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HEADQUARTERS, 3D BRIGADE  
25th Infantry Division  
APO U.S. Forces 96225

25 April 1966

Combat Operations After Action Report

1. Name/Type: Operation LINCOLN; Search and destroy.
2. Dates of Operation: <sup>25</sup> 01200H March to 071300H April 1966.
3. Location: PLEIKU Province, RVN.
4. Control Headquarters: 1st Air Cavalry Division.
5. Reporting Officer:
  - a. Colonel Everette A. Stoutner, Commanding Officer, 3d Brigade.
  - b. Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Proctor, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
  - c. Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Callanan, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.
  - d. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cody, Commanding Officer, 52d Aviation Battalion.
  - e. Lieutenant Colonel Saul A. Jackson, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.
  - f. Captain Will E. Duffer, Commanding Officer, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry.
  - g. Captain Richard R. Russell, Commanding Officer, Company B, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
  - h. Captain James H. Kvicala, Commanding Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade.

6. Task Organization:

- a. Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
- b. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
- c. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.
- d. 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery.
- e. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry.
- f. B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor.
- g. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Brigade (-).

7. Supporting Forces:

a. 2d Air Division: Elements of the 2d Air Division total of 27 sorties with the following bomb damage assessment: structures destroyed, 10 damaged, 1 secondary explosion, and 3 killed by air. All tactical air support was requested on a basis. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

requested for air cover were ordered to work with the ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

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Air Cavalry Division. Air cover had to be released by division, it could respond to the immediate requests from the brigade.

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b. 52d Aviation Battalion: Three air mobile companies were used in direct support of the brigade. Generally, troop lift and resupply requirements were met with a minimum delay in time. However, on one occasion, due to maintenance requirements and other commitments, only 15 helicopters were available to support an operation. The mission was still accomplished.

8. Intelligence:

a. Anticipated Enemy Strength: Enemy information prior to Operation IFFCIN was nebulous.

b. The only significant contact was made vicinity YA79084. Debriefings indicated an estimated reinforced company to a battalion size element was dug in along a line approximately 7,000 meters and oriented north to south.

c. No VC units were identified.

d. Terrain: Not applicable.

e. CA/Psy War: S-5 report.

f. No liaison with ARVN; a third country element was employed during the operation.

9. Mission: Screen along border from YA7909 south to YA8004 with priority of effort in the Ia Drang River Valley; prevent enemy from withdrawing or reinforcing, and conduct reconnaissance in force south of grid line 04 (see overlay 1), and provide security for selected ground lines of communication. Locations are depicted on overlay 1 and/or 2; specific missions were as follows:

a. Conduct search and destroy operation in sector with priority of effort in area 576.

b. Conduct search and destroy operation in sector with priority of effort in area 575.

c. Provide convoy security on ground lines of communication from PLEIKU to LE THANH and, as required, to DUC CO. Secure log facilities vicinity CASIS during hours of darkness.

d. Provide convoy security on ground line of communication from PLEIKU to PLEI ME.

10. Concept of Operation: 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry conduct heliborne assault into LZ 11 commencing 011200 April 1966, screen border from YA7909 south to YA8004, position forces so as to prevent enemy withdrawing or reinforcing, and conduct search and destroy operation in sector with priority of effort in area 576. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conduct heliborne assault into LZ 21 commencing 011500 April 1966, conduct search and destroy operation in sector with priority of effort in area 575. 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery provide fire support to 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry from LZ 11 and 21 respectively. B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor provide convoy security on ground lines of communication from PLEIKU to LE THANH and DUC CO, as required; upon relief from convoy mission move to vicinity of YA805080 to reinforce 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry provide convoy security for ground line of communication from PLEIKU to PLEI ME.

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11. Division FM CO 6090-2 was received 010001 April 1966. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry, minus one company, supported by A Battery, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery conducted heli'orne assault into LZ 11 commencing 011230 April 1966. The first lift at 1245 consisting of 108 men touched down at LZ 11 with negative enemy contact. At approximately 1305, B Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry received automatic weapon fire from a position 600 meters northwest of LZ 11. The enemy position was taken under fire with small arms and mortar. At approximately 1345 contact was broken. At 1520, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry had closed LZ 11 and began sweeping the area from which the automatic weapon fire was previously received. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry commenced helilift into LZ 21 at 1530 and at 1540 the first lift touched down at LZ 21 with negative enemy contact. At 1600, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry received indirect weapons fire from vicinity Cambodian border. Artillery fire and air strikes were placed on the suspect target area. C Battery, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was heliflifted into LZ 21 in DS of 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry.

On 2 April 1966, B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor and A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry moved from DUC CO to vicinity YA805080 to reinforce the 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry position.

On 3 April 1966, 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted company size search and destroy operation from LZ 21 to vicinity YA944127 with light enemy contact. Platoon size eagle flights into vicinity YA928060 were conducted; an ambush was established vicinity YA946036. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry occupied blocking positions as follows: A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor vicinity YA833247, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry (-) and A Battery, 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery vicinity YA807082, and C Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry vicinity YA804075.

On 3 April 1966, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry continued platoon and company size search and destroy operations in area 576 with light enemy contact. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry continued platoon and company size search and destroy operations in area 575 with light enemy contact.

On 4 April 1966, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry with B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor attached, conducted search and destroy operations in sector PUNCH to prevent enemy withdrawal or reinforcement. 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry conducted helilift into sector JUDY and conducted search and destroy operations with negative enemy contact.

On 5 and 6 April 1966, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry reinforced and 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry continued search and destroy operations in sectors PUNCH and JUDY, respectively, with light enemy contact.

On 071300H April 1966, 3d Brigade Task Force (-), 25th Infantry Division, terminated its participation in Operation LUNCHEON. 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 35th Infantry were extracted from sectors PUNCH and JUDY to vicinity brigade base of operation (DUC CO) and subsequently transported to brigade base camp and New Pleiku Airfield by helicopter and CV2 aircraft. C Troop, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, B Company, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, and other wheel vehicles moved via Highways 19 and 14 to brigade base camp, with all elements closing approximately 071810 April 1966 with negative enemy contact.

12. Results:

a. Personnel:	<u>KIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>KBA</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>VCS</u>
(1) Frd:	1	22	0			
(2) En:	13	1	0	8	0	9

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b. Equipment losses:

(1) Frd: 1 M43A3 damaged.

(2) En: 50 rounds SA ammo, 2 grenades, misc medical supplies; 20 structures and 7 bunkers destroyed, 2 structures and 5 automatic weapon positions damaged.

13. Administrative Matters:

a. Supply: Accomplished primarily by airlift and was considered adequate. Combat loads, ammunition and weapons carried by assault troops had no adverse effect on the mission.

b. Maintenance: Adequate.

c. Treatment of casualties, evacuation and hospitalization: Excellent.

d. Transportation: Considered adequate; however, additional aircraft would have expedited the extraction of troops and supplies from BAN ERIENG to DUC CO on 31 March 1966. Due to the availability of aircraft the extraction was not completed until 2 April 1966.

e. Communications: Considered adequate; however, initially at DUC CO there was no VHF line to Headquarters, 1st Air Cavalry Division, thereby limiting communications to FM radio.

f. Medical evaluation: Excellent.

14. Special Equipment and Techniques: None.

15. Commanders Analysis: The experience gained by the employment of armor in securing lines of communications and operating in support of infantry search and destroy operations will be invaluable for future similar operations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl  
1 - Overlay 1  
2 - Overlay 2

*Gleason*  
for ELLERY G. KRUEG  
Major, Infantry  
Adjutant

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