




WELCOME TO "A WALK WITH THE 35TH"



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Battle of Nga Man

1. On the afternoon of the 19th of May the Brigade S2 section received an intelligence report from Duc Pho District stating that a large NVA force of approximately 300 troops was located in a village vic BS842315. The agent who initiated the report had traveled from Sa Huynh to Duc Pho by bicycle and was stopped by the NVA on the highway. The agent was successful in convincing them that he was a local merchant and continued on to Duc Pho where he turned the information over to Duc Pho District.
2. The report was immediately dispatched to the 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry. The recon platoon, which was conducting search and destroy operations to the southwest, was moved to vic BS828307.
3. As the recon platoon moved to the suspected enemy location, plans were made for lifting companies A & B into the area. At 1538 hours the first lift touched down to the southeast of the enemy location (vic BS852300) with the first platoon of Company A (See Fig 1). The rest of Company A followed on, landing to the north of the suspected enemy location (vic BS839323). With observer helicopters from Troop B, 1-9th Cav overhead, the units quickly maneuvered to surround the village. The recon platoon was moving towards the village from the southwest when it became heavily engaged and reported six battle casualties. Company A, moving in from the north also became heavily engaged as they maneuvered against the enemy position. It was soon apparent that the recon platoon and Company A were in contact with a large force - estimated at battalion size. Reinforcements were required in order to seal off the battlefield and prevent enemy withdrawal. Company B, 1-35th Infantry and Company B, 2-35th Infantry were lifted into the area and deployed to surround the area (See sketch).
4. The enemy force was well armed and occupied fortified positions within the village. Further intelligence reports stated that the area was an R&R center for the VC/NVA forces and was frequently used as an avenue of withdrawal. Employing maximum cover and concealment, at which the enemy had often proved himself an expert, accurate deadly fire was being placed on the maneuvering elements. The Communist force had waited until the US forces were almost on top of their positions before opening fire, thereby exercising strict fire discipline and proving the high degree of training of NVA forces. The attackers were momentarily pinned down by the accurate fire. The fortified positions were constructed to provide excellent fields of fire and forced US troops to cross open areas in front of the bunkers in order to destroy the positions.
5. Gunships and air strikes were immediately called to soften the hamlet. The Blue Team (assault platoon of Troop B, 1-9th Cav) was also inserted. All lifts were complete by 1830 hours, and the units maneuvered as rapidly as possible to block possible avenues of enemy withdrawal. At the same time, resupply was lifted to the elements in contact.
6. By 1900 hours, all units had reported receiving heavy fire. The enemy was not to be denied and was tenaciously protecting his perimeter around

the hamlet as the fighting continued well into the night. "Spooky" reported on station at 2100 hours and gunships from 174th Aviation and B/1-9th Cav remained on station with flare ships turning the night into day. At 2118 hours the friendly casualties were reported at 6 KHA and 10 WIA. Despite the fact that the units were still in contact, resupply of much needed ammunition and water was conducted after dark and finished at 2355 hours. Helicopter pilots of the 174th had once again displayed their courage and professionalism which had won them the respect of fellow aviators throughout Vietnam.

7. By 2400 hours the units had moved into ambush positions in an attempt to block avenues of withdrawal. Flare ships continued to provide illumination throughout the night. Sporadic contact continued as small groups ran into the ambushes while retreating from inevitable death, when the US units would close in at daybreak. At 0300 hours on the 20th, the companies began maneuvering on the enemy positions. As daylight spread across the battlefield the units were sweeping into the fortified hamlet. The sweep revealed 31 enemy killed by body count and seven (7) weapons captured including 2 X AK-47 rifles and 2 X M-16 rifles. Although the resulting body count failed to depict the fierceness of the battle, a search of the contact area indicated many wounded and dead were removed from the battlefield. The indications that the NVA force had suffered greater casualties was further corroborated by an intelligence report, two days later, that more than seventy wounded were located in a cave in the hills to the southwest.

8. The ability of the NVA force to exfiltrate when seemingly surrounded was indicative of the high degree of professionalism of the NVA soldiers. The contact was to become typical of other major battles, in that contact would occur late in the afternoon allowing the enemy to use the cloak of darkness to maximum advantage and withdraw.

9. Documents captured indicated the contact was with the 2d Company, 8th Battalion, 22d NVA Regiment, and the 3d Company, 7th Battalion, 22d NVA Regiment.

EXTRACT: INTSUM NO 9 (3D BDE TF) 20 MAY 67

3. SUMMARY OF EN ACTIVITY

A. GROUND ACTIVITY

(1) DUC PHO

(L) 191547H, BS860231, 1-35 ACTED ON AN AGENT REPORT WHICH STATED THERE WERE 300 EN LOC VIC BS841315 DIGGING TUNNELS, TRENCHES, CAVES, AND OTHER FORTIFICATIONS RECON MOVED FROM THE WEST TOWARDS THE SUSPECTED EN POSITION, A CO (-) COMBAT ASSAULTED TO THE NORTH OF THE SUSPECTED POSITION, 2D PLAT, A 2-47 MOVED TO ESTABLISH A BLOCKING POSITION TO THE EAST AND B 1-9 W/B (-) 2-35 COMBAT ASSAULTED TO THE WEST OF THE EN POSITION. ALL UNITS REC'D HEAVY AW FIRE. FRI RETURNED FIRE AND ADDITIONAL GUNSHIPS WERE DISPATCHED TO THE EN LOCATION. ONE AIRSTRIKE WAS CALLED IN AND WAS FOLLOWED BY ARTY FIRE. RSLTS THUS FAR 9 EN KIA AND 3 WPNS CIA: 1 X AK-47, 1 X SKS, AND 1 X RPD LMG.

EXTRACT: INTSUM NO 10 (3D BDE TF) 21 MAY 67

3. SUMMARY OF EN ACTIVITY

A. GROUND ACTIVITY

(1) DUC PHO

(H) 201100H, BS843315, 1-35 CONDUCTING A SWEEP OF CONTACT AREA LOC 22 EN KIA, 1 US CARBINE SN: 7016518, 2 M-16 RIFLES, 2 AK-47's SN: 2006144 AND 2013971, 1 SKS SN: 7060337, 3 ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES, 28 CHICOM HAND GRENADES, 1 US HAND GRENADE, 110 RDS 7.62MM AMMO, 40 RDS .30 CAL AMMO, 1 RPD AMMO CARTRIDGE, 2 ENTRENCHING TOOLS, 1 PISTOL BELT, 1 CANTEEN, 1 PACK W/3 AK-47 MAGAZINES, 1 CANVAS MACHINEGUN COVER, AND MISC DOCS. DOCS INDICATE 2D CO, 8TH BN, 22D REGT, AND 3D CO, 7TH BN, 22D REGT.

"A TRUE COPY"

Bobby L. Moore

BOBBY L. MOORE
Captain, GMLC