bound convoy received two B-40 rocket rounds, rifle grenades and SA fire, resulting in two US WIA. The remainder of 1st Battalion, 69th Armor was released from the operational control of the 4th Division and moved overland to the Cochise Green area of operations. At ZB005076 Omega team #27 made contact with an estimated 20 NVA, killing one before they were extracted. At ZB993033 LRP HH61 called artillery in on four NVA, killing one.

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10 April. A CSF company from PLEI ME killed two VMC in two separate contacts at ZA014082 and ZA004087. At ZV243222 IRP Team 35 received SA fire from an unknown size force, one US WIA. At BR243493 Troop B, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry killed one NVA. At ZV210130 a gunship from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was shot down, two US WIA. At YA723077 an airstrike destroyed an anti-aircraft position. At YA660763 a FAC observed an estimated 30-40 NVA and directed an airstrike, resulting in a secondary explosion and an estimated 17 NVA KBA. At YA659761 another airstrike resulted in an estimated five NVA KIA.

11 April. At ZA044931 a 2½ ton truck from 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry struck a mine, resulting in two US WIA. At ZA068921 a truck from 4th Engineer struck a mine, resulting in two US WIA. At ZA055928 a 5 ton truck from 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry struck a mine, resulting in one US WIA. At YA935935 an ambush patrol from 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged an estimated 20 NVA and called in artillery with unknown results. At YA941976 LRP GB-12 engaged three to five NVA and called in artillery, resulting in two NVA KIA.

12 April. At ZB054006 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body in a grave. At ZA015835 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found 10,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, and at YA995826 Company B, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found 600 pounds of TNT, 27 anti-tank mines, 200 CHICOM grenades, 30 CHICOM claymores and two B-40 rocket launchers. At AQ758189 a 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry patrol made contact with an estimated eight to 10 individuals, resulting in one US KIA. At ZA085405 LRP H-2A was ambushed by an unknown size VC force, resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA.

13 April. At ZA203359 a civic action team from DISCOM was ambushed by an estimated nine to 10 individuals, resulting in two US WIA. At ZA007828 Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found 64 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At YA929934 Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry found two AK-47's, two B-40 rocket launchers and two B-40 rounds. At YA927916 Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry killed an NVA sniper in a tree. At YA925934 Company B, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry found five US bodies believed to be MIA from contact of 5 April. At AQ807197 the 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon engaged four to five VC, killing one and capturing one. At ZA199121 a CSF ambush patrol from PLEI ME engaged five NVA, killing one and capturing an M-16 rifle.

14 April. At ZEL53096 an APC from Company C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry struck a mine, resulting in three US WIA. In the vicinity of ZV2419 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry found three NVA bodies, estimated dead for one or two weeks. At YA928931 Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry found a 60mm mortar and a light machine gun. At YA925934 Company A, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry recovered one US KIA believed killed in contact of 5 April.

15 April. At ZA207955 an ARVN 3/4 ton truck struck a mine, resulting in five ARVN WIA. Later at the same location an ARVN 2½ ton truck struck a mine resulting in one ARVN WIA. At YA935937 Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry made contact with a large force and received mortar fire. Company D, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry linked up, also receiving mortar fire enroute. The companies withdrew to the FSB at YA938931. Results of the contact were 10 US MIA, 48 US WIA.

16 April. At YA934930 Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received heavy AW ground fire. Fire was returned, resulting in one NVA KIA. At YA939913 FSB #14 received four recoilless rifle rounds, resulting in one US KIA and two US WIA.

17 April. At ZA045972 an individual from Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry struck a mine or booby trap while digging a foxhole and was wounded. At AQ835335 LRP 34 made contact with an estimated 10-15 individuals. Gunships were employed, resulting in one VC KIA and several secondary explosions. At AQ815387 LRP 36 made contact with two VC, resulting in one VC KIA, one VC PW, and two carbines CIA. At YA935937 Company C, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry recovered the 10 US bodies MIA from contact of 15 April. At YA976488 LRP 4E killed one NVA and captured an AK-47.

18 April. At YA835965 Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry found 140 rounds of 82mm mortar ammunition. At YA810942 an LOH from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry was shot down by AW ground fire, two US WIA. One US from the aerial rifle platoon was wounded during the rescue operation and one US was wounded when another LOH received ground fire. Seven NVA were killed during the contact. At ZA107537 an APC from Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received one B-40 rocket and SA fire, resulting in one US KIA, one US WIA. At ZA092167 a CSF company from PLEI ME made heavy contact with an estimated NVA company. Airstrikes were employed and contact was broken after 45 minutes of fighting. Results of the contact were unknown. At ZA094439 an ambush patrol from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry killed one VMC.

19 April. At YA937928 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found four NVA bodies approximately a week old and one AK-47. At YA935938 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found eight NVA bodies.

20 April. At YA963855 a 155mm artillery round impacted near the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry location, resulting in one US killed. Two NVA walked into FSB #14 and surrendered. They were classified as returnees and evacuated for interrogation. At ZA137182 Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry engaged an estimated 20 NVA and killed two. At YA937928 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies killed by artillery. At ZB163462 LRP H-1A observed three VC and killed one. At YA863907 a US mortar round impacted near Company A, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry's position, resulting in one US wounded. At ZA128595 a CSF company from PLEI MRONG made contact with an estimated VMC platoon, killing one and capturing an AK-50.

21 April. At ZA016817 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry received two bursts of AW fire, resulting in one US WIA. At YA937028 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found seven NVA bodies, and Companies C and D each found one more at YA936936 and YA935939. In three separate mining incidents at ZA058928 a tank from Troop C, 2d Squadron, 1st Cavalry, a 3/4 ton truck from 5th SF Group and an ARVN 3/4 ton truck were damaged or destroyed, and two US and two ARVN were wounded. At YA863418 a CSF company from PLEI DJERENG engaged four VMC, killing two and capturing two. At ZA008818 Company A, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry made contact with a small NVA force, resulting in one US KIA, four US WIA. At YA887816 LRP 4B made contact with an estimated NVA platoon and called in gunships and artillery. Results were three NVA KIA and six SA weapons captured. At ZV165985 a CSF company from PLEI ME engaged an estimated NVA platoon, killing one. At YA890814 Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry killed one NVA.

22 April. At ZA124593 a CSF company from PLEI MRONG engaged an estimated 60 man force, killing three VMC, three NVA and capturing a 60mm mortar, two B-40 rocket launchers and five SKS. At YA845819 Omega Team #33 made contact with an estimated NVA company, resulting in one US WIA, two indigenous WIA and four NVA KIA. At YA923931 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found 14 NVA bodies killed by artillery. In the vicinity of YA8686 a platoon from Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with eight NVA, resulting in one US KIA and two US WIA. At ZA125575, a CSF company from PLEI MRONG engaged an estimated VC company, killing seven VC and capturing a sub-machine gun and a B-40 rocket launcher.

23 April. At YA936945 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies. At YB936906 a Headhunter aircraft observed an estimated company constructing a bridge. An airstrike was called in, resulting in two NVA KBA. At YA801974 an aircraft from Troop B, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry killed one NVA.

24 April. At YA932927 Company D, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body, and another at YA930926. Both bodies had been dead for about two weeks. The aerial rifle platoon of Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry was inserted at YA745949 to check out a bunker complex sighted by Troop B. The platoon conducted a reconnaissance with negative findings and began its extraction when six US were wounded by SA and AW fire from the east of the PZ. At YB930825 two MSF companies engaged an estimated four NVA platoons, resulting in one US WIA, one Australian MIA, two MSF KIA and five MSF WIA. At YA933930 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found five SA weapons. At YA783427 LRP 4B engaged several NVA, killing one and capturing an AK-47. At YA844891 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company. The fighting, which lasted for two hours, resulted in seven US WIA and two NVA KIA. A UH-1H helicopter in support of the contact was shot down by ground fire, but all personnel were rescued with only slight injury to one US.

25 April. At YA944891 Company D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry killed two NVA snipers in trees and captured their AK-47's. An hour later the company received mortar fire and shortly thereafter made heavy contact with an

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estimated reinforced NVA company. The contact continued through the morning, and the company received two B-40 rocket attacks in the afternoon. Results of the contact were two US KIA, 29 US WIA, six NVA KIA. At YB934832 the 206th MSF company at DAK PEK made heavy contact with an unknown size force. The company became separated into three groups during the fighting, which continued for more than four hours. Results of the contact were 10 MSF WIA, 14 MSF MIA. LRP 3C found one NVA body at ZAL47942. At ZAO60925 a 5 ton truck from the 5th Battalion, 22d Artillery struck a mine, resulting in two US WIA, one US MIA. At AP822981 the 3d Battalion 45th ARVN engaged an unknown size force, resulting in five ARVN KIA, 11 ARVN WIA, one ARVN MIA and 23 NVA KIA.

26 April. At YA198695 a UH-1H from Troop A, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry received an air burst, slightly wounding three US. The aircraft landed on Highway 14S to check the damage, but had to lift off and return to KONTUM when it received fire from both sides of the road. At YA937935 Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found three NVA bodies killed by artillery. At YA844891 Companies B and D, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made contact with an estimated NVA company, receiving SA, AW, B-40 and 60mm mortar fire. Two hours later Company C also made contact with an estimated company at YA843886. By 1250 hours all three companies were heavily engaged. At 1255 hours a gunship from the 52d Aviation Group received heavy ground fire, seriously wounding the pilot. The 1600 hours Company A conducted a relief in place of Company D. At 1800 hours Companies A and B reported the enemy was withdrawing. At 1845 hours the enemy broke contact with Company C. Results of the contact were two US KIA, 28 US WIA and four NVA known killed. At ZAL62167 a patrol from Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received SA fire from an estimated three individuals, resulting in one US WIA.

27 April. At YA842884 Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry received one B-40 rocket round. At YA845893, the night location for Companies A and B, a patrol from Company A received SA and B-40 rocket fire 30 meters outside their perimeter. The two companies remained in their night location and continued to receive sporadic SA, rocket and mortar fire throughout the day. At 0940 hours Company C conducted an attack against an unknown size force in bunkers. Meeting heavy resistance, the company withdrew and called in artillery and airstrikes. At 1040 hours, the heavy enemy fire forced them to withdraw to the night location. Artillery and airstrikes continued to hit the enemy position and at 1615 hours Company C took the high ground and the bunker complex. At 1700 hours the enemy counterattacked with AW, B-40 rocket and 60mm mortar fire. At 1825 hours, the company withdrew, but continued to receive mortar fire. At 1920 hours artillery produced a large secondary explosion at YA835819 and the mortar fire ceased. Results of the contact were five US KIA, 52 WIA, two MIA, and nine known NVA KIA. At YA934944 Company C, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found one NVA body. At YA839911 Company C, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry killed one NVA. The airstrip at BAN ME THUOT received 40-60 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, resulting in 14 US WIA and seven aircraft damaged.

28 April. At YA844891 a 105mm artillery round impacted inside the perimeter of Company C, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, resulting in one US killed,

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and one US wounded. At YA842907 Company C, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry engaged five NVA, killing four and capturing an AK-47, with one US slightly wounded. At YA843887 the company again made contact and withdrew to call in artillery and airstrikes. Half an hour later the company received a 60mm mortar attack, resulting in four US KIA and 19 US WIA. At 1424 hours Company D, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry attempted a lift into Company C's location but the mission was aborted by mortar fire on the LZ, wounding three US. At 1700 hours Company D received three rounds of 60mm mortar fire at YA842884, resulting in two US WIA. At 1906 hours at the same location the company received five 75mm RR rounds, resulting in one US KIA seven US WIA. At YB830183 a mine sweep element from Company D, 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body. Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry found one NVA body at YA849168, and Company A found three NVA bodies at YB830183. At ZA072769 Troop A, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry found one NVA body. At YA870880 the Commanding Officer of Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry moved off the trail his unit was moving on and was captured by two NVA.

29 April. At 0206 hours at YA836908 the night position of Company B, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was attacked by an estimated NVA battalion employing SA, AW and B-40 rocket fire. At 0224 hours the enemy began employing 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and flame throwers. The enemy began digging in 10-15 meters outside of the company perimeter, and heavy contact continued until 0515 hours, when the enemy broke off and withdrew. Results of the battle were two US KIA, 20 US WIA, 46 NVA KIA in the immediate vicinity of the perimeter, two light machine guns, four AK-47's, two SKS and one B-40 rocket launcher captured. At ZA012813 one US from Company D, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry was wounded in an exchange of fire with two NVA. At YB928202 Company B, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry found one NVA body in a grave. At YA844892 Company B, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry received one B-40 rocket, resulting in three US WIA. At ZA063283 an airborne personnel detector received ground fire, resulting in one US WIA. At YA936935 Company B, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry found two NVA bodies. At Z115513 an APC from Troop B, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry received two B-40 rockets, resulting in one US WIA. The Commanding Officer of Company A, 3d Battalion, 12th Infantry, captured on 28 April, returned to the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry FSB. He had made his escape when an artillery round wounded his two NVA captors at YA878875.

30 April. At the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry FSB an outgoing 105mm artillery round struck a radio antenna, resulting in an airburst which killed one US and wounded 12. At AR833230 an MP escort for a Civic Action team was ambushed by an estimated 10 NVA, resulting in two US KIA and one US WIA. At YA996825 Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry reported one US MIA who became separated from his unit. A search was made with negative findings. At YA881372 a CSF company from DUC GO made contact with an estimated VMC squad, resulting in three CSF WIA.

E-X-T-R-A-C-T C-O-P-Y O-N-L-Y

HEADQUARTERS 1ST BATTALION 22D INFANTRY  
"REGULARS"  
APO San Francisco 96262

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACV J3-32)

TO: Commanding General  
4th Infantry Division  
ATTN: AVDDH-GC  
APO San Francisco 96262

1. BATTLE OF KONTUM / TET COUNTEROFFENSIVE
2. DATES: 301121 January 1968 - 121200 February 1968
3. LOCATION: KONTUM City, SVN
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry
5. TASK FORCE COMMANDER: LTC William P. Junk Jr. 063358

6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

TM A	B/1-22 Inf (-)	B/1-12 Inf	TM C
A/1-22 Inf (-)			C/1-22 Inf
1/C/1-69 Armor			C/2-1 Cav
TM RUTHLESS	D/1-12 Inf	TM D	TM ARMOR
D/7-17 Air Cav (-)		D/1-22 Inf	G/1-69 Armor (-)
2/C/1-69 Armor		3/C/1-69 Armor	3/B/1-22 Inf
			1/D/7-17 Air Cav

BN CONTROL

Recon Plt  
1/A/1-22 Inf  
C/4-42 Arty (DS)  
C/5-16 Arty (DS)  
2 twin 40 mm AA  
3/B/4th Engr

7. BACKGROUND:

a. The initial attack on KONTUM: At 292300 January 1968, the KONTUM Province Capital was attacked by an estimated battalion size VC force. The attack, a part of the enemy country-wide TET offensive, had as its objective

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the overthrow of the provincial government, destruction of local government forces, and seizure of the city of KONTUM. The enemy plan of attack was, first, to infiltrate the city of KONTUM during the hours of darkness dressed in Regional Force uniforms and occupy preselected defensive positions and public buildings south, southeast and west of the province chief's house. Secondly, the command element, consisting of the VC province chief, his personal physician, the VC political officer and two bodyguards, was to position itself east of the Province Headquarters. Concurrently, a VC company was to occupy an empty field to the west of the province chief's house to engage the Regional Force company deployed in foxholes and bunkers protecting the Provincial Headquarters area. The above was accomplished by 300230 January and the assault on the Provincial Headquarters commenced. LTC Doan, the province chief, had been alerted earlier to trouble when a small contact between VC forces and elements of an ARVN signal platoon occurred during the enemy movement to position. He immediately recognized that the individuals dressed in Regional Force uniforms east of his residence were the enemy and ordered them taken under fire. As a result, the VC command group was annihilated and the attack on the RF company protecting the province chief's house failed. By morning, the province chief's residence, Province Headquarters (adjacent to the province chief's house), and the US advisors' communications shack in the same area were under friendly control. The remaining offices and buildings were occupied by VC elements who commenced firing at targets of opportunity.

b. 4th Infantry Division initial reaction. At 301121 January 1968, ACofS G3 alerted LTC William P. Junk, Jr, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry that his battalion could possibly be deployed to the KONTUM area. LTC Junk organized a reconnaissance/liaison party consisting of the S3, S2, Reconnaissance platoon leader, Artillery Liaison Officer, and the Commanding Officer of Company B, and departed by helicopter for KONTUM where he made direct on the ground coordination with COL Cahill, Senior Advisor, 24th Special Tactical Zone, LTC Whalen, Sector Advisor, KONTUM Sector, and LTC Doan, KONTUM Province Chief. Following the visit, the CO, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry returned to Camp Enari, assembled his staff and issued instructions for deployment of the battalion to KONTUM.


#### 8. OPERATIONAL PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT:

a. Predeployment. The initial planning for deployment of the battalion, or elements thereof, to the KONTUM area was hampered by the following factors:

(1) The battalion had recently returned to Base Camp for a five day stand down and was engaged in refitting, preparation for training, and individual personnel actions.

(2) Two companies, two separate platoons, and the battalion TAC CP were deployed north of PLEIKU as a blocking force for the PLEIKU area.

(3) The mission of the battalion and the extent the battalion would be deployed were not clearly defined in the warning order. (G3 NOTE: The situation in KONTUM had not developed sufficiently to permit the issuance of definitive orders.)




- |                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| 1. Province HQ Bldg              | 8. Information Service                   |
| 1A. Advisory Commo Shack         | 9. Treasury                              |
| 2. Province Chief's House        | 10. Ag and Husbandry Co-op               |
| 3. Guest House                   | 11. New Guest House                      |
| 4. RD Staff Bldg                 | 12. Signal Platoon                       |
| 5. MAC-CORDS Advisory Admin Bldg | 13. Police Station and Compound          |
| 6. Post Office                   | 14. Admin, Log and Supply Co             |
| 7. Education Service             | 15. Garage and Official Employee's House |

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(4) There was a lack of complete intelligence on the existing and potential threat to KONTUM.

(5) Command relationship and control of other friendly elements in the area were not fully clarified. These problems were eventually resolved by direct coordination with US and VIETNAMESE Headquarters in the KONTUM area, liaison visits to Division Headquarters, and queries for information from division by the battalion staff.

b. Deployment. At 301121 January 1968, the battalion was alerted to prepare one company for deployment to KONTUM, under the operational control of the 7th Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry. At 301425 January 1968, Company B made a combat assault from Base Camp to the vicinity of AR8191 and initiated search and destroy operations in that area. At 301658 January 1968 the battalion was directed to deploy a company size force to secure the bridge across the DAK BLA River at AR769876. The directive further stated that the Commanding officer 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry would assume command of all 4th Infantry Division forces in the KONTUM area, once two of his companies had been deployed. Company A was selected for the bridge security mission and completed its combat assault at the bridge site at 301910 hours, followed by the Battalion TAC CP, the Reconnaissance Platoon, and the heavy mortar platoon minus. The bridge across the DAK BLA River (AR7687) was secured immediately and at 302400 hours the TAC CP was operational and in communication with all 4th Infantry Division elements in the area as well as with Division Headquarters. The chain of command for the operation was established earlier in the day at a meeting between LTC Junk and COL Cahill. It was agreed that COL Cahill was to be overall coordinator of military operations in the area and LTC Junk working in close coordination with LTC Whalen and LTC Doan was to be the ground force commander. The sensitivity of the civilian populace to the conduct of military operations in cities and the political impact that could result were taken into consideration. Consequently, the approval of the province chief was solicited and received prior to the undertaking of any operation.

## 9. OPERATIONS.

a. GENERAL. Combat operations in the defense of KONTUM and the surrounding area covered a 14 day period (30 Jan - 12 Feb 68). The operation was unusual in that the environment required the conduct of unconventional, conventional, and special combat operations. For example, initial operations within the city required the application of special methods and techniques to defeat the enemy. Following the clearing of the city, operations moved to the suburban areas, where units were forced to assume unconventional or counter-guerrilla postures. When he realized that the areas immediately adjacent to the city had become untenable, the enemy moved into the hills north of KONTUM and occupied previously prepared defensive positions, thus establishing a situation suitable for conventional operations. The positions were mutually supporting bunkers with overhead cover, foxholes, and trench systems. Avenues of approach into the area were covered by mortars, automatic weapons, and B-40 rockets. For reasons yet undetermined, the enemy elected to defend these areas at all costs. To neutralize the positions, the battalion was forced to conduct a series of coordinated ground attacks utilizing all available


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firepower, including tanks in a direct fire support role.

b. EXECUTION. The course of events allowed the operation to be divided into three phases: Phase I - The deployment of a reaction force to prevent the provincial government from capitulation to enemy control. Phase II - The initiation of offensive operations to destroy enemy forces within the city of KONTUM, and Phase III - Exploitation and pursuit.

(1) Phase I 30-31 Jan. A second meeting on the morning of 31 January 1968 between the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry and the Senior Advisor 24 STZ, clearly delineated the task at hand. The enemy was directing his effort against the Provincial Headquarters complex and the MACV Compound. These were the only areas within the city still completely in friendly hands and their fall would have completed the seizure of KONTUM. A contact made by Company B at 310752 January 1968 resulting in two NVA KIA, one AK-47 and one NVA pack with protective mask CIA indicated the presence of NVA forces on the outskirts of the city, confirming and compounding the seriousness of the threat to KONTUM. Instructions were immediately issued for the deployment of a reaction force of sufficient size to prevent the takeover of the city. To accomplish this, Company B 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry and Troop D, 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry were combat assaulted from north of the city to the KONTUM Airfield and company D was airlifted from a blocking position north of PLEIKU to the bridge site being secured by Company A. These moves were accomplished by 1341 hours. Concurrently with these moves, the Reconnaissance Platoon and a platoon of Company A were ordered to move north of the DAK BIA bridge and develop the situation in the southwestern part of the city. The battalion was now in a position to react to the enemy threat.

(2) Phase II 1-4 Feb. During this phase, action was initiated to destroy VC and NVA forces within the city. All ARVN and RF/PF forces in the area were committed, providing security for outlying hamlets, the airfield, the Provincial Headquarters, and ARVN Military Headquarters installations. With this situation in mind, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry made a detailed estimated of the situation and concluded that additional forces were required. A request was dispatched to Division and after some discussion, permission was granted to bring Company C, the only uncommitted company of the battalion, into the area. Continued contact and additional intelligence concerning the enemy strength in the area revealed that the enemy threat was greater than previously estimated and additional troops were dispatched. By the end of the third day of Phase II, the battalion task organization reflected six rifle companies, one tank company, one 105mm howitzer battery, one 155mm howitzer battery and reconnaissance platoon. This phase lasted a total of four days and was characterized by house-to-house street fighting which was beyond a doubt the bloodiest and most violent of the entire operation. The enemy had established themselves in basements, lofts of buildings, roof tops and tunnels. The areas of enemy concentration were divided into search areas and the basic principles of combat operations in built-up areas were applied. Objectives, phase lines, and boundaries were used for control. The problems normally associated with combat in cities were compounded by the fact the city was still partially occupied by civilians. It was necessary to issue special instructions to troops on such matters as rules of engagement, search and seizure, destruction of municipal and private



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property, handling of refugees and enemy suspects. Discipline was of the utmost importance and positive control had to be exercised at every level of command. With the exception of the limited instruction received in basic training, the troops were not trained for combat in cities and were accustomed to fighting the enemy in the jungle. Nevertheless they rapidly adjusted to the new environment and performed superbly. At the close of Phase II, 26 VC and 608 NVA had been killed (BC).

(3) Phase III 5-12 Feb. By 4 February, activities indicated that the enemy had been defeated in his attempt to seize the Provincial Capital and was withdrawing in all directions. Since he had suffered heavy losses and was badly in need of supplies, it was suspected that the enemy would withdraw to pre-selected defensive areas and hamlets within close proximity of the city. In order not to lose contact, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry, with approval and guidance from the Division Commander, initiated search operations outside the city to locate and destroy the withdrawing enemy forces. The concept was similar to the method used during the city fighting. Suspected areas of enemy withdrawal were designated and given to the maneuver elements as areas of operation. Almost without exception, contact was made, enemy bodies were found and weapons, food supplies, and documents were captured in each AO. At 051331 February 1968, at AR767917, Company C made contact with a company size force supported by automatic weapons and mortars. The contact lasted until 1930 hours. It was reported that the enemy withdrew north to Hill 684 (AR801935). An assessment of this major contact, integrated with visual reconnaissance reports, infrared readings and agent reports confirmed that an enemy force of significant size was located on Hill 684 and its associated terrain features. Having positively fixed the enemy, LTC Junk directed the staff to draw up plans for a coordinated attack at first light on 6 February to seize Hill 684. The concept of the operation called for Companies A and B to attack abreast with Company A seizing Hill 684 and on order continue the attack to seize the high ground at AR802942. Company B was to seize the high ground at AR815938 and then continue the attack to seize Hill 721, AR8194. Company C was given the mission of support, and initially occupied a position at AR797917. At 06075 hours, following an artillery preparation and airstrike, Companies A and B crossed the line of departure. Company B moved toward its objective unopposed, but Company A was stopped short of Hill 684 by intense automatic weapons and mortar fire. Company B was directed to discontinue its previously assigned mission and to assist Company A in the seizure of Hill 684. A second attempt made by both Companies again was stopped. Company A sustained heavy casualties during the second assault, and the company commander was wounded. At this stage of the fight, these facts became abundantly clear.

(a) The enemy position was well fortified.

(b) The enemy defense was supported by automatic weapons, mortars and B-40 rockets.

(c) The enemy had elected for unknown reasons to defend the hill at all cost.

(d) A frontal attack would be costly.

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
In view of the above, the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 22d Infantry developed a scheme of maneuver which envisioned Companies A and B continuing the attack to the north and Company D, supported by tanks, conducting an envelopment to the west to seize the high ground to the enemy rear at AR802942, making Hill 684 untenable for the enemy. Plans were also made to seize Hill 721 (AR812942), Hill 701 (AR8096), Hill 828 (AR519976) and the ridge line running southeast from Hill 828. On the morning of 7 February, artillery and aircraft utilizing CBU, CS, and napalm were employed and Hill 684 was seized. During the five days which followed, a series of successful coordinated attacks were conducted against the other objectives. Throughout this, all support weapons were employed to the maximum extent possible (see Annex A, Fire Support).


10. RESULTS.


	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>
1st Bn 22d Inf	16	71
Enemy KIA	TF 1-22 844	ARVN 205


11. ANNEXES.

- A. Fire Support
- B. Intelligence
- C. Psychological Warfare/Civil Affairs
- D. Logistics
- E. Communications









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Annex A (Fire Support) to After - Action Report, Battle of KONTUM.

1. Artillery

a. Phase I (30-31 Jan 68)

(1) 81mm Mortars.

(a) Initially four mortars brought in at bridge on the night of 30 Jan 68 in support of the company securing the fire base.

(b) On 31 Jan 68 two were deployed at the province chief's house in support of the Recon element and RVN forces. Weapons were set up in the immediate grounds and used as follows:

(1) Against snipers in city - 69 rounds (HE) were expended on houses in the city and were credited with nine enemy KIA.

(c) The mortars located at the bridge were necessary for close-in support of the fire base and protection of the bridge. The fires throughout the operation were solely H&I's and defensive.

(2) 4.2" Mortars.

(a) Arrived at fire base about 2000 hours on 30 Jan 68 and prepared their positions all that night. (One 4.2" mortar reinforced the 81mm mortars).

(b) 31 Jan 68: Little firing during the day, but in excess of 50 rounds were expended that night against a target reported by Company D. Later report indicated that approximately 87 KIA were discovered on 1 Feb 68 in the target area.

(3) 105mm and air support: (Not employed during this phase)

(4) Gunships: Used on landing zones to effectively prepare the area at AR806913.

b. Phase II (1 Feb - 4 Feb 68)

(1) 81mm Mortars.

(a) On 3 Feb the two mortars at the province chief's house were returned to the fire base. At this time there were six mortars at that location.

(b) On 3 Feb two mortars were sent to the airstrip.

1. Supported elements securing airstrip, specifically Company C, which was operating in the area northeast of KONTUM which later became the site of the mini fire base.

2. This configuration continued until 8 Feb 68 (i.e, six at bridge and two at airstrip.)

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(2) 4.2" Mortars.

(a) Two mortars were brought into the airstrip on 1 Feb 68 and used as follows:

1. For the support of all elements in KONTUM City area.

2. To support operations to the north of the city which would increase as the battle continued.

3. To support Companies C and D during contact on 2 Feb 68 in area of grid AR7790. About 200 HE fired and a good casualty report resulted.

(b) 1-2 Feb 68. Mortar at fire base by bridge fired H&I's and illumination for city fighting during 2-5 Feb.

(3) 105mm Howitzer.

(a) Battery C, 4th Battalion, 42d Artillery arrived by air at the fire base by the bridge on 31 Jan 68 to provide direct support.

(b) Artillery was used extensively and effectively in the city of KONTUM against enemy hiding in buildings.

(c) Artillery was concentrated on HE targets and targets beyond mortar range to free mortars for firing illumination and close-in support.

(d) On 2 Feb 68, fired in support of Companies C and D which were in a major conflict in area of AR7790 W/900 meter radius. Time of mission: 1315 to 1715 hours. Estimated results: one 82mm mortar destroyed and 150 enemy casualties. 267 HE rounds were expended against a VC force occupying dug in positions in an open field.

(e) An extensive H&I program was fired each night.

(4) Tanks. Employed very effectively in the city for direct fire into buildings. They were invaluable in the areas where there was a very heavy amount of enemy fire. Their ability to attack where dismounted infantry would have taken heavy losses was exploited.

c. Phase III (5-12 Feb 68)

(1) 81mm Mortars.

(a) 8 Feb 68 - Two tubes moved from the fire base at bridge to the mini fire base.

(b) 9 Feb 68 - One tube from the fire base at bridge went with Company C to support its operation.

(c) Total rounds expended: 500 rounds HE and 200 rounds illumination.

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(2) 4.2" Mortars.

(a) Mortar tube at fire base 1 fired on 5 Feb 68 on sniper position close to province chief's house. Adjusted by platoon FO located at province chief's house. Result: sniper silenced.

(b) Fired H&I's 5-8 Feb.

(c) Moved on 9 Feb to support C/1st Battalion, 12th Infantry operations northeast of KONTUM.

(d) Two mortars at airstrip were in general support of all elements within range.

(3) 105mm Howitzer.

(a) By 6 Feb the infantry had driven the enemy into the hills outside the city, requiring more extensive use of the artillery at this greater range.

(b) Artillery was employed (105 and 155) on confirmed rocket positions and mortar positions and as blocking fire. A battery firing one round every three minutes was found to be very effective.

(c) Artillery was of primary importance in the securing of Hills 721 and 684. By employing rolling fires just ahead of the infantry, fire superiority was effectively retained, reducing friendly casualties.

(d) Time-on-target method was used on almost every objective, followed by preparatory fires. Preplanned data was used to allow immediate shifts to blocking fires when preparatory fires were lifted.

(e) Artillery fire was given precedence, but there was equally effective use of gunships and airstrikes. In order to provide continuous fire support check fires were held to the last minute when gunships or airstrikes were employed. Then the artillery resumed, usually shifting to blocking fires.

(f) Blocking fires. For most effective use of blocking fires for long periods or indefinite periods of time, firing was concentrated along back sides of ridge lines. One round every one minute worked effectively, but care was taken not to establish a pattern. Continuous H&I fires placed on suspected enemy locations near friendly troops were employed in the same manner as above, but at longer intervals.

(g) Of the total of 8,476 rounds expended, 50% were expended from 061200 Feb to 091300 Feb 68.

(4) 155mm Howitzer.

(a) On 5 Feb 68, Battery D, 5th Battalion, 16th Artillery joined Battery C,

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4th Battalion, 42d Artillery in a reinforcing role.

(b) The larger projectiles were necessary in order to penetrate the well fortified bunkers encountered in operations in the hills northeast of the city.

(c) Secondary explosions resulted from the combined artillery fires (105 and 155) brought upon Hill 721 and also from firing on a rocket site in the general location of AR8396.

(d) Eleven objectives were given the artillery on 9 Feb and preparatory fires were used very effectively on each prior to the infantry moving in. A combination of white phosphorous and high explosive was used for increased effectiveness.

(5) Tanks were utilized very effectively on 11 Feb 68 at AR837960 to reinforce the preparatory fires. The armor was in a good position to act as blocking fires on this objective if needed. Tank searchlights were used at night to designate targets for Air Force C-47 gunships (Spooky).

d. The attack of the final objective (AR827960) on 11 Feb typifies the integration of fires employed throughout the operation.

(a) Check-fire given and 10 minute prep with 105 and 155 began at 0640 hours.

(b) Eight airstrikes were employed.

(c) Infantry attacked the objective.

(d) Artillery shifted to blocking fires (grid AR8396).

(e) Infantry controlled employment of gunships against identified enemy locations.

## 2. Air Support Summary.

The following missions were flown between 6 Feb and 12 Feb 68 in support of ground operations in and around KONTUM:

### a. Airstrikes

#### (1) IMMEDIATE

(a) Hill 684 (AR802934)  
6 February - 5 strikes  
7 February - 7 strikes  
TOTAL 12 strikes

(b) Hill 721 (AR812942)  
7 February - 1 strike  
8 February - 5 strikes  
TOTAL 6 strikes

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(c) Hill 828 (AR817976)  
9 February - 1 strike

(d) Hill 729 (AR827976)

10 February - 3 strikes  
11 February - 3 strikes  
12 February - 2 strikes  
TOTAL 8 strikes

(2) Preplanned. Six missions were flown as preplanned targets. Often preplanned targets were changed to take advantage of more recent intelligence data provided by headhunters and gunships.

(3) Total Airstrikes

(a) Immediate - 30 strikes  
(b) Preplanned - 6 strikes  
TOTAL 36 strikes

(4) Spooky Mission flown

(a) 7 February - 1 mission  
(b) 8 February - 1 mission  
(c) 10 February - 2 missions  
(d) 11 February - 1 mission  
TOTAL 5 missions

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Annex B (Intelligence) to After Action Report, Battle of KONTUM

General. During operations in the KONTUM area, intelligence liaison was established between the following agencies. The 4th Infantry Division assistant Chief of Staff, G2; the 24th Special Tactical Zone; KONTUM Sector; USSF Forward Operating Base; and S2, 1st Bn, 22d Inf. There was no central agency established and consequently this would at times result in the receipt of conflicting information. Information could be checked through close coordination, but this slowed the reaction of the receiving agency.

a. Receipt of intelligence.

(1) Phase I, all intelligence concerning the city and outlying areas of KONTUM was received by the 1st Bn 22d Inf from the assistant Chief of Staff, G2.

(2) Phase II. Coordination was established by the 1st Bn, 22d Inf between the 24th STZ and KONTUM Sector. All PW's were interrogated by the 42d ARVN Regiment which was under the control of KONTUM Sector.

(3) Phase III. The 1st Bn, 22d Inf was unable to obtain an interpreter and had to rely upon interpreter support obtained from FOB 2. This was not totally satisfactory since the separation between the fire base and FOB 2 limited liaison to daylight hours. Consequently, the first PW, who was severely wounded and was evacuated to the dispensary located at FOB 2, was further evacuated to the 71st EVAC Hospital at 2130 hours without notification to the S2, 1st Bn 22d Inf. Hence, vital information was delayed at a crucial time early in the operation when unit identifications were badly needed. An interpreter was obtained from the assistant Chief of Staff, G2, and this problem was eliminated. Interrogation of PW's and translation of documents were of great importance in that the information was obtained quickly.

(4) Unusual success was experienced in evacuation of captured documents and materials to the fire support base as soon as the tactical situation permitted.

(5) Order of battle information was obtained from KONTUM Sector. This information was not available from the 24th STZ since its records were destroyed earlier in the action. Information obtained from Sector was extremely helpful. It was noted that OB files maintained at Sector and Zone are complete and well organized. They rapidly provide usable intelligence to the Task Force Commander.

(6) Spot reports obtained from FACs, Headhunters and gunships were relayed immediately to the fire support element. Artillery was placed on targets identified by these reports when possible.

b. Dissemination of information.

(1) Phase I. To the extent possible, briefings were conducted prior to units deploying to KONTUM City. Units unable to receive prior briefings were briefed upon arrival in the KONTUM area.

(2) Phase II and III. Intelligence was disseminated by radio and by messages carried by resupply aircraft.

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Annex C (Psychological Warfare/Civil Affairs Operations) to After Action Report Battle of KONTUM.

Due to the tactical situation existing in and around the city, with a high density friendly civilian population intermixed with a hostile armed force, extensive use was made of Psyops and CA Operations.

a. Psychological Warfare.

(1) One Psyops EM with a 250 watt loudspeaker assisted by a civil affairs EM and an interpreter was committed to support Company B during operations within the city on 30 Jan 68, during heavy battle at a pagoda. Additional Psyops personnel were attached on 2 Feb 68 and deployed with the battalion Civic Action Team to KONTUM City the following day.

(2) Phase III a joint CA/Psyops organization was developed on 4 February 1968 to include MACV/CORD, VIC, ARVN Psyops, and 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry CA/Psyops. Plans and recommendations for the structure and operation of refugee camps were formulated and submitted to the province chief. On 5 February 1968, the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry commenced operation of two vehicles mounted with 250 watt loudspeaker units, broadcasting to the population areas of danger and information as to cleaning of their areas to prevent epidemics and illnesses. At the same time, ARVN broadcast vehicles broadcast news of the enemy defeat in an attempt to restore the confidence of the people in the GVN. Leaflets were dropped daily. Mass graves were prepared for the interment of the bodies left throughout the city. HOI CHANH NONG VAN CAM was exploited. Photos, tapes, and statements were made and forwarded to Division for immediate use. On 6 February 1968, 100,000 leaflets featuring HOI CHANH CAM were dropped around the city. Firepower and safe conduct passes were dropped in the high ground NW of the city. On 7 February, medical teams from the 71st EVAC Hospital arrived and sprayed against the spread of plague. A sound truck accompanied the team informing the people of the nature of the spray and reason for its use. Three and one half hours of broadcasting was accomplished while approximately 100 pounds of powder was disseminated.

(3) Phase III. 100,000 HOI CHANH leaflets were dropped in known and reported enemy positions. At the province chief's request, a conference was conducted on the types of Psyops being conducted on the streets. The majority of his desires had been anticipated and were in progress at that time. A second set of tapes, photos and statements were made for follow up on CHIEU HOI Campaigns against the 24th NVA Regiment. The ground Psyops team broadcasted in the outskirts of the city on cleaning, sanitation and health problems. On 8 February, 100,000 CHIEU HOI leaflets were dropped in an area northeast of KONTUM. Four hours of ground Psyops were used while accompanying the preventative medicine spray team, advising the population on dud ordnance within the area and where to report findings. Minquee MONTAGNARD Hospital reported 12 cases of plague as of 8 Feb, of which all had come from PHING KIA and KON ROBONG. There were suspected other cases in other areas, but they could not be confirmed. On 9 February, air to ground Psyop missions utilizing themes of firepower, CHIEU HOI and safe conduct leaflets were flown. Eight hours of ground Psyops were conducted in conjunction with DDT spraying teams in the outskirts of city and in the village of KON ROBONG. Approximately 1200 pounds of DDT were utilized.

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Coordination was effected with police advisors on using National Police for search of vehicles moving into the city. On 10 February air to ground leaflets and loudspeaker missions were flown. Ten hours of ground Psyops was broadcasted to the population, along with 10,000 dud ordnance leaflets and sanitation leaflets dropped on the city. Coordination with the ARVN medical team at KON ROBONG was effected and approximately 1100 pounds of dust were used in the village. On 11 and 12 February, air to ground missions were flown again. Approximately 50 pounds of medical supplies were donated to ARVN CA officers for continuing MEDCAP in outlying areas and buildings. A total of 100,000 leaflets were dropped. 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry activities were terminated and unused materials were turned back to JUSPAO.

b. Civil Affairs. Civil affairs activities were limited to those conducted in conjunction with Psyops activities, discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

c. Population Control. Control of civilian traffic crossing the bridge over the DAK BLA River was accomplished according to the guidance provided by Division G5 and with the assistance of members of ARVN and the RVN police when they were available for duty. They effectively accomplished their control mission when they were available. Difficulty was experienced when only US soldiers and ARVN soldiers were required to man the control points due to a language barrier. No qualified interpreter was available to the US forces a majority of the time and the ARVN units did not have a qualified interpreter.

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Annex D (Logistics) to After Action Report, Battle of KONTUM.

a. Resupply

(1) During the KONTUM operation, the S4, support platoon and transportation section maintained their base of operations at Camp Enari until the last two days of operation when the support platoon and transportation element moved to KONTUM. During the entire operation, a daily average of 40,000 pounds of Class Five was moved, loaded and rigged for air shipment by hand, utilizing the support element for this purpose. The highest single day tonnage of Class Five handled was 91,000 pounds. It is estimated that an additional daily tonnage of all other supplies moved by the support element was 15,000 to 20,000 pounds.

(2) Problems encountered during the course of logistical operations are enumerated below and solutions as well as recommended solutions are indicated:

(a) In many instances, excess Class Five was ordered due to duplication of resupply requests from forward element. This caused a total of twenty-eight truckloads of Class Five to be back hauled from KONTUM upon departure. An additional six truckloads were to be picked up by the convoy on its return trip to PLEIKU. Recommend that using elements place orders of needed supplies. Liaison should be effected to preclude the using element and staff personnel placing identical or differing orders for the same user and period.

(b) Barrier material which was a critical item was requested constantly and as a result, large quantities obtained and sent forward. A considerable amount of this material was not utilized and left upon departure. Recommend using elements order what they need and use and prepare to move with barrier materials they request.

(c) A great deal of time and effort was wasted and confusion caused because of misinterpretation and confusion on the part of radio-telephone operators who, because they were not familiar with or knowledgeable of S4 operations, relayed or received messages incorrectly. This problem has been solved by establishing an S4 operations center. This operation is currently functioning and has proved completely satisfactory.

b. Medical.

(1) Phase I: The medical platoon was deployed on 31 January to the KONTUM area. Four line medics were attached to each line company and were already with these elements in the KONTUM area. The aid station section took prepacked medical supplies to the KONTUM area and set up a treatment facility. Supplies consisted of supplementary bags packed with emergency supplies designed to be taken to the companies in the field. A large amount of emergency supplies accompanied the aid station for use in the field support base and for further resupply of the line companies. All resupply was accomplished from the fire base due to the lack of trains facilities.

(2) Phase II: The special Forces Camp near KONTUM offered the use of its dispensary, greatly increasing the capability for emergency care. Very few of the casualties were treated in the fire support base. If this facility had

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not been available, it would have been necessary to have a clearing section from the medical battalion located close by to provide adequate coverage. A small force of medics was on standby to go to the field and provide assistance to the line medics when a number of casualties developed. This was done on three occasions. This reserve also provided for the replacement of medics who were killed or injured.

c. Phase III: A number of problems were experienced besides that of treating casualties. The large number of enemy killed presented a health hazard to both the military and civilian personnel in the KONTUM area. Plague and typhoid became a threat to the area. A team from the 71st EVAC Hospital sprayed the area in an effort to minimize this threat. Personnel were immunized as soon as possible.

d. Engineer.

(1) Phase I. Prior to the alert for movement to KONTUM, the third platoon, Company B, 4th Engineer Battalion had the first and second squads assigned to Companies A and B respectively. The third squad was deployed with Company C in the AO north of PLEIKU City. The 4th and HQs squad were on standby alert at Camp Enari for deployment.

(2) Phase II. The first and second squad accompanied Companies A and B to the city of KONTUM. On 1 Feb 68, Company C arrived with the third squad. On 3 Feb, the fourth squad and the HQs element arrived at the fire support base. These elements provided the fire support base with a water purification capability and destruction of both friendly and enemy explosive ordnance. On 5 Feb the third squad disarmed a B-40 rocket in the launcher. On 6 Feb the first squad removed a mine from the road while enroute to the minifire base. On 6 Feb the fourth squad was sent to D Company and returned to the platoon at DAK TO.

(3) Phase III: On 7 Feb the HQs element was directed to move the patrol base that was established by Company C. This was to be accomplished with the help of two D7-H bulldozers from the 299th Engineer Battalion. An AVLB was made available to C/1st Battalion, 69th Armor for their operation. On Feb 9, the first squad was sent to destroy a bunker complex in the vicinity of Hill 721. The first squad found five foxhole type emplacements with light overhead cover. All were destroyed. On 10 Feb the second squad was sent to C/1-69 Armor to remove the mask to enable the tanks to fire. This was accomplished with chain saws. On the 11th of Feb, first squad was sent to C/1-12 Inf to assist in preparing a landing zone for extraction of the company using chain saws. On 12 Feb 68 the first, second and third squads moved to DAK TO.

SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL USED:

- (1) Approximately 10,800 gallons of water consumed. (3 Feb - 11 Feb)
- (2) 64 pounds of TNT expended
- 200 pounds of C-4 expended

SUMMARY OF ENEMY EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DESTROYED:

- (1) 100 82mm Mortar rounds
- (2) 80 60mm mortar rounds
- (3) 40 B-40 rocket rounds
- (4) 12 Ft of expedient bangalore torpedo

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- (5) Various other cartridges and foreign devices.
  - (6) Various types of hand grenades.
  - (7) MLAL anti-tank mine

ENEMY MINES FOUND:

(1) Type MLAL anti-tank mine (no booster) pressure firing device.  
Location: AR801906, left center of road going north.

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Annex E (Communications) to After Action Report, Battle of KONTUM.

COMMUNICATIONS: During the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry's operations in and around the city of KONTUM, it was necessary to monitor several FM radio nets which are not normally monitored by the battalion. The battalion was responsible for the defense of KONTUM, RVN, and consequently had to maintain radio contact with all friendly elements within the city. This required additional radio set AN/PRC 25 assets. Additional nets continuously monitored throughout the operation were the MACV net, Province Sector Headquarters net, Special Forces net, and the Army Aviation control net at KONTUM Airfield. During contact, the battalion command net was occupied to such an extent by units in contact that it was absolutely necessary to have these other supported elements on a different net. When more than one company of the battalion was in contact it was essential that the company commander have a minimum of three radios available, one radio on the battalion command net, one radio on the company internal command net, and one radio to alternate between the Admin-Log net for controlling "Dust-offs" and the air ground nets for controlling gunships, flare ships, and FACs. By reducing as much as possible the traffic on the battalion command net, proper net control was possible. Additional communication support was provided by the 124th Signal Battalion. This consisted of a UHF radio telephone capability. Utilization of permanently installed lines within the city was not possible as most lines had been damaged or destroyed by explosive ordnance fired in the area.

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CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

1. (C) Defoliation Data.

a. The following TRAILDUST missions were flown by Air Force C-123's utilizing 1000 gallons of agent ORANGE per sortie:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
4 Feb	7	YA9301-YA8508 YA9203-YA8409
6 Feb	5	YA8802-YA8618
17 Mar	6	YV9200-YV9283
20 Mar	6	YV9183-YA9101
23 Mar	5	YA9001-YV9084
23 Mar	3	BR2252-BR2747-BR3146
29 Mar	3	AQ9954-AQ9266
7 Apr	3	YA6983-YA5970
9 Apr	3	YA7384-YA6671
14 Apr	3	YA7285-YA6572
18 Apr	3	YA7284-YA6571
22 Apr	3	YA8901-YV8984
23 Apr	3	YB7404-YA7488
24 Apr	6	YA7244-YA7226
25 Apr	3	YB7404-YA7488
26 Apr	3	YB7404-YA7488

b. No crop destruction missions were flown in the division AO due to lack of enemy crop growing activities during the dry season.

d. Perimeter defoliation was conducted as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>
12 Feb	II Corps	AR763515	Truck	50	BLUE
30 Apr	4th Div	AR813359	Truck	165	BLUE

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d. Roadside defoliation was conducted as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>HCWY</u>	<u>COORDINATES</u>	<u>METHOD</u>	<u>GALLONS</u>	<u>AGENT</u>
23 Mar	19E	BR0855-BR1752	Truck	400	ORANGE

2. (C) RCA Employment.

a. Bulk CS-1 agent was delivered by CH-47 helicopter during the reporting period as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>POUNDS CS-1</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
8 Feb	1	480	BR014412
8 Feb	1	480	BR019387
8 Feb	1	480	BR013361
8 Feb	1	320	AR956319
18 Feb	1	1720	YA983257
19 Feb	1	1720	YB747018
13 Mar	1	1600	AR983345
13 Mar	1	1600	AR982349
1 Apr	1	1600	ZA068385
1 Apr	1	1600	ZA055373
14 Apr	1	800	AR849966
14 Apr	1	800	AR839958
15 Apr	2	3440	YB746018
15 Apr	2	3440	YB776032

b. E-158 Canister Clusters were delivered by UH-1 aircraft as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>	<u>MUNITIONS</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
8 Feb	1	4	YB873294
9 Feb	1	6	ZB006257
10 Feb	1	4	ZB006257
21 Feb	1	4	ZA041718
3 Apr	1	3	YA0498
5 Apr	1	6	YA956859
9 Apr	1	6	YA997827
22 Apr	1	6	YA918808

c. CBU-19 CS munitions were employed by Air Force aircraft as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>MUNITIONS</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
5 Feb	2	ZB019259
5 Feb	2	YB9717
6 Feb	16	AR8093
7 Feb	9	AR8193
24 Feb	4	ZA179761
25 Feb	8	ZA185765
27 Feb	4	AR850964
28 Feb	8	AR824970
3 Mar	8	AR854976
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DATE

MUNITIONS

TARGET

7 Mar	4	ZA205722
15 Mar	8	ZA0499
15 Mar	4	ZA215660
16 Mar	4	ZA146946
16 Mar	2	AQ753136
17 Mar	4	ZA0498
23 Mar	4	ZA155957
4 Apr	12	ZB035003
16 Apr	12	YA935935

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## ABBREVIATIONS

List of abbreviations used in text (local, common usage, standard Army).

AA	Anti-Aircraft
AFB	Air Force Base
AFRS	Armed Forces Radio Service
AGI	Annual General Inspection
ALOC	Air Line of Communication
AO	Area of Operations
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APD	Airborne Personnel Detector
ARVN	Army Republic of VIETNAM
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASR	Available Supply Rate
A/V	Audio/Visual
AVLB	Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge
AW	Automatic Weapon
BC	Body Count
CA	Civic Action: Combat Assault
CAS	Close Air Support
CBU	Cluster Bomb Unit
C&C	Command and Control (Aircraft)
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CI	Counterintelligence
CMIT	Combined Mobile Instruction Team
CMTT	Combined Mobile Training Team
CORD	Council on Revolutionary Development

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CP	Command Post
CS	Tear Gas
CSF	Camp Strike Force
CSS	Combat Sky Spot
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DS	Direct Support
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
EDP	Equipment Deadlined for Parts
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FO	Forward Observer
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSE	Forward Supply Element
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GRREG	Graves Registration
GS	General Support
GSR	General Support Reinforcing
Gunship	Armed UH-1 Helicopter
GVN	Government of VIETNAM
Hawkeye Team	Four Man Hunter-Killer Team
HE	High Explosive
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction
Headhunter	O-1E Aircraft Used for Visual Reconnaissance

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Hook CH-47 "Chinook" Helicopter  
ICC Installation Coordination Center  
I PFORCEV; IFV I Field Force, VIETNAM  
JUSPAO Joint US Public Affairs Office  
KBA Killed by Air  
KIA Killed in Action  
LF Local Force  
LOH Light Observation Helicopter  
LP Listening Post  
LRP (formerly LRRP) Long Range Patrol  
LLCC Land Line of Communication  
LZ Landing Zone  
MACV Military Assistance Command, VIETNAM  
MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program  
MF Main Force  
MI Military Intelligence  
MIA Missing in Action  
MSF Mobile Strike Force  
MSR Main Supply Route  
MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment  
NCS Net Control Station  
NVA North VIETNAMESE Army  
NVAC North VIETNAMESE Army Captive  
OB Order of Battle  
OP Observation Post  
OPCON Operational Control

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OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPORD	Operation Order
PF	Popular Force
PKSAC	PLEIKU Sub-Area Command
POLWAR	Political Warfare (ARVN)
POW, PO	Prisoner of War
PP	Preplanned
Psyops	Psychological Operations
PZ	Pick-up Zone
RATT	Radio Teletype
RCA	Riot Control Agent
RD	Revolutionary Development
Red Ball	Requisition for Part to Remove Major Items from Deadline
RF	Regional Force
RL	Rocket Launcher
RRC	Radio Research Company
RVN	Republic of VIETNAM
SA	Small Arms
SED	Search and Destroy
Slick	UH-1 Helicopter Used Primarily for Air Lift
SLAR	Side Looking Airborne Radar
Snatch	Sudden Apprehension of Suspect Person
SP	Self Propelled
Spooky	Air Force Minigun Armed AC-47 Flea-ship
SSB	Single Side Band
STZ	Special Tactical Zone

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TAC	Tactical
TACR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOT	Time on Target
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USARV	United States Army, VIETNAM
USSF	United States Special Forces
VC	Viet Cong
VCC	Viet Cong Captive
VETCAP	Veterinary Civic Action Program
VIC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong
VICC	Viet MONTAGNARD Cong Captive
VR	Visual Reconnaissance
VT	Variable Time
VTR	Vehicle, Tank Recovery
WIA	Wounded in Action
WP	White Phosphorous

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