DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BRIGADE TF, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96355

AVDC-C-OP 10 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

TO: See Distribution

SECTION I (C) SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1. (C) GENERAL: During the reporting period 1 August 1967 to 31 October 1967 the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division participated in Operation Baker for a total of 92 consecutive days in combat. The 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division has participated in 540 consecutive days in combat as of 31 October 1967.

a. Mission: The 3d Brigade's mission in Operation Baker is to assume responsibility within the DUC PHO AO for:

(1) Offensive and defensive operations designed to locate and destroy NVA, main force, local force, and guerrilla units as well as the Viet Cong infrastructure.

(2) Provide convoy security in zone, and from QUANG NGAI south on Highway #1 to the Brigade AO.

(3) Be prepared to relieve and/or reinforce the Special Forces camps at MINH LONG, BA TO, GIA VUC, and HA THANH.

(4) Assume responsibility for the security of logistical installations in the vicinity of SA HUYNH on or about 16 October 1967.

(5) Be prepared to provide one rifle company on two hours notice, and an additional rifle company in an additional two hours, for employment anywhere in the Americal Division AO, on order.

(6) Be prepared to provide a company size reaction force to support the defense of QUANG NGAI airfield, on order.

(7) Support Revolutionary Development in the 3d Brigade AO.

(8) Conduct psychological operations in support of tactical operations and revolutionary development.

(9) Be prepared on 12 hours notice to provide one reinforced infantry battalion for employment anywhere in South Vietnam.

(10) Be prepared on an additional 12 hours notice to deploy the remainder of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division anywhere in South Vietnam.

b. Operational Area: (See Inclosure #1)

The area designated as the 3d Brigade AO encompasses the majority of DUC PHO and MO DUC Districts, QUANG NGAI Province; covering an area of approximately 606 sq. km.

c. Control: The 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division was under the operational control of TASK FORCE OREGON, later designated The Americal Division, throughout the reporting period.

d. Task Organization: Principal units of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division, with commanders' names and dates of command, and the major supporting and operational controlled units are as follows:

Headquarters, 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division
Commander: Colonel George E. Wear

Deputy Commander: LTC Alvin C. Hadley
Executive Officer: LTC John D. Weil

1st Battalion, 14th Infantry
LTC Peter P. Petro

1st Battalion, 35th Infantry
MAJ James E. Moore (1 Aug - 8 Aug 1967)
LTC Robert G. Kimmel (9 Aug - 31 Oct 1967)

2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry
LTC Norman L. Tiller, Sr.

2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery
LTC Gerald B. Bobzien

C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry
1LT Richard A. Knudson

3d Support Battalion (PROV)
MAJ Robert R. Rutledge

40th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog)
1LT Robert W. Thackeray (1 Aug - 22 Aug 1967)
2LT Evy L. Davis (23 Aug - 31 Oct 1967)

Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion
CPT Arthur J. Panese, Jr.

AVDC-C-OF

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

174th Aviation Company (HS) (1 Aug - 31 Oct 1967)

C Co, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (attached) (1 Aug - 14 Oct 1967)

Principal Staff:

S1
MAJ Gerard M. Wynn (1 Aug - 25 Oct 1967)
CPT James L. Hughes (26 Oct - 31 Oct 1967)

S2
MAJ Edgar Egeland (1 Aug - 14 Aug 1967)
MAJ William Campbell (15 Aug - 31 Oct 1967)

S3
MAJ Emil P. Mosbey (1 Aug - 14 Aug 1967)
MAJ Edgar Egeland (15 Aug - 31 Oct 1967)

S4
MAJ John A. Jones

S5
CPT Converse B. Smith (1 Aug - 19 Sep 1967)
MAJ John S. Anderson (20 Sep - 31 Oct 1967)

2. INTELLIGENCE:

a. General: During the reporting period, 1 August through 31 October 1967, enemy activity within the Brigade's Area of Operation [illegible] can be categorized into three phases.

b. Phase One: The first phase was a continuation of the phase that began in July and lasted until late August. During this phase, the majority of contacts centered around hole-hunting operations. There were three significant contacts during this period. On 8 August, the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry, in response to information gained from a Hoi Chanh, engaged elements of the 38th LF Battalion along the SONG VE River, vic BS6757. The battle resulted in 65 enemy KIA and the capture of 20 weapons. Company C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor and elements of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry engaged a company of the 97th MF Battalion on 20 August, vic BS8145, resulting in the killing of 53 enemy and the capturing of 19 weapons. The last significant contact during this phase took place on 24 August, vic BS7647 with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry engaging a company of the 406th MF Battalion. The operation was a classic hole-hunting operation that resulted in 24 enemy killed and the capture of 19 weapons. The thickly forested mountains to the west of the Brigade's AO provided LF and MF VC units areas for rest, refit, and re-supply. Enemy units would often withdraw to these areas after an engagement

with US Forces in the lowlands. Intelligence reports revealed that MF and NVA units up to battalion-size were located in and around the Brigade's AO, but the enemy continued to be evasive and displayed a reluctance to openly engage US units. During operations in the mountains, US units located base camps with obvious signs of recent use, but seldom made contact with more than a few snipers.

c. Phase Two: The second phase was short but definite. In mid August, local force activity in the lowlands increased markedly. Mining incidents on Highway #1, ground-to-air fire, and probes of base camps indicated that local guerrillas were becoming more aggressive. Agent reports indicated that the main force units had moved south from their mountain bases into BINH DINH Province. It is believed this movement was prompted by two factors: 1) the requirement to recruit, resupply, and rest as a result of the heavy losses of personnel and equipment encountered while operating in QUANG NGAI Province; 2) the requirement to move to a more populated area in order to have a more direct influence in the 3 September National Elections. During search and clear operations against known local force guerrillas, NVA and MF VC soldiers were often killed or captured. It was learned that these troops were usually individuals who had been wounded or because of sickness were left with local hamlet and village guerrilla units to recuperate. The more educated and better trained soldiers would function as political training cadre during their convalescence.

d. Phase Three: In mid September the third phase of enemy activity began. This phase continued through the end of the reporting period. Intelligence reports and supporting collateral information revealed that the 97th Battalion of the 2nd Main Force Regiment returned to the mountains on the western flank of the 3d Brigade AO. Main Force and NVA units in western QUANG NGAI and KONTUM Provinces based carrying parties in these same areas. The carrying parties would displace to the lowlands where they collected rice, salt, fish, and medical supplies with the assistance of village and hamlet VC cadre. These supplies were then transported to the mountain bases under cover of darkness. Other elements of the 2nd VC Regiment and 22nd NVA Regiment were also reported in these mountain bases during this period. Only scattered contact with the 38th Local Force Battalion has been made since 1 September. It has been reported that this once-strong LF Battalion is down to approximately 150 men and its four companies are operating independently of the battalion in order to recruit and resupply. This unit operated in the northern SONG VE Valley but has avoided contact with 3d Brigade units. PWs captured during this phase disclosed the use of the mountain bases southeast of Ba TO by NVA infiltration units. These units would stop to rest and resupply before continuing on to the south. Two local force companies continue to operate in the coastal lowlands in close coordination with the village and hamlet guerrillas. The C219 Company continued to operate in the SONG TRA CAU Valley. The present strength of the company is approximately 60 men, one-half its size at the start of the reporting period. Indications are that the C219 Company has split into small cells with missions of probing US and RF/PF posts in the lowlands at night and hiding in the hills during the day. The C120 Company is a local force sapper unit that operates

in the southern part of the Brigade's AO. This well-trained unit is undoubtedly responsible for the increased number of mining and booby trap incidents that occurred on Highway #1 south of DUC PHO. Hamlet and village guerrillas as well as the political infrastructure were the main targets of infantry search and clear operations in the coastal lowlands. These operations were often frustrating, but each political cadre that was killed or captured weakened the hold of the Viet Cong and enhanced revolutionary development.

a. Summary of Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses; 01 Aug - 31 Oct:

(1) Personnel
KIA - 835
PW/NVA - 17
PW/VC - 186
Civil Defendants - 72
Returnees - 22

(2) Captured Weapons
Small Arms - 217
Crew-served - 5

(3) Captured Equipment

(a) Ammunition
Small Arms - 7245 rds
81/82mm Mortar - 20 rds
60mm Mortar - 40 rds
Grenades - 226
TNT - 109 lbs
2.75" Rockets - 18
B-40 Rockets - 17
Mines - 63
B-50 Rockets - 2

(b) Personal Equipment
Packs - 125
Clothing Sets - 106
Web Gear Sets - 83
Ponchos - 26

(c) Miscellaneous
Magazines - 107
Medical Equipment - 170 lbs
Radios - 7

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(4) Installations Destroyed
Huts - 132
Bunkers - 138
Caves - 31
Tunnels - 59
Foxholes - 165

(5) Food Captured
Rice - 116 tons
Salt - 16 tons

3. OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Plans:

(1) During the period covered by this report the 3d Brigade was responsible for planning for the relief and/or reinforcement of the following Special Forces Camps:

(a) MINH LONG BS541525

(b) BA TO BS558327

(c) GIA VUC BS379270

(d) HA THANH BS386704

(2) Due to the rapid increase in size and facilities at LZ MT BRONCO (formerly LZ MONTEZUMA) a Base Defense Command was established in late October and several base defense plans were published.

(3) Operations:

(a) General: The 3d Brigade continued with the mission assigned for Operation Baker throughout the reporting period. The First and Second Battalions, Thirty-fifth Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in their respective areas of responsibility with attachments from C Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry and Co C, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor. The contacts during the period were moderate, except for two heavy contacts on 8 August 1967 and 20 August 1967 both of these being in the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry Area of Operations. The contacts during the period were in some cases initiated by the enemy, however, in all cases the enemy force was defeated and heavy enemy casualties resulted. Friendly casualties were light; the 3d Brigade enemy/friendly killed in action ratio is a very respectable 20 to 1 for Operation Baker. During the latter part of the reporting period contacts became moderate to light. This was caused by the brigade's continuous operations which forced the enemy to break up in to small groups (six to ten individuals) and to attempt to relocate in the high ground to the west of the

brigade AO. Operations became a process of searching for, locating, and destroying small groups of enemy in tunnels, caves, and spider holes. The two large contacts were a result of a combination of timely intelligence and the combat assault. In each case the enemy was surprised and destroyed. In addition to the named objectives for an infantry brigade, the additional objective of denial arose. By denying the enemy the use of the inhabited lowlands of DUC PHO and MO DUC Districts he was cut from his sources of food, intelligence, labor and recruits. In order to accomplish this objective it was necessary to have either physical presence of US troops or extensive harassing and interdicting fires from artillery and the US Air Force throughout the AO. The two infantry battalions, having established battalion fire support bases within the Brigade AO by using one rifle company (-) to secure a firing battery, were able to combat assault the remaining three companies throughout the areas of responsibility at will. This combined with this brigade's extensive H&I fires has resulted in: first, accomplishment of our mission; second, security for the entire AO; third, a high rate of NVA/VC returnees and fourth, relative safety within our fire bases. While it is true that some look with disfavor on our extensive H&I program it should be taken into account that since 22 April one battalion fire base, and the brigade fire base have been mortared by the enemy only once each and very lightly, after a temporary reduction of H&I fires. Enemy captured in action and returnees through the "Open Arms" program have repeatedly stated that their main reason for giving up is the continual artillery fires and air strikes, which serve to destroy their already weakened determination to carry on the war. The only argument against H&I fires, is that they are costly. War, regardless of scale, has never been an economical process, and success in war is seldom described in dollars and cents. Harassing and interdicting fires based on sound intelligence are useful and should be employed when the mission so dictates.

During the reporting period the infantry was used in its classical role of finding and fixing its enemy. Once this had been accomplished all available fire power was directed on the enemy. Then the infantry advanced, methodically searching and destroying every enemy position.

(4) 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in their area of operations with the battalion CP located at LZ OD (OLIVE DRAB) (BS786368). The battalion had no major contacts, however, there were many minor contacts and ambush engagements. On 4 October 1967 the 1st Battalion was airlifted to TAM KY, RVN, and placed under the operational control of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division.

(5) 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry: During the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted search and destroy operations in their area of operations with the Battalion CP being located at LZ LIZ (BS751436). The battalion had two major contacts on 8 and 20 August 1967, (See Inclosure #2 and #3). A detailed explanation of the techniques employed during these operations is included in the inclosures.

(6) 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry: During the reporting period the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry was under the operational control of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade until 24 September 1967 at which time it reverted to 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division. Upon arrival in the DUC PHO AO the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry established a battalion fire support base at LZ THUNDER (BS874323), and began to conduct search and destroy operations within the former 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry area of Operations. The Battalion has had several minor contacts during the remainder of the reporting period. The battalion also assumed the additional mission for the security of the logistical installations in the vicinity of Sa HUYNH.

(7) Troop C, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry: During the reporting period the troop was employed in several cavalry roles, i.e., screening, strong points, convoy security etc.

(8) C Company, 4th Engineer Battalion:

(a) Engineer support in the AO averaged four (4) line squads per day and consisted mainly of:

1 Clearing landing zones.

2 Destruction of enemy caves, tunnels, bunkers, and defensive positions.

3 Construction, maintenance, and clearing of defensive perimeters.

4 Mine clearing.

5 Technical assistance in construction of field fortifications.

(b) Engineer support at the forward base camp (LZ MT BRONCO) which included:

1 Prefabricating and assisting in construction of 60 tent kits and other vertical construction.

2 Helipad construction and maintenance.

3 Maintaining a water supply point.

4 Peneprime distribution.

5 Mine clearing.

6 Road construction.

7 Drainage.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(c) Base Defense: Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion continues responsibility for the control of LZ MT BRONCO base defense.

(9) 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery: During the period 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967 the mission of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery was in direct support of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division; Battery A was in direct support of the 1-35th Infantry; Battery B was in direct support of the 1-14th Infantry; Battery C was in direct support of the 2-35th Infantry.

(a) During the reporting period the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery fired the following missions and rounds:

	OBSERVED MISSIONS	OBSERVED ROUNDS	UNOBSERVED MISSIONS	UNOBSERVED ROUNDS
Aug	343	2664	2596	7927
Sep	606	3152	9691	12236
Oct	284	1806	6685	10631
TOTAL	1233	7622	18972	30794

(b) The 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery had operational control of one searchlight section of Battery G, 29th Artillery throughout the reporting period. A second section was out under the control of the battalion from 1 August 1967 to 9 October 1967. These sections were employed in the harrassing and interdicting program, as navigational aids to aircraft and in perimeter defense.

(c) The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery supported the 2nd Battalion, 9th Artillery in a reinforcing role during the period 1 August 1967 through 31 October 1967. Two searchlight sections from Battery G, 29th Artillery and one composite battery, Battery C, 3d Battalion, 18th Artillery (175mm-8"), were attached to the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery for this period. These reinforcing units added great power and depth to the artillery fire support of the brigade.

c. Aviation:

(1) During the quarter the Brigade Aviation Section flew a total of 1386 hours, 2186 sorties, and carried 1490 passengers. Forty-nine hours were flown by the UH-1 aircraft, which was withdrawn from the section at the end of September. Of the 1337 hours of OH-23 flying time, 814 hours were flown on scout operations. A total of 1089 scout sorties were flown. The scout aircraft had 163 confirmed enemy kills during the period. As a result a total of 26 weapons were captured by the section or picked up by the ground troops. Seven aircraft were damaged by ground fire during the quarter and 4 crewmen were wounded.

(2) The Duc Pho Ground Controlled Approach radar was flight checked and became operational during the quarter. A system of handling IFR traffic into the area from both Chu Lai and LZ English has been established. During the quarter the air traffic control facility handled an average of 563 aircraft operations per day. A fire fighting detachment arrived during the quarter and is operational. An airfield lighting set has been requested, but none are available in-country at this time. The only lights now available are emergency sandbag type. These lights have been used successfully on several occasions.

d. Tactical Air Support statistics for the reporting period are as follows:

	FAC MISSIONS		COMBAT SKY SPOTS	
	Req	Flown	Req	Flown
AUG	171	102	130	69
SEP	237	150	127	59
OCT	188	88	79	36
TOTAL:	596	340	336	164

e. Chemical: During the reporting period the following chemical activities were conducted by the brigade:

(1) Use of CS grenades on a daily basis by ground troops and the Brigade Aviation Section to rout enemy from suspected locations and to segregate enemy from civilians.

(2) Nine (9) CH-47 sorties were flown on CS-1, 55 gal drum drops. A total of 10,080 pounds of CS-1 was expended on five suspected enemy locations.

(3) Ten personnel detection missions were flown using two modified Man Pack Personnel Detectors.

(4) A test was conducted to evaluate cartridge, 40mm, CS X M651 for M-79 grenade launchers.

(5) One LZ preparation was conducted using CS delivered by Air Force CBU-19.

(6) Base camp defoliation was conducted using a Jerry-rigged sprayer from UH-1B helicopter and diesel fuel as defoliant.

(7) Two, six hour classes were conducted on servicing and firing portable flame throwers.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

f. Training: During the reporting period 3d Brigade TF personnel graduated from the following schools:

SCHOOL	# GRADUATED
3d Brigade NCO Preparatory School	120
4th Division NCO School	64
MACV Recondo School	2
4th Division Pre-Recondo School	12
Marine Reconnaissance Battalion - School	25

A one-day in-country orientation and training course was conducted by the 3d Brigade's NCO Preparatory School during the period 23 - 31 October 1967 for each company of the 198th Lt Inf Brigade. A total of 1,199 men received this training.

g. During the last month of the reporting period the 3d Brigade was designated as sponsor for the 198th Light Infantry Brigade. A full report on this operation and lessons learned will be included as an inclosure to the next quarterly ORLL.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. General; The 3d Support Battalion (PROV) has primary responsibility for logistical support of the brigade. General support continues to be provided by FSA (Task Force McDonald), 1st Log Command. The brigade continues to use its requisitioning, shipping and receiving actions concerning Class II and IV items and repair parts. Repair parts requisitions are passed through our general support maintenance activity, the 188th Maintenance Battalion at Chu Lai. All other requisitions are delivered by courier to Qui Nhon Depot. Supply and Maintenance support for elements of the brigade rear detachment at Pleiku base camp is provided by the 4th Infantry Division.

b. Supply:

(1) Class I:

(a) All items are provided by FSA with distribution made to the brigade Class I yard for storage and issue. Ration breakdown for all units at LZ MT BRONCO is accomplished by the 3d Support Battalion (PROV). Non-perishables are stored in two 1½ ton refrigeration vans and four 600 cubic feet refrigerators.

(b) With the advent of the monsoon season, storage capacity for a 15 day supply of A rations was completed. The FSA increased its prestock of C rations to a 30 day supply for all 3d Brigade and supporting units.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

(c) Class I issues for report period:

A Rations:	558,000
C Rations:	274,176
LRRP Rations:	5,328

(2) Class II and IV:

(a) Depot ships directly to our activity address code through the Brigade Supply Officer, to a Class II and IV storage and distribution area. This was made possible by the opening of a supply account enabling all organic, attached and opcon units to requisition and draw directly from the Brigade Supply Officer, rather than returning to a distant base camp.

(b) The brigade continues to make extensive use of the air strip at Duc Pho which aids the functioning of the logistical train, bringing quick delivery of personnel and necessary items of equipment.

(3) Class III:

(a) Task Force McDonald provides wholesale issue of all types of fuel. With the completion of a tank farm on or about 15 November 1967, storage capacity will increase to 871,000 gallons.

(b) POL Issues (gallons):

JP4	1,265,045
AVGAS	182,500
MOGAS	468,200
DIESEL	459,400

(4) Class V:

(a) Task Force McDonald operates the local ASP and is supported from Qui Nhon, and on occasion, from Chu Lai. A second ASP is nearing completion and will provide storage for a 15 day supply of most Class V items.

(b) Class V Issues for report period:

105mm HE	58,000
4.2" HE	10,620

81mm HE	11,180
155mm HE	82,600

c. Transportation:

(1) Two (2) light truck squads and one (1) medium truck squad from the 3d Support Battalion (PROV) support the brigade units at LZ MT BRONCO.

(2) Air Force C123 aircraft provide a scheduled airlift between the brigade at Duc Pho and its rear detachments at Pleiku. Averaging three sorties per day, the aircraft complied the following record during the reporting period:

(a) Sorties: 307

(b) Passengers: 9,978

(c) Cargo: 116 tons

d. Medical:

(1) "D" Co, 4th Medical Battalion provides immediate medical support for the brigade. Excellent evacuation support is provided by the 498th Medical Company, Air Ambulance, and by Air Force evacuation teams. D Co evacuates patients to the 2nd Surgical Hospital in Chu Lai and to the 67th and 85th Evacuation Hospitals in Qui Nhon.

(2) Medical Statistics for reporting Period:

Disease patients	5,164	
Battle casualties	217	
Non-battle casualties	663	
Total:	6,044	
Patients admitted to ward		864
Patients evacuated to hospitals		1,455
Patients returned to duty		3,725

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. General: Priority of effort was directed towards the following four areas: public health and sanitation, public education, refugee relief, and the national elections. All projects were designed to be short range and high impact in nature. All projects were requested by GVN officials and work

performed by indigenous labor. US personnel and units participating in civic action in DUC PHO were S5, 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division, a team from 29th Civil Affairs Company and the MACV Sector Advisory Team. GVN agencies included four RDC Teams, Refugee Relief Personnel, VIS, and the VN Cultural Drama Team.

b. Medcap Results:

(1) Sick Call	12,763
(2) Dental	558
(3) Baths for Children	884

c. Engineer Projects:

(1) Schools: Construction of 5-room and 3-room elementary schools was completed during the reporting period. In addition the repair of another 6-room elementary was accomplished. Work is progressing on two new 3-room elementary schools.

(2) Wells: Twenty-two wells were completed, with three presently under construction.

(3) Latrines: Four latrines were completed, two new ones are under construction.

(4) Orphanage: New dining and sleeping facilities constructed.

d. PSYWAR:

(1) Psychological Operation activities during the reporting period included leaflet drops, ground and aerial speaker missions (both tape and live).

(2) Leaflet drops and aerial speaker mission were accomplished through C-47, U-10, O-2, and UH-1D aircraft.

(3) The use of armed propaganda personnel (ex VC) specially trained in PSYWAR was frequent and successful. They were best utilized on the ground after the infantry had trapped the enemy in holes or tunnels.

(4) Summary:

(a) Leaflets dropped	35,899,400
(b) Aerial speaker time	65 hours
(c) Ground speaker time	298½ hours

(d)	Chieu Hoi Rallies	18
(e)	Weapons	1
(f)	Leaflets made	5
(g)	Tapes made	7

6. PERSONNEL:

a. Unit Strength:

(1) As of 31 October 1967, the strengths of the units of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division were as follows:

	AUTH			ASG & ATTACH			PRES		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
HHC Bde	24	4	102	38	5	222	30	5	200
1-14 Inf	45	2	924	47	2	870	45	2	838
1-35 Inf	45	2	924	45	1	862	45	1	816
2-35 Inf	45	2	924	48	1	883	47	1	852
2-9 Arty	37	3	450	36	4	451	35	3	438
C/4 Engr	5	0	142	6	0	140	6	0	135
B/704 Maint	4	2	113	4	1	108	4	1	106
D/4 Med	8	0	83	8	0	86	7	0	84
C/1-10 Cav	5	0	179	5	0	166	5	0	160
40th SB	1	0	26	1	0	27	1	0	26
14 PIC	2	0	3	2	0	3	2	0	3
TOTALS:	221	15	3870	240	14	3818	227	13	3658

(2) The 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division strength fluctuated daily during this period. The following are periodic strength figures:

	ASSIGNED				PRES		
DATE	OFF	WO	EM	DATE	OFF	WO	EM
5 Oct	230	13	4011	5 Oct	237	12	3936
12 Oct	230	14	4041	12 Oct	226	13	3973
19 Oct	232	15	3924	19 Oct	230	14	3904
26 Oct	245	13	3933	26 Oct	239	12	3771
29 Oct	245	13	3900	29 Oct	237	12	3736

(3) Total figures on replacements received for the period Aug, Sep, Oct 1967:

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

	E-9	E-8	E-7	E-6	E-5	E-4	E-3	E-2	TOTAL
HHC 3d Bde	0	2	0	1	3	5	5	0	16
1-14 Inf	0	2	5	20	14	51	386	1	479
1-35 Inf	1	2	9	11	26	14	281	0	344
2-35 Inf	1	0	3	4	7	12	282	0	309
2-9 Arty	0	1	1	5	2	24	156	1	190
C/4 Engr	0	0	0	3	6	12	30	0	51
C/1-10 Cav	0	1	2	3	2	7	35	0	50
3d Spt Bn	0	0	1	0	2	3	29	0	35
	2	8	21	47	62	128	1204	2	1474

(4) The number of friendly casualties for Aug, Sep, Oct are as follows:

	KIA	WIA	MIA	WIA - DIED OF WOUNDS
ORGANIC UNITS:	30	206	0	2

(5) Number of Emergency Leaves:

	AUG	SEP	OCT
HHC 3d Bde	1	0	1
1-14 Inf	3	4	3
1-35 Inf	1	4	8
2-35 Inf	2	3	2
2-9 Arty	4	0	2
C/1-10 Cav	0	1	1
C/4 Engr	0	1	0
D/4 Med	0	0	0
40th SD	0	0	0
14 PIO	0	0	0
B/704 Maint	0	1	2
4 MI Det	0	0	0
3d Spt Bn	0	2	2
	11	16	21

(6) Personnel who departed for PCS and ETS:

AUG 250
SEP 393
OCT 379

b. Morale: Morale continues to be excellent within the command.

(1) Mail:

(a) Number of bags received: 7,565

(b) Number of bags dispatched: 2,772

(c) Total value of money orders sold: $886,550.73

(d) Total stamp value sold: $23,728.20

(e) Dates mail was not received:

AUG 23, 25, 28
SEP 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 30
OCT 3, 20, 28

(2) R & R

(a) Out of country allocations were sufficient to satisfy the needs of the command.

(b) Monthly out of country allocations were as follows:

	AUG	SEP	OCT
HHC 3d Bde	36	33	17
1-14 Inf	74	70	58
1-35 Inf	74	71	62
2-35 Inf	73	65	57
2-9 Arty	49	40	35
3d Spt Bn	16	27	12
C/1-10 Cav	17	18	12
C/4 Engr	0	14	0
	339	338	253

(c) There was a 100% use of allocations for all three months.

c. Promotion Allocations:

	AUGUST					
	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9
1-14 Inf	82	15	3	0	0	0
1-35 Inf	19	12	1	0	0	0
2-35 Inf	25	35	1	1	0	0
2-9 Arty	173	35	4	0	0	0
C/4 Engr	32	8	0	0	0	0
C/1-10 Cav	4	2	0	0	0	0
HHC 3d Bde	29	3	0	0	0	0
3d Spt Bn	6	0	0	0	0	0
D/4 Med	17	0	0	0	0	0
B/704 Maint	13	3	0	0	0	0
4 S&T Co	30	0	0	0	0	0
	430	113	9	1	0	0

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period ending 31 October 1967

SEPTEMBER

	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	E-8	E-9
1-14 Inf	79	36	4	1	0	0
1-35 Inf	86	2	0	0	0	0
2-35 Inf	88	22	4	2	1	0
2-9 Arty	0	0	0	1	0	1
C/4 Engr	16	0	0	0	0	0
C/1-10 Cav	7	0	1	0	0	0
HHC 3d Bde	0	0	0	0	0	0
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
D/4 Med	0	0	1	0	0	0
B/704 Maint	0	2	1	0	0	0
4 S&T Co	0	0	0	0	0	0
	274	62	11	4	1	1

OCTOBER

1-14 Inf	20	39	4	0	0	0
1-35 Inf	48	20	8	2	0	0
2-35 Inf	62	8	2	0	0	0
2-9 Arty	0	5	3	1	0	0
C/4 Engr	9	5	0	0	0	0
C/1-10 Cav	10	10	1	0	0	0
HHC 3d Bde	11	19	4	0	0	0
3d Spt Bn	0	0	0	0	0	0
D/4 Med	3	1	0	0	0	0
B/704 Maint	9	7	1	0	0	0
4 S&T Co	0	6	1	0	0	0
	172	120	24	3	0	0

(2) Awards Presented:

	AUG	SEP	OCT
Distinguished Service Cross	0	2	0
Distinguished Service Medal	0	0	0
Silver Star Medal	3	5	9
Legion of Merit	0	0	0
Distinguished Flying Cross	0	0	0
Soldiers Medal	0	1	4
Bronze Star Medal	67	55	60
Air Medal	8	44	20
Army Commendation Medal	33	14	15

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

e. Religion:

(1) Chaplains continued to conduct numerous religious services in the field and have noticed a significant increase in attendance.

(2) On their weekly trip to Qui Nhon, the chaplains have noticed the excellent spirit of the men of the 3d Brigade who are confined to hospitals.

f. Reenlistment:

	AUG		SEP		OCT		
	elig	reenl	elig	reenl	elig	reenl	Percent
Last Prior Service RA (Career)	5	4	1	1	7	7	92.3%
Last Prior Service (1st Term)	4	0	3	2	5	5	63.6%
Last Prior Service (AUS)	8	0	14	5	24	0	10.6%
	17	4	18	8	36	12	55.5%

SECTION 2 (C) COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Part I, Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. (C) Personnel:

a. Item: Critical shortage of non-commissioned officers, MOS 11B40
Discussion: At the end of the reporting period, 31 October, shortage of infantry non-commissioned officers, MOS 11B40, existed as follows:

E-7		E-6		E-5	
AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG	AUTH	ASG
40	35	156	60	231	91

Observation: Although a liberal promotion policy is a possible solution, it is not a desirable substitute for experienced and mature non-commissioned officers.

b. Item: This unit continues to experience personnel problems among Brigade Aviation flight platoon crew members of utility aircraft.
Discussion: The crew member problem comes as a result of the overall personnel shortage, but additionally stems from such things as the thirty day special leave program, R&R, men in the hospital and details such as guard duty. The unit has a TO&E authorization of one gunner and one crew chief per aircraft on hand. When for one of the above reasons a man is gone there is generally no one authorized or qualified to fill his position.

Observation: There is a need for one extra crew chief and gunner to be authorized to each flight platoon.

c. Item: Personnel who leave the unit because of combat injuries or illness.

Discussion: When a person is medically evacuated from the unit, very little, if any information comes back to this unit concerning the individual's location and condition. When these people leave they very seldom have time to take their records with them. Consequently, items such as flight records and award records are frequently left with no forwarding address. Thus it frequently takes several weeks before the location and condition of these individuals is ascertained.

Observation: There is a definite need for a more expedient means of tracing personnel who have left the unit for medical reasons.

d. Item: Lack of qualified refrigerator repairmen.

Discussion: The development of the brigade base complex necessitated the establishment of a cold storage and freezer capability. The brigade does not have a qualified mechanic to accomplish the minimum inspections, maintenance and repair activities and a mechanic must be called in from a distant support unit causing great delay.

Observation: A refrigeration mechanic should be assigned to the Brigade Support Battalion (PROV).

e. Item: Forward observer parties for fourth infantry company

Discussion: In an effort to increase the fighting strength of the combat units without significantly increasing the support base, a fourth infantry company was added to each infantry battalion in this brigade. The increase did not provide for the necessary forward observer parties from the direct support artillery battalion. It then became necessary to form these parties from existing resources and personnel within the artillery battalion. The lieutenants assigned TO&E positions on the battalion staff were assigned as forward observers and enlisted men and material were taken from less critical positions and formed into forward observer parties. This reduction in staff officers, NCOs and equipment seriously affects the flexibility of the battalion. In particular, if a forward observer position was vacated due to enemy or administrative action, the only staff officers available to immediately fill this vital position were captains. Of secondary concern was the fact that certain staff functions suffered from lack of leadership when the lieutenants assigned to these positions were reassigned as forward observers.

Observation: The TO&E should be modified to provide three (3) additional forward observer parties for the direct support artillery battalions. In the interim a letter order should be issued to cover the situation.

2. (C) OPERATIONS:

a. Item: The M-79 ammunition carrying vest.

Discussion: Several months ago this brigade received four of the new M-79 ammo carrying vests. This is an item of equipment that has been need-

ed for sometime. The vests are excellent. They are lightweight, durable, distributs the load and carry sufficient ammunition. Since then no more vests have been issued although many requests have been submitted.

Observation: A determined effort should be made to get these new vests issued to the units as soon as possible.

b. Item: There is a need for a standard survival mirror in each squad.

Discussion: Several personnel in this brigade have survival signal mirrors. These mirrors greatly conserve the use of smoke and they do not compromise the unit position as readily as smoke does, when signaling aircraft. Mirrors, when used properly on a sunny day, are actually easier to spot than smoke.

Observation: The standard survival signal mirror should be made available for issue to the rifle companies.

c. Item: Shortage of interpreters within the units.

Discussion: The rifle companies habitually operate independently. There have been numerous times when an interpreter was needed immediately, i.e., to exploit tactical information, to persuade NVA/VC to surrender etc. There is a critical shortage of interpreters.

Observation: A determined effort should be made to produce enough qualified interpreters so that one could be assigned to each rifle company, one to the reconnaissance platoon and two to battalion headquarters.

d. Item: FADAC operator training.

Discussion: It was found that experienced FDC computers (13E20) had no trouble becoming proficient with FADAC operations, but some additional training was required for them to utilize the full capabilities of the computer.

Observation: FDC personnel should first be fully qualified as firing data computers prior to being trained as FADAC operators.

e. Item: Determination of muzzle velocity with FADAC.

Discussion: The MV used by the firing battery, based on previous calibrations, did not produce accurate met + MV transfers when used with FADAC. However, an acceptable MV could be calculated by inserting the current met in the computer, conducting a precision registration, zeroing the range correction and varying the MV in the FADAC until the computer could produce the adjusted QE when given the registration point coordinates. This new MV was then averaged with the old MV and an average MV entered. The registration corrections were then computed and entered as outlined in the FM 6-3-1.

Observation: Using the MV thus calculated it was found that the initial data (met + MV) to the registration point averaged within + 2 mils of the adjusted data. This evaluation strongly supports the theory of 1st round hits from FADAC data.

f. Item: Switching from FADAC to graphical equipment during a fire mission.

Discussion: Since the FADAC occassionally experiences mechanical failures, FDC personnel must be prepared to continue a mission without loss of

time or accuracy. Data obtained by means of the graphical system does not always agree exactly with FADAC produced data, but as long as observer shifts are 300 meters or less the differences have proven to be constant.

Observation: The most expedient method of switching from FADAC to graphically computed data during a mission is to continue the mission with the check chart as it has been constructed and maintained prior to the FADAC failure, applying the "difference factors" obtained during the early stages of the mission to all graphical data. The method, however, invites confusion and inaccuracy. This method should be used only if speed is absolutely of the essence. The most accurate method is accomplished by computing data for replot from the last data fired, moving the pin in the chart if necessary, and proceeding with the mission from that pin plot. Another chart must be constructed and available to set up quickly for use as a check chart in the event of FADAC failure.

g. Item: Selection of Position.

Discussion: Battery position areas which would be appropriate on a conventional warfare battlefield, such as a tree line position or a position on a reverse slope, would be impractical and even dangerous in the unconventional environment in which we find ourselves in Vietnam.

Observation: The most desirable terrain for a battery position area is a high defoliated hill. Such a position enhances the battery's defensive posture by providing better fields of direct fire and observation. Enemy movement or mortar flashes can be easily spotted. In addition, such a position provides good drainage in rainy weather and excellent communications due to its altitude.

h. Item: Moisture inside fire control instruments.

Discussion: During humid weather, many of the collimators and panoramic sights in this unit become fogged and, as a result, unserviceable.

Observation: Although collimators and panoramic sights are sealed with a pressurized nitrogenous gas inside, the seal is not tight enough to keep the gas from escaping, thereby being replaced by air containing water vapor which condenses. The moisture can be removed temporarily if the instrument is placed in a heated container, but this is a slow procedure, the instrument is deadlined during such period, and the seals sometime crack. Additionally, this procedure is unauthorized and should not be performed at battery level. This problem should be researched with a view towards development of an improved seal for these fire control instruments.

i. Item: Infinity Aiming Post, M-1 (Collimator)

Discussion: With the howitzer properly emplaced, the collimator has one bad fault that makes it much less desirable for use than M-1 aiming posts for an M101A2 105mm Towed Howitzer. Specifically, as the trails are shifted or as the tube is traversed, displacement varies so rapidly on such a wide range that the reticle of the M12A7 (H and D models) panoramic sight cannot cover the displacement and the collimator must often be realigned, causing a delay. Conversely, aiming post displacement never varies to an

extent that they must be realigned.

Observation: This unit always lays and aligns both the collimator and the aiming posts, referring to the collimator with the upper sight scale and to the aiming posts with the slipping scale. The collimator is used as the primary point for all firing unless time is critical and trails must be shifted so that the sight "loses" the collimator, at which time the gunners are directed to use aiming posts as reference points. This is easily accomplished without loss of accuracy, but it invites mistakes if the gunner is not careful. Greater assurance of avoiding error is achieved if a firing battery consistently uses one reference point system. The collimator could work better if one of two conditions could be met. One, it could be redesigned so that it could be read from a greater distance through the sight than its present distance of approximately 15 feet. Two, the sight reticle could be redesigned so that instead of its present width of 80 mils it would be 100 mils wide or even greater. The second condition would not completely solve the problem, but the collimator could then be used through a wider range of traverse, and would have to be realigned less frequently.

j. Item: Stabilization of howitzers during firing.

Discussion: During periods of wet weather this unit has experienced some difficulty in keeping the howitzer in a stable position during firing, especially with the higher charges. When the soil in the parapet is muddy, the trails invariably move a considerable distance to the rear, left, or right, causing a great amount of aiming post displacement. Frequently the piece must be relayed before firing continues.

Observation: To counter such problems, this unit employed perforated steel planking (PSP) dug in on its edge, reinforced with engineer stakes, and with a log placed against the PSP. The trails will then be braced no matter which direction the howitzer is firing (See illustration at inclosure 5). This method has proven successful, in that very little aiming post displacement is experienced with the trails braced in such a manner.

k. Item: Resupply of rifle companies during S&D operations.

Discussion: Search and destroy operations are constantly hampered by the need for resupply. The weight of the present C-rations makes resupply on alternate days mandatory, therefore alternate days are spent finding suitable landing zones (which are rare in coastal highlands) and securing them. For all practical purposes, operation time is reduced to one half. Even in the coastal plains where landing zones are plentiful, it takes a full half a day to resupply a company. Resupply helicopters on alternate days also fix the elements positions and indicate the direction of movement of the element. Overburdening troops with rations fatigues the men before the element can move very far.

Observation: Small unit commanders would prefer to conduct operations over a six to eight day period with only resupply of ammunition, water, and equipment as required. This could be achieved if lighter rations and load bearing equipment were available. During the past quarter, a limited amount of indigenous type rations were available. These, combined with "C" rations" permitted companies to operate for a period of three days without

requiring a resupply and without substantially increasing the combat load.

l. Item: Using Interpreters and Indigenous Searchers.

Discussion: The use of interpreters when available, has provided exceptional sources of on the spot information. Often opportunities are lost because prisoners are evacuated to rear areas. Substantial information from these people is either outdated when it gets back to the field, or the fast moving tactical situation precludes the possibility of returning to areas of operations to check intelligence reports. Vietnamese Nationals used as searchers in village search operations have proven invaluable both in finding military contraband, and in training US personnel in search techniques.

Observation: Interpreters should be assigned to the company level or more ideally to the platoon level. Immediate questioning of prisoners and civilians during S&D operations is essential to insure success in these operations. Indigenous searchers should be employed as much as possible, both in search operations and in training US personnel.

m. Item: Evacuation of Friendly KHA.

Discussion: There is a recurring problem of evacuation of friendly personnel, killed in action. The medical evacuation policy is not to endanger aircraft or crews evacuating the dead. But often it is a tactical necessity that these bodies be evacuated. The problem is not great when the units are operating in open territory where landing zones are plentiful for a helicopter can be requested and the evacuation made. Problems arise when elements are located on steep slopes and in heavy canopy terrain of the coastal highlands. In these areas, wounded personnel are evacuated with a dust-off helicopter equipped with a winch because of the lack of a suitable landing zone. Since med-evacs are not permitted by DA policy to evacuate the dead, the bodies must be carried to a landing zone. Carrying this additional weight puts a tremendous strain on the troops. In addition the present situation has an adverse effect on the morale of the men.

Observation: Thought should be given to developing a winch device that could be rapidly mounted on any UH-1D helicopter. Since the proposed primary mission, would be evacuating KHAs, it would not have to be a sophisticated device. Employment of such a device would also give any helicopter a back-up capability for the winch equipped helicopter of the Medical Company.

n. Item: Utilization of Hoi Chanh and VC Infrastructure Personnel.

Discussion: It has been found that when Hoi Chanh and VC infrastructure personnel are returned to the area of their capture they led units to numerous weapons and food caches. These people are also more inconspicuous and more helpful when they are given US uniforms to wear instead of their indigenous clothing.

Observation: When military intelligence personnel and interpreters are not available in the field to interrogate Hoi Chanhs and VC guerrillas, evacuation, questioning and return to the area of capture should be accomplished as quickly as possible. This affords maximum exploitation

of their information. They should be dressed in US uniform. If rewards are promised, they should be paid in a discreet manner, for paying informers in view of other members of their village endangers their lives and discourages others fro coming forward with information.

o. Item: Night vehicle movement on roads.

Discussion: At times armored vehicles are employed on the roads during hours of darkness. This technique has proven effective for keeping roads clear of mines over short stretches of road. Problems are encountered on large stretches of road because the enemy has adequate time to plant mines, especially when the movement is on a regular schedule.

Observation: Except for short stretches of road, night movement by armor on roads should be limited to emergency situations.

p. Item: Use of CS RCA from an OH-23

Discussion: The use of CS Riot Control Agent has helped in flushing the enemy out of bunkers, trenches, and houses. The most effective method of employment is to use smoke to determine the wind direction and then drop upwind of the target. CS must be dropped within 5 meters of a bunker opening to be of any effect. If results are not gained from 2 well placed grenades, normally more will not be of any value. After a period of 4-5 weeks, use of CS has been found almost totally ineffective on houses and bunkers as the enemy either obtains masks or some satisfactory substitute for a mask. The effects of the CS on the scout crew has not been significant as it is relatively easy to see the white cloud and avoid it. Some effects have been felt when the cloud has become invisible, but the area is small and fresh air quickly neutralizes and effects received. The ground troops have been effected to a greater degree, particularly on damp mornings. A limited number of XM651 CS rounds for the M-79 grenade launcher were also tested during the quarter. This round appears to be highly desirable for scout aircraft. The area coverage is only from 1/2 to 2/3 that of a CS grenade, but the concentration appears to be a bit stronger than the grenade. It can also be placed with acceptable accuracy without unduly exposing the aircraft and can penetrate the normal straw structure.

Observation: CS grenades are very effective when used by aerial scout crews for a few weeks. They normally remain effective against personnel who evade into brush and hedgerow. The XM651 round for the M-79 appears to be very useful.

q. Item: M-79 Grenade Launcher employed in an OH-23

Discussion: The M-79 grenade launcher has been most effective when used at a hover for pinpoint targets, or when fired directly to the front in forward flight. To prevent damage to the aircraft from stray fragments, the engagement range must be at least 30 meters at a hover and 50 meters when in forward flight. The M-79 is most effective in brush, bamboo, or other areas of light cover. It has proved to be an excellent reconnaissance by fire weapon as it has a definite psychological effect and a good bursting radius. Excellent results have also been achieved when used against enemy in trenches and buildings. A skilled gunner can fire the M-79 rapidly,

but it would be a more effective weapon for scout aircraft if it had a 3 to 4 shot capability.

Observation: An M-79 increases the firepower and recon by fire capability of scout aircraft. A multi-shot capability for the M-79 would increase its usefulness.

r. Item: Enemy use of decoys

Discussion: A decoy in the form of a dummy enemy soldier has been encountered by the scout team. The decoy was positioned on a route often covered by the scout aircraft to lure the aircraft in for a closer inspection. Two enemy bunkers were located in a trench line about 30 meters away. The observers were able to spot the enemy as well as the dummy and successfully avoided the trap.

Observation: When scout missions are flown frequently in the same area, crews must be especially vigilant for enemy ruses to lure the aircraft into a vulnerable position. In the case discussed, the decoy was so obvious it aroused suspicion.

s. Item: Attack Methods by OH-23 scout ships.

Discussion: Once a target is spotted, the attack is best accomplished at close range of 30 meters or less. With two observer/gunners, one is always in position to fire. The observer/gunners sit facing outward and observe primarily to the side and rear. The enemy normally breaks and runs or tries to hide just as the aircraft passes over and are easier to spot at that time. When a target is spotted the gunner taps the pilot on the leg, and the pilot immediately turns the aircraft in that direction. The gunner must receive clearance to engage the target from the pilot, unless the enemy is firing at the aircraft or the aircraft is in immediate danger. This procedure allows the crew to identify and engage almost simultaneously, thus depriving the enemy of the opportunity to seek cover or dispose of weapons or other military gear. Each observer/gunner has a 160 degree field of fire. Target engagement consists of orbiting the target, keeping it on a fixed point to eliminate the lead problem for the gunner. This method also forces the enemy to cope with a lead problem. Continous fire is placed on the target until it is destroyed. If the enemy is able to reach a bunker, the only effective means of engaging is utilizing ground forces. Without ground forces the battle then becomes a stalemate as the doors of the bunkers do not permit the enemy to fire at the aircraft, and neither the scout aircraft, gunships, nor artillery has proven effective in destroying bunkers found in the AO.

Observation: Enemy targets spotted by scout aircraft are always fleeting and must be engaged immediately. The most effective employment is in conjunction with ground forces, using the scout aircraft to spot the enemy forces and isolate them, where ground forces can close with, capture, or destroy them.

t. Item: Terrain

Discussion: The reconnaissance capability is best exploited in relatively open terrain with scattered trees, brush, or hedgerows, and in villages. The capability to attack a target in these areas is also excellent. In mountainous areas or areas of heavy tree canopy or heavy brush, attack capability is limited and aircraft vulnerability is greatly increased.

Best employment in such areas is to use the scout aircraft to mark areas for search by ground troops and to direct the movement of ground elements to these areas. Structures can often be spotted through a single canopy, however, the scout aircraft has no effective method of destroying them.

Observation: Employment of the scout aircraft in the coastal or highlands plains areas yields the best results for the time committed. Vulnerability is increased and productivity decreased in mountainous areas and areas with heavy brush or trees.

u. Item: Observer/gunners of an OH-23

Discussion: The observer/gunners have been obtained from the section crew chiefs and volunteers from other brigade units. There is an unlimited supply of eager volunteers; however this individual is the most critical element of the scout crew and must excel in all aspects. Some have proven too slow in reacting to targets, or were unable to acquire targets. All crew chiefs are not able to function as an observer/gunner and still maintain their aircraft as required. About half of the crew chiefs developed into first class observer/gunners. Former line company infantry personnal have proven to be the best candidates in most cases, as they possessed a knowledge of the weapon and skill in spotting and recognizing the enemy. Helicopter gunnery was an easy transition for them. A weight limit of 165 pounds was established due to the restricted cockpit space and the gross weight limitations of the OH-23. Volunteers should never be taken on actual scout missions until qualified on the weapon and in target acquisition.

Observation: The success of the scout team depends on the observer/gunner. He must excel in target acquisition and recognition, quick reaction, and ability to handle and fire the M-60 machinegun.

v. Item: Compaction equipment

Discussion: In the past this unit has often had the mission of constructing helipads, roads and various other projects requiring compaction equipment. This type of equipment is not TO&E to this unit. Due to the great distance that normally seperates us from our parent unit it is not practical for them to transport equipment at our request. Availability of this equipment would speed construction and improve the quality of the finished project.

Observation: Combat engineer companies separated from their parent unit should have compaction equipment included in their MTO&Es.

w. Item: Aircraft Utilization

Discussion: Although the situation has greatly improved during this reporting period, it is still found that when aircraft report for a mission such as resupply, they are often poorly used. In some instances resupply aircraft have been utilized for missions which should have been accomplished by the Command and Control aircraft. Also on several occasions resupply aircraft have taken several seperate small loads to different locations which could have been consolidated into a larger load and saved much time on the aircraft.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

Observation: Aircraft commanders should be quick to assist supported units in the concept of aircraft utilization. This should include, but not be limited to, consolidating loads, capabilities and limitations of aircraft, loading and unloading procedures. Additionally, aircraft commanders should make note of all mission discrepancies and record them on their after mission reports so that the air operations officer is aware of the situation and can also advise supported units on optimum aircraft utilization.

x. Item: Employment of stay-behind force

Discussion: Considerable success has been reported by units establishing a stay-behind ambush around a bivouac site prior to the rest of the unit departing the area. When the enemy moves into the area to pick up material discarded by the unit, the stay behind force ambushes them, then rejoins the unit.

Observation: This technique takes advantage of a common enemy practice.

y. Item: Continuous secure (Cipher) voice radio operation

Discussion: On 7 August 1967 the brigade initiated a continuous secure voice FM radio net employing standard AN/VRC-12 series radios and the KY-8/TSEC speech security equipment. Previously the secure voice operations were conducted on a "on call" basis using the brigade command radio net. The disadvantages found in operating the security equipment "on call" were numerous. Operator error in programming the equipment for cipher operation was common. Battalion stations frequently did not program the cipher units until cipher operation was necessary, resulting in excessive delay preparing the equipment for operation. The changing from "Plain" to "Cipher" modes of operation on the brigade command net resulted in frequent damage to the KY-8 devices. The Mode Selector Switch and Signal X-Mode cable were found to be fragile and broke when handled improperly. When the stations on the brigade command net reverted to the secure mode of operation, the command and control aircraft could not monitor or transmit traffic over the net. The operation of the continuous secure voice FM radio net between brigade and battalion tactical operations centers proved to be advantageous. Stations entered the net at CSOOH (2400Z) daily ensuring that all cipher devices were programmed properly. Minimal maintenance difficulties were encountered with the KY-8/TSEC machines or associated Signal X-Mode cables. The brigade and battalions used the secure voice net to transmit tactical operation plans and classified intelligence information. Operator proficiency and confidence increased and the equipment proved valuable during numerous immediate operations.

Observation: The employment of the continuous brigade secure voice FM radio net facilitated rapid dissemination of vital tactical information and enhanced the communication security of the command. Recommend that the employment of this type radio net be included within standard tactical communications doctrine.

z. Item: Newly Arrived Units.

Discussion: The arrival of a new packet of troops from CONUS to comprise the fourth rifle company of each battalion posed a challenge in

attempting to make the elements immediately combat ready. New elements arriving in country universally go through adjustment problems prior to becoming truly combat effective; however, new replacements to existing companies normally adjust much more quickly. The new packet was broken down with much thought to individual DEROS, the leveling off of NCOs, experience factors, and the current strength of companies. The fourth rifle company was organized in each battalion from approximately three-quarters experienced personnel and one-quarter new personnel. To further prepare the new unit it was put through seven days of training stressing working together in small unit operations rather than combat skills. As a result of this training the company's first combat assault, normally a difficult operation for any new unit, was described as extremely smooth by flight leaders. The unit's day-to-day operations have shown few adjustment problems. This procedure should also prove helpful if used in integrating officers of new units as well as enlisted men.

Observation: Integrating personnel from new units arriving in country with existing units alleviates problems of adjusting these units to combat conditions and also avoids rotational humps.

aa. Item: Ambush rehearsals.

Discussion: The importance of good ambush rehearsals is universally accepted but often not adhered to in the combat areas. Our ambushes made remarkable improvement when commanders insisted on detailed preparation to include live fire rehearsals prior to the execution of the ambush. It was found that the troops must be given sufficient time for rest following the ambush for them to be effective. On a recent occasion, only two weeks after this increased training, platoon ambushes in one area engaged an enemy force killing fourteen, capturing one NVA and a total of twelve weapons including a RPG-7 without incurring one serious injury. On another ambush a reinforced squad engaged and killed six VC and captured six weapons without the enemy being able to unsling their arms. No US casualties were accrued.

Observation: Time devoted to realistic live fire ambush rehearsals in the combat zone and during stand downs following ambushes yields significant results in terms of enemy killed and fewer friendly casualties.

bb. Item: Multiple flight air assaults.

Discussion: Following the initial large engagements in our area of operations we faced small and scattered groups of enemy, sometimes only two or three, whose mission was to harass and to evade, avoiding contact. Normal air assaults did not suffice because the enemy just split up and successfully evaded from the initial landing zone. To counter this tactic, a new technique of multiple impromptu air assaults of platoon or smaller size elements, oriented on enemy movement, was developed. Initially a small element, usually a platoon, is placed on the ground. Following this the brigade OH-23's scout and screen the surrounding areas up to two thousand meters. Meanwhile the troop helicopters return to the pickup zone and load the next element. These troops are loaded in such a manner that each two ships contain an independent element that can be inserted in one location while the other elements go to another. The helicopters remain on the pickup

zone or some intermediate secure area either at flight idle or shut down until the enemy situation is sufficiently developed to determine the most opportune landing zone(s). The flight or a section on standby pulls pitch, is briefed while in flight, and is inserted after a gunship preparation of a landing zone which is suitable to the tactical situation. To assist the company commander in remaining abreast of the situation he accompanies the battalion commander in the command and control helicopter until his final element is landed. The command and control helicopter is used to mark all landing zones as selected. This technique requires increased attention to command and control and adequate communications with each participating element or subelement. The results of this tactic have been extremely encouraging and indicate a successful method of assaulting an adequate number of troops in the proximity of an evading enemy.

Observation: A series of small unit helicopter assaults inserted as a result of sightings by OH-23 scout helicopters frustrate an enemy attempting to evade and disperse. This tactic meets each enemy force with a superior yet economically sized friendly force.

cc. Item: Floating Marking Devices.

Discussion: The terrain and weather in the combat theater of Vietnam and especially in the Duc Pho area necessitates landing troops in locations where there are several inches to several feet of water. Marking these landing zones with normal smoke grenades from a helicopter has proven impossible, necessitating a floating smoke marker. To meet this situation, a field expedient marker was made out of a 7.62mm ammunition can filled with two inches of sand and water with a smoke grenade wired on top. The device initially sinks, but then returns to the surface giving a normal billowing smoke marker. The drawbacks to this device are its size and cumbersome nature.

Observation: A need exists for a floating smoke marker for marking wet landing zones. An ammunition can field expedient will suffice but is cumbersome.

dd. Item: Aircraft panels

Discussion: Every unit has, as a part of its basic issue, aircraft panels, but few units have utilized them on a daily basis. During pickups and extractions, elements of this brigade have utilized them to mark the landing point for the lead ship in each vee. Consequently we have had little trouble with ships overflying their proper positions even during periods of reduced visibility.

Observation: The utilization of aircraft panels for pickups made during periods of reduced visibility facilitates each aircraft in finding its proper place on the landing zone and assists in rapid troop loading.

ee. Item: Night airstrikes.

Discussion: During this reporting period several "night owls", (airstrikes run at night with a FAC and a flareship) have been employed. In constrast to radar directed night air strikes which rarely hit the exact target, these strikes were as accurate as day strikes and allowed the FAC to adjust the strike to suit the actual situation in the target area.

Observation: Night airstrikes adjusted by an airborne FAC with the help of a helicopter flare ship are much more accurate and flexible than radar directed strikes.

ff. Item: Rotating beacons on landing zones.

Discussion: Because of the nature of the enemy's operations much of the action in this war occurs during periods of reduced visibility. In our area of operation a heavy fog accumulates at night, making it extremely difficult for helicopters to navigate. To counteract this problem rotating red beacons were installed at firebases. Numerous pilots have volunteered that this has been a valuable aid for their navigation, and several time we have had requests to turn them on for ships passing through our AO in order to help them orient themselves.

Observation: A rotating beacon located on landing zones is a good navigational aid for helicopters.

gg. Item: Techniques of guiding helicopters in for night landings.

Discussion: Through repeated trial and error, it has been found that there is only one acceptable method of guiding helicopters into landing zones at night. When the helicopter is a considerable distance from the landing zone, approximately four minutes, a trip flare and a hand held flare or mortar illumination round should be utilized to give the pilot a bearing on the landing zone. Trip flares, if used when the helicopter is closer, may blind the pilot and destroy his night vision. One more hand held flare may be used when the helicopter is forty-five seconds out.

Observation: Hand held flares and mortar illumination rounds are good guides for aircraft in giving them a general fix on the location of a landing zone. Trip flares should only be used when helicopters are at least four minutes out.

hh. Item: The utilization of 106 recoilless rifles with M113 personnel carriers.

Discussion: During this reporting period an extensive experiment was conducted mounting a 106 recoilless rifle on one of the M113's attached to our unit. The M106 enabled the carriers to deliver suppressive fire against enemy hiding in bunkers or buildings and was often used to "RECON by fire". When a supply of "beehive" rounds was carried, it gave the carriers an excellent defensive weapon against night attacks which helped offset the lack of a full complement of troops aboard the carriers. Some problems were experienced with the gas tank seams of the carriers which indicates that a detailed study should be made of the effects of this employment.

Observation: 106 recoilless rifles, when used with M113 personnel carriers give them a valuable offensive and defensive weapon.

ii. Item: Artillery preparation of landing zones.

Discussion: It has been the experience of this unit that artillery preparations of ten to fifteen minutes duration have one of two undesirable effects. Either the enemy leaves the area because of this

forewarning, or he gets his weapons and position ready to engage the assaulting element. To offset this we have tried a high intensity TOT type preparation of short duration in which three or more batteries mass and fire their maximum rate of fire for three minutes, hitting all the danger areas surrounding a landing zone. The result is a tremendously increased shock effect on the area around the landing zone and in addition gives the enemy only minutes warning prior to actual touchdown. No fire has been received on any landing zone in which this method has been used.

Observation: By blanketing all critical terrain with a short three minute intensive artillery preparation, followed immediately by insertion of ground troops, the enemy is denied time to either leave the area or get his weapon and prepare to engage the assaulting troops or their helicopters.

jj. Item: Snipers and Sniper Weapons.

Discussion: Although the majority of this war is fought at close range, here in Duc Pho there has been ample opportunity for engaging the enemy at ranges up to 1,000 meters as they are retreating from sniping missions against US Forces. At the present time the only acceptable sniper weapons available are some captured M-1 rifles. These rifles have been more successful than the M-16 in this role. A short sniper school was held at the division base camp, but this instruction was oriented only towards using the M-16 with a low power scope. If a course of instruction was given to at least one person per squad armed by MTO&E with a superior sniper weapon and high power scope, a rapid improvement in long range kills would follow.

Observation: In the Duc Pho area a need exists for a sniper weapon and trained personnel in each squad for engaging enemy targets at ranges up to 1,000 meters.

kk. Item: Air Support.

Discussion: During the past reporting period our experiences with Air Force support has shown it to be too inflexible to adequately support our operations. Preplanned FAC controlled air strikes must be submitted at least twenty-four hours prior to time over target. It is extremely difficult in a fluid guerrilla war to decide what targets are going to be the most productive twenty-four hours in advance. A standing policy which precludes diverting air strikes even if later intelligence indicates a much more lucrative target means many airstrikes are not employed as profitably as possible. Another problem with air support develops because no one knows until flight is over the target what type of aircraft and ordnance will be available. This makes it impossible for the FAC to give the ground commander an estimate on the limitations of the support he can expect, so he can plan his operation accordingly. For this reason there are numerous times that close air support might have been used, but it was not because by the time information about the type of support available was obtained, the movement of the troops had precluded its use. Finally, a highly dangerous situation exists with respect to radar directed air strikes. Once requested, these air strikes cannot be stopped under any circumstance later than thirty minutes

prior to time over target. In our highly mobile war where helicopters could be forced to land at any moment and where airmobile assaults can, within minutes, deposit troops as a result of a developing contact, this arrangement is extremely dangerous.

Observation: Because of the inflexible nature of the support provided by the US Air Force, especially in its radar directed air strikes, its inability to provide advance information on aircraft ordnance loads, and its reluctance to divert pre-planned airstrikes to more profitable targets of opportunity, air support cannot be considered a significant factor in our operations.

ll. Item: Ammunition for the M-79.

Discussion: The M-79 has been combat proven to be an efficient means of placing effective fire on and marking distant enemy targets. However, it could be more effectively used if a variety of rounds were available to include, smoke, white phosphorous and canister. White phosphorous rounds would be valuable for their incendiary effects and smoke rounds would be valuable for marking enemy targets for air strikes and gunships. A canister round would be excellent for ambushes.

Observation: The M-79 is an effective weapon but could be more effective to mark targets and engage the enemy if white phosphorous, smoke, and canister were made available.

mm. Item: Aircraft consoles.

Discussion: The command and control helicopters (C&C) of this unit have been responsible for marking an average of four landing zones per day, and controlling combat assaults into these landing zones. Such actions take minute and continuing coordination between the unit commander, gunships, lift ships, airborne FACs, participating ground units, airborne members of the command group, and the pilot of the C&C ship. The FM radios of most aircraft are unreliable, this requiring the commander to have a UHF and back up FM capability. For the above control and coordination, a minimum of two FM radios, a UHF radio, and an intercom system enabling each member of the airborne command group to use these radios, talk to each other, and direct the C&C pilot are required.

Observation: An urgent need for an aircraft console in each battalion command and control ship exists.

nn. Item: M-79 CS munition.

Discussion: A test of Cartridge, 40mm, CS, XM651 was conducted in this brigade from 21 October to 31 October 1967. Only forty-four (44) cartridges were available for the test, but both units (Reconnaissance Platoon, Second Battalion, 35th Infantry, and Brigade Aviation Section) using the munitions found them effective for reconnaissance of concealed, suspected, enemy positions.

Observation: The 40mm CS munition for the M-79 Grenade Launcher is a valuable asset to units on the ground and for crews in light observation aircraft. Action should be taken to expedite the delivery of the munition to the field in sufficient quantities to meet current demands (at least 60 rds/Bde/day until a more accurate supply rate can be established based on experience).

oo. Item: Wearing of stripes on jungle fatigues.

Discussion: Since fatigues are laundered in bulk and the same fatigues are not sent back to the same individual, the wearing of stripes on jungle fatigues is impractical in most combat field units.

Observation: Black metal rank insignia, if issued, can be removed in the same manner as brass when the clothing is sent to the laundry and affixed to a fresh clean uniform. Metal insignias should be an item of issue in all combat areas.

pp. Item: Disposable Food Containers.

Discussion: This unit continues to feed its elements in the field hot "A" rations for breakfast and supper whenever possible. Utilizing mermite containers to supply elements requires two helicopters sorties for each company, and in many instances tactical operations have been delayed in order to wait for their extraction. This problem has been intensified during the monsoon season because of marginal flying conditions. A critical need exists for disposable mermite containers for use by troops in the field.

Observation: Weather problems and the tactical situation necessits the development of a disposable insulated food container for feeding troops in the field.

qq. Item: Company tunnel kit.

Discussion: Due to the many tunnel and cave complexes found in the Duc Pho area of operation, it has been advantageous to one battalion to locally assemble company tunnel kits. Through trial and error it has been found that the following items should be included:

(a)	Rope 100' lengths	2 ea
(b)	6 volt lights	6 ea
(c)	Armored Vests	2 ea
(d)	Grappling hooks	2 ea
(e)	Infrared scopes	2 ea
(f)	Protective masks	2 ea
(g)	Sound powered phones	2 ea
(h)	WD-1 wire one mile spool	1 ea
(i)	Ear plugs	2 ea

These kits can be lifted to the unit once it finds a cave complex, then lifted out once the cave has been explored.

Observation: The creation and utilization of tunnel kits by each unit furnishes them with a ready means to capitalize on any cave complex found.

rr. Item: The M170 vs M37B1 Ambulance.

Discussion: In this war the only need for an ambulance is to transport patients over adequate roads to nearby medical facilities or aircraft evacuation locations. The M170 is too small to efficiently transport patients in the numbers required. Further, it rides too rough for injured personnel. The larger ambulance, the M37B1 could carry a larger number of personnel and afford them a smooth ride.

Observation: The M170 is too small and gives occupants too rough a ride for the local transportation of patients.

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

ss. Item: Hole Hunting
Discussion: Hole hunting is the technique of locating underground bunkers, caves and spider holes used extensively by the VC and NVA throughout the AO. The enemy has adopted the concept of inflicting a few casualties at long range and then going underground to avoid further contacts.

There are three main types of holes and they are classified more by location than by their construction, bamboo, beach, and water. The most common is the "under bamboo" hole shown in sketch #1, inclosure #5. This hole is easily and quickly camouflaged, characteristic of all the holes found in the Duc Pho - Mo Duc area of Vietnam. The entrances to the holes differ widely as do the techniques of camouflage. Most of the entrances are located within the edge of a bamboo clump or just outside the edge. The hole cover or trap door contains the camouflage material. Some have pieces of cut bamboo affixed to the door itself. The edges of the door fit snugly into the entrance. Many other entrances are covered only by the door which is camouflaged by spreading leaves, rocks, and other materials over the top. Another characteristic common to all these small tunnels is the air hole which is normally made from a hollow piece of bamboo, three or four inches in diameter, inserted into the tunnel and camouflaged on the surface.

The air hole is the only telltale indicator of the second type hole, the "beach hole." The beach hole differs from the bamboo hole in that it is made in the sand and normally constructed from cut timbers. It does not depend upon the bamboo roots to add rigidity to the roof. Naturally, the entrance to a beach hole is impossible to locate as it is often buried under a foot of loose sand; however, it can be detected by finding the breathing tubes. Some air holes are a continuation of the bamboo frames that make up the local fisherman's "lean to." Other air holes can be exposed by pulling up the cacti plants that grow along the sand dunes on the beach. See sketch #2, inclosure #5.

The third type of tunnel, the least common, is the "water entrance" type. This tunnel may be located near a small stream or beside an old bomb crater that has filled with water. Normally these holes have no lid and depend on the natural growth along the stream bank to hide the entrance. Sometimes the entrance is completely submerged, but not always. A typical water entrance tunnel is depicted in sketch #3, inclosure #5.

Before the enemy can be engaged he must first be located. This can only be accomplished through the deliberate search technique. Once located he has already fixed himself by choosing a small tunnel in which to hide. The enemy, dependent only on his experience at passive camouflage, has no choice but to be killed or captured.

There are several indications that should prove to be helpful in locating these holes. Visual indicators often disclose the general area of the hole but not its precise location. Worn places on the bamboo that the enemy has used as hand holds are good visual indicators. Another indicator is a small trail, much like a game trail, through the brush into a bamboo clump. Easily seen, although not a sure sign, is cut bamboo. Frequently, the VC dig their holes under these partially harvested bamboo clumps. A good visual indicator, but difficult to detect, is a slight depression in or around the bamboo clump.

This depression is often the location of a trap door. The depression collects leaves and trash and aids in the camouflage of the hole entrance. The surest of all visual indicators is the ever present air hole. Once located these bamboo breathing tubes will always reveal the tunnel below. Visual indicators are by far the best indicators, but they are not the only ones. A lone individual, especially a female, signals that the VC are not far away. She places the finishing touches of camouflage around the hole. Fresh cooked food with no one attending the pot is a sure sign the VC departed in haste or are hidden nearby. The VC being lazy and not very good soldiers, often dispose of human waste near their hole. Fresh human feces can point out an unwary enemy.

The places to look are in the corners of hedgerows, in the corners of villages and in the corners of trails or trenches. The enemy often hides in these corners as he can see from them while not being seen. Additionally, hiding in a corner allows the party who puts the finishing touches on the camouflage to escape undetected.

Reduction of the hole is a simple four step process beginning with a soldier firing one or two magazines from his M-16 into the trap door. This has a tendency to discourage enemy grenadiers from getting too close to the door. Various American and Vietnamese expressions are shouted into the hole exhorting the enemy to come out or be killed. Sometimes he will give up without a fight. When all else fails and the enemy remains within the tunnel, a few strategically placed grenades normally reduce both the tunnel and the enemy to rubble. The last step is the insertion of a tunnel rat to insure that all weapons and documents have been recovered as well as all enemy killed or captured. A caution to remember is that the enemy's defense is to toss out a grenade when everyone is standing around the hole and attempt to escape from another exit of the tunnel.

Observation: Deliberate search techniques are easily taught and quickly learned. The emphasis is, of course, placed on where to look for the enemy; a location that provides him with observation, cover and concealment and a route of escape. The soldier then learns what to look for; the indicators, a game trail, worn and cut bamboo, an airhole, human feces, a depression, fresh food, a lone individual. These trigger a mental alert in the curious American soldier that the enemy is not far away. The four step reduction process provides a simple means of effectively combatting the enemy with minimum friendly casualties.

INTELLIGENCE:

a. Item: Security of long range reconnaissance patrols

Discussion: Several techniques have been developed to insure the security of long range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP). The insertion of the LRRP with company-size heliborne operation as a breakoff, stay-behind patrol has proven successful. The company-size force provides cover for the LRRP team, attracting the enemy's attention to the larger force. The LRRP should avoid prominent terrain features when establishing observation posts in order to avoid detection when calling artillery. A successful technique has

been developed to provide a means of deception when calling for artillery fire. This technique is to use a visual reconnaissance aircraft in the vicinity of the LRRP position to deceive the enemy as to who is calling in artillery fire. During extraction, a signal mirror can be used to mark the pick-up point in lieu of smoke or radio. The mirror signals are easily seen by the pick-up helicopter.

Observation: Security of the LRRP insures the accomplishment of their mission and the safety of the patrol.

b. Item: Civilian control at checkpoints.

Discussion: A method of apprehending Viet Cong suspects, contraband, and weapons is to establish a checkpoint along a road or highway. At the checkpoint, all non-US personnel are stopped, searched, and identified. The checkpoint team used is a joint effort on the part of Vietnamese National Police and US Forces. The team consists of 2-4 National Policemen, 2-4 US Military Policemen, one interpreter, and one infantry squad. The infantry squad establishes observation posts at both ends of the roadblock approximately 300 meters out. The checkpoint should be located at a point along the road wide enough to allow vehicles to pull completely off the road in order to prevent traffic congestion. The checkpoint should be situated in a place where observation can be obtained for 500 meters in all directions and at least one kilometer from the nearest town. Checkpoints should be operated at different times and at varying intervals. After approximately three hours, the indigenous personnel in the area will be aware of the roadblock and travelers can be warned. Suspects should be evacuated to Military Intelligence interrogating teams for questioning. If available, a counterintelligence team may assist in checking indigenous personnel passing through the checkpoint.

Observation: Checkpoints conducted as a joint American-Vietnamese operation are successful in the control of contraband and weapons. The operation often provides current intelligence and assists in the detention of VC guerrillas operating at village and hamlet level.

4. LOGISTICS: NOT USED.

5. CIVIL AFFAIRS: NOT USED.

Part II: Recommendations

1. Personnel: None.

2. Intelligence:

a. That sufficient qualified interpretors be provided infantry units to meet operational requirements of reacting to immediately available intelligence. Interpretors for a brigade task force are required as follows:

(1) Bde HQ - 10

(a) MI - 5

(b) S5 - 3

(c) S2 - 1

(d) MP - 1

(2) Inf Bn - 6

(a) Bn HQ - 2

(b) Rifle Cos - 1

(3) Arty Bns - 1

3. Operations and Logistics:

a. That a modification be made to TOE 6-157E to provide the three additional forward observer parties required for the fourth infantry company in each battalion.

b. That members of packets scheduled to become the fourth rifle company of infantry battalions be integrated with existing units making four balanced units with equal strength and experience.

c. That metal rank insignia be issued to all enlisted men serving in Vietnam for use on jungle fatigues.

d. That an aircraft console be made available to each infantry battalion forcommand and control purposes.

e. That artillery preparations of landing zones be short and intensive in nature.

f. That OH-23 helicopters utilized as scout ships in the Brigade Aviation Section be armed with hand held, door mounted, free swinging machine guns. In this manner they can provide the necessary aerial observation for the ground troops and also engage and destroy small enemy elements fleeing from the infantry.

AVDC-C-OP 10 November 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

George E. Wear
GEORGE E. WEAR
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

5 Incl:
~~#1, Area of Operations Map~~
~~#2, Combat After Actions Report for 8 August 1967, Battle of An Thach~~
~~3, Combat After Actions Report for 26 August 1967, Battle of An Da~~
4. Construction for Howitzer Stabilization
5. Typical Viet Cong Underground Structures

Distribution:

CINCUSARPAC	2
DCG, USARV	3
CG, IFFV	2
CG, AMERICAL DIV	2
CG, 4TH INF DIV	1
CG, 1ST CAV DIV	1
CO, 1/14TH INF	1
CO, 1/35TH INF	1
CO, 2/35TH INF	1
CO, 2/9TH ARTY	1
CO, C/1-10TH CAV	1
CO, C/4TH ENGRS	1
CO, HHC 3/4TH TP	1
CO	1
DCO	1
XO	1
S1	1
S2	1
S3	1
S4	1
S5	1

*Withdrawn, Hqs, DA; published separately as Combat After Action Report 67X186

AVDF-GC (10 Nov 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report—Lessons Learned (RCS-CSFOR-65)(U)

DA, HQ, Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374 5 JAN 1968

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375

1. (U) Forwarded herewith is the subject report of the 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the observations and comments contained in subject report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

FW Cunningham 2LT

for MAZUTO KAWABATA
Capt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 30 JAN 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1967 from Headquarters, 3d Brigade TF, 4th Infantry Division (DPOA) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning critical shortage of noncommissioned officers, MOS 11B40, page 19, paragraph 1a. The "Skill Development Base" program in CONUS will be the principal source of NCO replacements in grades E5 and E6. As NCO replacements arrive, they are assigned proportionately based upon shortages reported by major subordinate commands, or, in the case of E7 positions, valid requisitions. Skill Development Base graduates are scheduled to arrive in the command commencing in February 1968.

b. Reference item concerning flight crewmembers, page 19, paragraph 1b. HQ USARV does not assign personnel to spaces over and above authorized strength in anticipation of temporary absences. This problem is not unique to flight platoons.

c. Reference item concerning forward observer parties for fourth infantry company, page 20, paragraph 1e; and page 38, paragraph 3a: Concur. Authorization documents for all DS Artillery battalions were modified during the USARV Standardization Program to provide four forward observer parties per battalion. It is anticipated that implementation of these modifications will begin on or about 15 February 1968.

d. Reference item concerning shortage of interpreters, page 21, paragraph 2c; page 24, paragraph 21; and page 37, paragraph 2. The 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division is authorized the following ARVN interpreters by MACV Directive 551-5:

(1)	Brigade Headquarters	- 4 ea
(3)	Infantry Battalion Headquarters	- 2 ea
(12)	Rifle Company	- 1 ea
(1)	Artillery Battalion Headquarters	- 3 ea
	TOTAL	25

AVHGC-DST (10 Nov 67) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967

The 4th Infantry Division has 93 ARVN interpreters assigned of its authorized 117. Thirteen additional interpreters are tentatively allocated for the month of February 1968. This is proportionate to the number assigned other divisions.

e. Reference item concerning observer/gunners of an OH-23, page 27, paragraph 2u; and page 38, paragraph 3f: Nonconcur with door mounted M-60 machine guns on OH-23 type aircraft. Concur with the use of an armed observer in the OH-23 scout ships in the Infantry Brigade Aviation Section.

f. Reference item concerning aircraft consoles, page 33, paragraph 2mm; and page 38, paragraph 3d: Concur. Command consoles with four interphone positions, for use of the commander's party are being provided on the basis of two per aviation battalion and one per assault helicopter company. A large percentage of these consoles are on hand. Additional consoles have been requested to completely equip all USARV aviation elements consistent with current authorizations.

g. Reference item concerning the wearing of stripes on jungle fatigues, page 34, paragraph 1oo; and page 38, paragraph 3c: Concur. A message authorizing the wear of pin-on metal rank insignia has been dispatched to the field.

h. Reference item concerning security of long range reconnaissance patrols, page 36, paragraph 3a: Concur. Two of the techniques discussed in this item, plus several others not covered, are discussed in greater detail in USARV Pamphlet 525-1, Combat Operations, 30 November 1967.

3. (U) A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies Furnished:

HQ, 3d Bde TF, 4th Inf Div
HQ, Americal Div

GPOP-DT(10 Nov 67) (U) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967 from HQ, 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div (UIC: WDPQAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 MAR 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

for R. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG



TOP VIEW



INCL: 4

SIDE VIEW



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SKETCH #1


NOTE:
THE RAFTER CONCEALS AN
EXTENSION OF THE
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PLANT
AIR HOLES
WOOD COVERED
WITH SAND
SAND
BAMBOO MAT OR WOOD

SKETCH # 2



47 SKETCH #3